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IMPROVING SAFETY AT SMALL UNDERGROUND MINES 
Proceedings: Bureau of Mines Technology Transfer Seminar 
Compiled by Robert H. peters' 
ABSTRACT 
This U.S. Bureau of Mines report identifies the types of serious accidents that occur most frequently 
at small underground coal mines and describes the strategies that could help prevent these accidents. 
A wide variety of methods for improving safety are suggested, including improvements in the design of 
equipment, work procedures, work schedules, safety programs, and emergency response plans, as well 
as techniques for diagnosing the potential hazards associated with new technologies and work pro- 
cedures. Some of the papers in this volume focus on preventing specific types of mining accidents--ones 
associated with materials handling (primarily back injuries), equipment maintenance, improper machine 
guarding, and ground failure during retreat mining. AIthough the recommendations in this volume are 
heavily influenced by research performed at underground coal mines in the Appalachian coalfields, most 
of the papers contain advice that is equally pertinent to almost any type of mine. 
'~esearch psychologist, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
BACKGROUND 
The vast majority of underground coal mines in the 
United States are relatively small operations. Of the 1,345 
U.S. underground coal mines in operation durhg 1992, 
about one-half (638) employed 20 or fewer people and 
about one-third (454) employed between 20 and 50 people. 
The median number of employees was 22. Mines of fewer 
than 50 employees accounted for 26% of total under- 
ground coal production and 28% of the total number of 
hours worked in underground mines. 
Unfortunately, small mines seem to account for far 
more than their share of total fatalities. Although small 
mines (50 or fewer employees) accounted for only about 
28% of the total work force, they accounted for 66% of 
the fatalities that occurred in 1992. These statistics are not 
too different from other recent years. During the period 
1989-91, 58% of the fatalities occurred at mines of fewer 
than 50 employees. 
To assist small mine operators with improving safety, 
the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) is conducting a series 
of technology transfer seminars at multiple locations within 
the four States that contain most of the small underground 
coal mines in the United States-Kentucky, West Virginia, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania. This report was prepared to 
summarize the information presented at these seminars. 
It contains 13 papers on various issues related to safety at 
small underground coal mines. These papers describe a 
wide variety of approaches to improve mine safety: mod- 
ifications to the design of mining equipment, work proce- 
Back injuries are the most frequent type of nonfatal 
injuries at small underground mines. These injuries are a 
major problem for both employers and employees. Back 
injuries are responsible for a great deal of suffering and 
account for from 30% to 40% of worker compensation 
costs at underground coal mines. Miners working in thin- 
seam mines must handle materials and perform other 
duties while iri unusual and somewhat awkward postures, 
resulting in stress to the lower back. Four of the papers 
in this volume address various aspects of miners' back 
injuries and how to prevent them (2-4, 7). 
The major causes of fatalities and serious injuries at 
underground coal mines are basically the same regardless 
of the size of the mine. The recommendations contained 
in this volume are generally just as applicable to large 
mines as they are to small mines. However, because of 
greater limitations on work force and capital, the alter- 
natives for solving certain types of safety problems may be 
more limited for small mines than for larger operations. 
The authors of this volume have been encouraged to con- 
centrate on proposing solutions that would be feasible for 
implementation at most small mining companies. How- 
ever, large mlning operations may be able to solve certain 
types of safety problems via strategies that would not be 
feasible for most small mining operations (e.g., major 
changes in equipment or mining techniques). 
Several hypotheses have been proposed to try to ac- 
count for why fatality rates are so much higher at small 
mines (5, 9). However, there is almost no research evi- 
dence available indicating whether or not any of them are 
dures, and work schedules; development of effective safety valid. Data need to be collected and analyzed to evaluate 
programs and emergency response plans; and techniques the impact of various factors on safety at small mines. 
for diagnosing the potential hazards associated with new The National Academy of Sciences (5) researchers ana- 
technologies and work procedures. Some of the papers lyzed data on a variety of factors that sounded like plau- 
focus on preventing specific types of mining accidents, such sible explanations for the difference between fatality rates 
as back injuries and roof falls. 
Ground control is a particularly important problem at 
small mines. Roof falls are the most frequent cause of 
fatalities at small underground coal mines, accounting for 
over one-half (56%) of all fatal accidents. The Peters and 
Fotta (6)2 analysis of accident statistics indicates that, in 
comparison to large mines (over 50 employees), the rate 
of groundfall fatalities is 10 times higher at mines with 20 
or fewer employees. This volume contains only one paper 
on this topic (1). However, the USBM conducted several 
seminars on preventing groundfall accidents at small mines 
during 1992-93. The eight papers prepared for those 
seminars are published in a proceedings volume-USBM 
Information Circular (IC) 9332 (8). 
2~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this introduction. 
at small mines versus large mines, but found that none of 
them were capable of accounting for the large differences 
that exist. It is clear that small mines differ from large 
mines in several respects (e.g., seam height and longevity 
of operation), but it remains to be determined whether 
these differences are of any significance in explaining why 
small mines have higher fatality rates. 
During the 1980's, there was a substantial decline in the 
number of underground coal mines and in the number of 
jobs for miners in the United States. The number of 
mines in the United States declined by 32% and the 
number of hours employees worked in underground coal 
mines declined by 40%. These dramatic changes have no 
doubt influenced mine safety in various ways. In some 
respects, these changes may have improved miners' safety 
and, in other respects, they may have worsened it. There 
is currently very little in the way of theory or data on 
which to base any predictions or arguments. However, 
future safety researchers and economists may wish to 
explore how mine closures and the threat of job loss 
impact safety and whether the impact varies across mine 
size. 
PLANS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The USBM plans to conduct further analyses of 
existing data to try to determine if there are charac- 
teristics of mines or miners that tend to vary with mine 
size and whether any of these factors are significantly 
related to variations in fatality rates. Very little infor- 
mation is available concerning what small mine operators 
are currently doing to ensure their employees' safety. It is 
very difficult to determine what types of changes are 
needed without having a better picture of what small mine 
operators are currently doing and what kinds of constraints 
and opportunities for improving safety exist at these op- 
erations. Therefore, the USBM plans to conduct struc- 
tured interviews with underground coal miners, mine 
owners, and mine inspectors to find out more about the 
approaches small mine operators are currently using to 
prevent accidents and what the people who work at small 
mines perceive as the obstacles to maintain a safe work- 
place. Once this information has been collected, it will be 
summarized and published, and the USBM will assist, if 
possible, with implementing any recommendations. 
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STATISTICAL PROFILE OF ACCIDENTS AT SMALL 
UNDERGROUND COAL MINES 
By Robert H. peters' and Barbara ~ o t t a *  
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Bureau of Mines prepared this paper to pro- 
vide statistical information on accidents, production, and 
employment at small U.S. underground coal mines. Mines 
are categorized according to size as follows: fewer than 
20 employees, 20 to 50 employees, 50 to 100 employees, 
and more than 100 employees. For each size category, 
statistics are presented showing the following: (1) the 
number of mines and the States in which they are located; 
(2) changes in employment, production, and rates of fatal 
and permanently disabling accidents between two periods 
(1978-80 and 1989-91); and (3) rates of coal production 
and rates of various types of serious accidents. The fiv 
States with the largest number of small underground coi 2 
mines are Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Pennsylvanr; 
and Tennessee. Statistics are presented to show how val 
ous sizes of mines in these 5 States compare with st 
another in terms of safety and productivity. Statistics 
also presented showing how miners who are injured wh- : 
working at mines of various sizes compare in terms of a:: 
and experience. Several propositions about why srn, 
mines have higher fatality rates are reviewed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published 
studies (5-6)3 in 1982 and 1983 examining the relationship 
between the size of underground coal mines and the rate 
of fatal accidents. It found that during the period 1978-80, 
the fatality rate for mines with 50 or fewer employees 
(0.14) was about 3 times that of mines with over 250 em- 
ployees (0.05), and almost twice that of mines with 51 to 
250 employees (0.08). The researchers note: 
This strong correlation between mine size and fa- 
tality rates was evident in all the data from the 
[U.S.] Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA) we examined dating back to 1969. 
Furthermore, the association was not explainable by 
'Research psychologist. 
'Research methodologist. 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
3~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this paper. 
company ownership, union status, seam thickness, :, 
any of the other factors we examined. 
More recent data from MSHA indicate that the -2.: 
crepancy between fatality rates at small versus large nn..: ,, 
has grown even more extreme since the NAS study ,, . 
performed. Tisdale (8) writes: 
In 1992, small underground coal mines, with 
fewer than 20 employees, had a fatal incidence rate 
of about 6 times that of larger mines, and those with 
more than 20 but fewer than 50 eniployees had a 
rate about 4 times that of larger mines. 
The NAS researchers analyzed data on accidents 
underground coal mines during the late 1970's to try A. 
establish which of several factors might be responsible ft 
the fact that fatality rates are so much higher at sS!! 
mines. Their findings are reviewed briefly as fullon. 
Exposure to Face Areas of the Mine.--One potential 
explanation of the association between mine size and 
fatality rates is that in large mines there are proportionally 
more workers away from the working face and therefore 
at reduced risk for a fatality. If this were true, then 
smaller mines would have larger fatality rates even though 
the risks for miners at the working face were the same as 
in larger mines. The NAS researchers allowed for this 
possibility in their analyses (6, pp. 91-93), but found that, 
at best, it could explain only a part of the strong asso- 
ciation between minc size and fatality ratcs. 
Seam 77zick11ess.-The NAS researchers investigated the 
impact that seam height might have on explaining the 
differences between fatality rates at slnall versus large 
mincs. They note that, in general, smaller mines have 
thinner coal seams than larger mines. However, they were 
unable to find any clear relationship between scam thick- 
ness and the fatality rate in small mines. In contrast, 
within each thickness category the fatality rate tends to 
decline with increasing mine size. Therefore, the authors 
concluded that the association between minc size and 
fatality rate is not due to differences between small and 
large mines with respect to seam thickness. However, 
about 78% of mines with 20 or fewer employees and 59% 
of mines with 21 to 50 employees failed to report seam 
heights for the period being studied (1975-80). Such a 
large amount of missing data precluded doing a thorough 
analysis of seam height relative to mine size. Unfortu- 
nately, it is impossiblc to determine thc extent to which 
this lack of data may have influenced the results that were 
reported. 
Dirratio~z ofAcfive 0l~erulion.-The NAS (.5) rcscarchers 
shortly after a mine first opens and thereafter declines- 
i.e., the risk of fatalities decreases over time. Although 
this notion appears plausible, the NAS researchers could 
not find sufficient evidence from their data to support it. 
The NAS findings strongly suggest that various factors 
that sounded like plausible explanations for the difference 
between fatality rates at small versus large mines are 
actually NOT capable of accounting for the large dif- 
ferences that exist. Unfortunately, researchers have yet to 
establish what the factors are that can account for the 
large disparity. The NAS (5) researchers speculate that 
the following factors may have been at least partly 
responsible for the disparity: 
On the basis of our examination of fatality 
reports, discussions with operators of small under- 
ground coal mines, and the experience of the Com- 
mittee's three mining engineers and geologist with 
small mine operations, we believe the following 
factors exacerbate the safety problem in small mines: 
1) The mining equipment in small mines is of 
lower quality, sometimes secondhand, and less well 
maintained. 
2) The physical condition of employees in small 
mines is less favorable to safety--small operators 
sometimes employ workers that large companies will 
not accept. 
3) The financial resources available to operators 
of small mines are limited. Hence many of these 
operators are not able to support the more extensive 
safety programs employed by some major coal com- 
panies (using safety engineers and technicians). 
note that there are striking differences bctwccn small and Statistics on ratcs of fatalities and permanently dis- large mines with respect to the length of time thcy remain 
abling injuries strongly suggest that small mine operators 
open. They note that smaller mines operalc for shorter face some unique obstacles to maintaining their employ- 
periods of time and more intermittently than larger mincs, 
ees, The U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) prepared 
which tend to operate more or less continuously. The paper to update the NAS accident statistics, 
majority (57%) of small mines in their sample were active (2) identify changes that have occurred since 1980, and 
for 18 months or less during 1975-807 compared with only (3) enumerate the ~ r o ~ o s i t i o n s  that have been set forth to 
\ I * L 4% of larger mines. try to account for the differences in the safety performance 
The NAS r t~earchers  hypothesized that Part of the dif- of small versus large mines. The information this paper 
ference between fatality rates at small versus large mines may be useful in arriving at causal explanations 
may reflect a "learning curve" phenomenon. The reasoning and successful interventions aimed at improving miners' 
behind this notion is that the risk of a fatality is greatest safety-especially at small underground coal mines. 
METHODS 
The data presented here are drawn Gom MSHA's information, MSHA requires mines to submit a form 
database of mining production, employment, and accidents (7000-1) that describes each "reportable" accident. Also, 
for the entire population of U.S. underground coal mincs. each working mine must submit quarterly information 
MSHA gathers these data in accordance with Part 30 of about their operations, including production, employee- 
the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. To collect this hours. and mine characteristics on another standard form 
(7000-2). The USBM has access to computerized copies 
of this information for all mine operators from 1975 
through 1991. The USBM does not have access to com- 
puterized data about independent contractors. Independ- 
ent contractor employees have become a more s i d c a n t  
part of the mining work force in the past decade. They 
may perform a wide variety of support functions for mine 
operators, such as hauling coal or constructing various 
facilities on mine property. Consequently, the numbers 
presented here will be slightly smaller than analyses that 
include independent contractors. Also, reporting require- 
ments for contractors are somewhat different from those 
for operators, so the data are not readily comparable. 
The analyses presented here primarily cover the years 
1989 through 1991. At this writing, the 1991 data are the 
most recent available in the USBM's copy of the MSHA 
database. A limitation of the MSHA data is that not all 
of the information on the reporting forms is complete for 
all the mines in the database. For instance, information 
on employment, production, and other variables is some- 
times missing. A total of 2,187 mines met the selection 
criteria of reporting nonzero underground production, or 
reporting a fatality during at least 1 of the 3 years studied. 
(That is, mines that reported zero coal production were 
included in the analyses only if a fatality had occurred at 
that location.) 
The injury data analyses will focus on three types of 
injuries: (1) fatalities (MSHA "Degree of Injury" code I), 
(2) permanently disabling injuries (MSHA "Degree of 
Injury" code 2), and (3) lost-time injuries that caused the 
employee to miss more than 20 days of work (referred to 
as serious injuries). 
Throughout the tables of statistics presented in this 
paper, mines have been stratified according to their size. 
Mines were usually put into one of the following four sue 
categories based on the average number of employees at 
that operation: 1 to 20,21 to 50,51 to 100, and more than 
100. Both the number of employees and the number of 
employee-hours included people who worked (1) under- 
ground, (2) at the surface of underground mines (except 
ofice workers), and (3) in preparation plants at under- 
ground mines. The sue of each mine was usually deter- 
mined by averaging the annual number of employees 
reported by the mine for 1989,1990, and 1991. However, 
there were a couple of exceptions to this procedure: (1) 
All data pertaining to office workers were excluded from 
the analyses because these workers are not normally 
exposed to the types of hazards that other mine employees 
face; (2) mines where a fatality had occurred were placed 
into the mine size category that corresponded to the aver- 
age number of employees the mine reported for the year 
of the fatality as opposed to using the 3-year average. This 
was done to accurately characterize what mines were like 
at the time the fatal accident occurred and also to be con- 
sistent with MSHA's statistics for the number of fatalities 
occurring in mines of a particular size category. 
The NAS researchers considered mines of 50 or fewer 
employees to be "small" mines. This paper follows the 
same convention--the term "small mines" always refers to 
mines of 50 or fewer employees. However, close to half 
of U.S. underground coal mines employ 20 or fewer 
people. Because so many mines are in this category, sta- 
tistics are always reported for each of two separate cate- 
gories of small mines: mines of 20 or fewer employees 
and mines that employ between 20 and 50. Throughout 
this paper, mines that employ 20 or fewer people are 
always referred to as "very small" mines, and mines that 
employ more than 50 people are considered to be "large" 
mines. 
The findings are organized into 10 tables of statistics. 
Each table is discussed below, beginning with a look at the 
number of mines in each size category that are located in 
each State. 
well. Of the 1,217 mines in this size category, 507 (41.7%) 
are located in Kentucky, 298 (24.5%) in West Virginia, 206 
in Virginia, 120 in Pennsylvania, and 53 in Tennessee. 
UNDERGROUND COAL PRODUCTION 
LOCATION OF MINES 
Table 1 breaks down the total number of underground 
coal mines that reported any coal production during 1989- 
91 by State and mine size. Over half of the underground 
coal mines in operation during this time period were 
concentrated in the States of Kentucky and West Virginia, 
with 38.6% and 28.4% of the total number of mines, 
respectively. Virginia accounted for 15.4% of the mines, 
followed by Pennsylvania with 8.3%. Similarly, the major- 
ity of very small mines are concentrated in these States as 
The total amount of coal produced from underground 
mines during 1989-91 is broken down by State and mine 
size in table 2. West Virginia mines produced 29.1% of 
the underground coal mined in the United States, followed 
by Kentucky mines with 24.4%. Other major producers of 
underground coal include Illinois (10.5%), Pennsylvania 
(10.1%), and Virginia (8.9%). Most of this production 
(60.3%) was from mines employing over 100 employees. 
Very small mines accounted for 8.5% of total underground 
coal production, and mines employing from 21 to 50 
employees accounted for 20.2%. Of the coal produced 
by very small mines, 40% came from Kentucky, 30% from 
West Virginia, 20% from Virginia, 3.8% from Pennsyl- 
vania, and 2.7% from Tennessee. 
Table 1 .-Number of underground coal mines stratified 
by State and mine size (number 
of employees) in 1989-91 
Number of employees 
State 1 to 21 to 51 to Over % of 
20 50 100 100 Total U.S. 
total 
Alabama . . . . .  
Colorado . . . . .  
Illinois . . . . . . .  
. . . . .  Kentucky 
Ohio . . . . . . . .  
Pennsylvania . . 
Tennessee . . . .  
Utah , . . . . . . . .  
Virginia . . . . . .  
West Virginia . . 
Other' . . . . . . .  
U.S. total . . .  
% of U.S. 













55.6 31.2 5.7 7.4 NAp 100 
NAp Not applicable. 
'Arkansas, Indiana, lowa, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Wyoming. 
Table 2.-Total underground coal production' stratified by 
State and mine size (number of 
employees) in 1989-91 
Number of employees 
State 1 to 21 to 51 to Over % of 
20 50 100 100 Total U.S. 
total 
CHANGES IN PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT, 
AND INJURY RATES DURING THE 1980's 
Table 3 presents eight different measures of the U.S. 
underground coal mining industry stratified by mine size. 
To be able to see how the industry changed during the 
1980's, statistics are presented that reflect two different 
periods: 1978-80 and 1989-91. Also included in the table 
is the percentage of change over the intervening 8-year 
span for each of the mine characteristics listed. 
1978-80 Statistics 
Several trends relating to mine size are evident for the 
period 1978-80. As mine size increases, the number of 
mines within each size category decreases and the number 
of employee-hours and the amount of production in- 
creases. The productivity rate, however, decreases with 
increasing mine size from 1.69 t/h at very small mines to 
0.98 t/h at mines with 50 or more employees. Both the 
fatality rate and the permanent disability rate decrease 
with increasing mine size. However, the decrease in per- 
manent disability rates (from 0.205 to 0.165 injuries per 
200,000 h) is of a much lower magnitude than the decrease 
in fatality rates (from 0.245 to 0.062). 
1989-91 Statistics 
Trends similar to those observed for 1978-80 are evi- 
dent for this period as well with one notable exception. 
The productivity rate is now highest for mines with 21 to 
50 employees (2.69 t/h), followed by a productivity rate of 
2.46 t/h for mines with 50 or more employees. It is the 
very small mines that now have the lowest productivity 
rate, 2.27 t/h. 
Alabama . . . . .  0.06 0.01 0.33 43.44 43.83 4.0 
Colorado . . . . .  0.76 2.03 4.44 17.70 24.92 '2.3 
Illinois . . . . . . .  0.06 1.88 4.04 109.75 115.70 10.5 
Kentucky . . . . .  37.30 79.89 41.71 108.98 267.88 24.4 
Ohio . . . . . . . .  0.93 1.71 0.23 29.75 32.61 3.0 
Pennsylvania . . 3.57 9.24 13.09 85.26 111.16 10.1 
Tennessee . . . .  2.56 4.37 2.62 1.54 11.09 1.0 
Utah . . . . . . . .  1.62 0.69 10.24 45.60 58.16 5.3 
Virginia . . . . . .  18.34 30.51 15.49 33.82 98.16 8.9 
West Virginia . . 27.98 90.85 24.57 176.35 319.74 29.1 
Other2 . . . . . . .  0.16 0.78 4.40 10.23 15.58 1.4 
U.S.tota1 . . .  93.37 221.94 121.14 662.38 1,098.83 NAp 
% of U.S. 
total . . . . .  8.5 20.2 11.0 60.3 NAp 100.0 
NAp Not applicable. 
'~roduction is in millions of metric tons. To convert to short 
tons, multiply by 1.10232. 
2Arkansas, Indiana, lowa, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Wyoming. 
1978-80 Versus 1989-91 Statistics 
The last three columns in table 3 summarize the data 
aggregated across mine size for the two time periods and 
show the percentage of change from one time period to 
the next. 
Productivi&.-The most significant change is 2 136% in- 
crease in overall productivity. This reflects a 42% increase 
in overall production and a 40% decrease in the overall 
number of employee-hours. Looking across mine size 
categories, the increase in production rate becomes more 
dramatic with increasing mine size, such that for mines 
with more than 50 employees the production rate has 
increased by 152%. 
Number of Mines andAmount of Production.-The total 
number of mines in operation decreased by 32%. The 
largest decrease (51%) was sustained by mines with 50 or 
more employees. Although the number of very small 
mines decreased by 39%, this category still constitutes over 
half (56%) of the total number of mines in operation. 
Conversely, the number of mines with 21 to 50 employees 
has increased by 8% from 631 mines in 1978-80 to 683 
mines in operation during 1989-91. Similarly, this mine 
size category, in contrast to the larger and smaller mine 
sizes, shows a substantial increase in total production and 
number of employee-hours. Production at mines with 21 
to 50 employees has increased 155% compared with an 
increase of only 21% and 29% for very small and large 
mines, respectively. 
Fatalitie,, arld Disabli~lg Irzjl~ries.-During the 1980's, the 
overall fatality rate decreased by 26%. The percentage of 
decrease in fatality rates becomes more pronounced with 
increasing mine size. For mines with more than 50 
employees, the fatality rate has been decreased by almost 
half (43%). For very small mines, the fatality rate has 
ACCIDENT TYPES 
Fatal Accidents4 
Table 4 breaks down the total number of accidents that 
resulted in one or more fa~alities during the period 1987- 
91 by type of accident and mine size. Because fatalities 
are a relatively rare event, a 5-year span was used for this 
table rather than a 3-year span. Increasing the number of 
incidents under consideration helps to mifiimize the im- 
pact of annual fluctuations. Overall, ground fall accidents 
constituted close to half (46.7%) of the total number of 
fatal accidents occurring over this 5-year period. The ma- 
jority (72%) of the 85 fatal ground fall accidents occurred 
in mines with 50 or fewer employees. [See Randolph (7) 
for an analysis of how ground fall accident rates vary ac- 
cording to mine size and various other factors. For some 
ideas about how to prevent ror~f la11 accidents at small 
mines, see USBM Information Circular 9332 (lo).] 
decreased bv 29%. Converselv. the ~ermanent disabilitv 
J J ,  41t is important to note that the accident statistics in tables 4 and 5 
rate increased for a11 three mine size categories the do not fatalities erperienced by independent contractors. If in- 1980's. The increases ranged Irom lor the dependent contractor fatalities were included, the trends might appear 
mines to 30% for mines in the 21- to 5~-employee cate- different. For  example, powered haulage accidents are  one of the most 
- - 
gory. Overall, the increase was 20%. This increase is common causes of fatalities to independent contractors, but ground falls 
somewhat unexpected, and the reasons for it are not clear. are 
Table 3.-Number of operations, employee hours, production, and rates of fatalities and permanently disabling injuries 
during two 3-year periods stratified by mine size (number of employees) 
Number of emplovees 
1 to 20 21 to 50 Over 50 Total or overall rate 
1978- 1989- % 1978- 1989- % 1978- 1989- % 1978- 1989- % 
80 91 change 80 91 change 80 91 change 80 91 change 
Number of 
operations . . . . . . . . 
~rnplo~ee-hours1 . . . . 
Production2 . . . . . . . . 
Productivit? . . . . . . . . 
Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . 
Fatality rate4 . . . . . . . . 
Permanent 
disabilities5 . . . . . . . 
Permanent disability 
rate4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
l~mployee-hours are in millions of hours. 
2~roduction is in millions of metric tons. To convert to short tons, multiply by 1.10232. 
3~umber  of metric tons per employee-hour. 
4 ~ e r  200,000 employee-hours of exposure. 
51ncludes all total and partial permanently disabling injuries except inguinal hernias that are repaired and losses of teeth or the tips of 
toes and fingers. 
Table 4.-Number of accidents resulting in one or more 
fatalities at an underground coal mine stratified 
by type of accident and mine size (number 
of employees) in 1987-91 
Number of employees 
Accident type 1 to 21 to 51 to Over Total % of 
20 50 1 100 total 
Ground fall . . . . . . . .  33 28 6 18 85 46.7 
Powered haulage . . .  7 11 5 14 37 20.3 
Machinery . . . . . . . .  1 7 4 11 23 12.6 
. . . . . . . . .  Electrical 5 3 3 6 17 9.3 
Explosives . . . . . . . .  3 1 1 0 5 2.7 
Other . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 4 0 6 15 8.2 
Total . . . . . . . . . .  54 54 19 55 182 NAp 
%oftotal . . . . .  29.7 29.7 10.4 30.2 NAp 100 
NAp Not applicable. 
The next most frequent type of fatal mining accidents 
are those associated with powered haulage equipment. 
MSHA7s accident classification scheme considers powered 
haulage accidents fr: Le those that are "... caused by the 
motion of the haulage unit, e.g., motors and rail cars, con- 
veyors, shuttle cars, haulage trucks, front-end loaders, etc. 
Also includes any accidents caused by a moving part of the 
haulage unit." Fatal powered haulage accidents are almost 
evenly split between mines with over 50 employees versus 
mines with 50 or fewer employees. Further statistics on 
powered haulage accidents may be found in the Holmes 
Safety Association Bulletin (4). 
Of the 182 zccidents causing 1 or more fatalities, 54 oc- 
curred at mines with 1 to 20 employees, another 54 oc- 
curred at mines with 21 to 50 employees, 19 occurred at 
mines with 51 to 100 employees, and 55 occurred at mines 
employing over 100 people. Thus, a sizeable number of 
fatal accidents have occurred at both large and small 
underground coal mines. 
It is interesting to note that the NAS (5) researchers 
found that the distribution of types of accidents causing 
fatalities did NOT vary much across mine size. They con- 
clude that- 
This indicates that the larger fatality rate in small 
mines is not the result of an increase in a specific 
type of accident (e.g., roof falls). Rather, the data 
indicated that smaller mines are more likely than 
larger mines to have fatalities from each of the 
major types of accidents. This would suggest that 
the problem in small mines is not isolated to a spe- 
cific work activity (such as roof bolting), but is pres- 
ent in all aspects of the mining effort. 
Based on analysis of more recent data, this conclusion 
no longer appears true. Table 5 shows rates of fatal ac- 
cidents stratified by accident type and mine size during 
1987-91. In comparing the rate of various types of ac- 
cidents at mines of 20 or fewer employees versus mines of 
50 and over, one sees that the rate of fatalities is greater 
at very small mines for each major accident type (except 
machinery). This is in line with what the NAS researchers 
found. However, looking down the last column of table 5, 
one sees that the magnitude of the difference between 
rates of various types of fatal accidents at very small versus 
large mines varies quite a bit from one type of accident to 
the next. In particular, the rate of fatal ground fall ac- 
cidents is 10.7 times greater at very small mines than it is 
at mines with over 50 employees. The corresponding 
ratios for fatal powered haulage, machinery, and electrical 
accidents are 2.9, 0.5, and 4.4, respectively. Thus, there is 
a much bigger disparity between fatal ground fall accident 
rates at very small versus large mines than there is for 
rates of other types of fatal accidents. 
Table 5.4ates1 of fatal accidents stratified by accident type 
and mine size (number of employees) in 1987-91 
Accident type Mine size 
1 to 20 21 to 50 Over 50 Fhtio2 
Ground fall . . . . . . . . .  0.0965 0.0418 0.0089 10.8 
Electrical . . . . . . . . . .  0.0146 0.0045 0.0033 4.4 
Machinery . . . . . . . . .  0.0029 0.0104 0.0056 0.5 
Powered haulage . . . .  0.0205 0.0164 0.0071 2.9 
'per 200,000 employee-hours of exposure. 
2Ratio of rate for 1 to 20 employees to rate of over 50 employees. 
Serious Injuries 
Table 6 breaks down the total number of serious in- 
juries during 1989-91 by type of accident and mine size. 
In this table, serious injuries are considered to be any 
nonfatal injury that caused a permanent disability or that 
resulted in more than 20 days of lost work. The last two 
columns in table 6 list the numbers and rates of the vari- 
ous types of accidents that were reported by all the mines 
over this 3-year period. Overall, "handling material" ac- 
cidents occurred at the highest rate (1.97), accounting for 
36.4% of all serious injuries. The next highest rate was for 
"slip or fall" accidents (0.89), which accounted for 16.4% 
of all serious injuries. Together, these two accident types 
accounted for over half of the serious injuries reported 
over this 3-year period. For some ideas about how to pre- 
vent handling material accidents in coal mines, see Unger 
(9), Gallagher (2), Conway (I), and Hamrick (3). 
A few trends are evident when looking at variations 
in the rate of specific types of accidents across mine size 
categories. It appears that rates of serious handling ma- 
terial accidents increase as mines get bigger. The rate of 
handling material accidents ranges from 1.42 at very small 
mines to 2.05 for mines with over 100 employees. Where- 
as handling material accidents account for 28% of all 
serious injuries at very small mines, they account for 38% 
of all serious injuries at mines of over 100 employees. 
Similarly, the trend is for serious injuries caused by slips 
or falls to occur at a higher rate as mine size increases. 
At mines of over 100 employees, the rate is over twice as 
high as at very small mines (1.11 versus 0.47). 
Table 6.-Number and rates1 of serious injuries2 stratified by accldent type and mlne slze (number of employees) In  1989-91 
Number of employees 
Accident type 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Handling material 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Slip or fall 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Machinery 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Powered haulage 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Ground fall 
Hand tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . .  Stepping or kneeling 
. . . . . . . . .  Striking or bumping 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Electrical 
Other2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. - 
1 to20 21 to 50 51 to 100 Over 100 Overall 
lnjuries Rate lnjuries Rate lnjuries Rate Injuries Rate Total rate 
292 1.42 805 1.95 478 2.03 2,787 2.05 4,362 1.97 
96 0.47 230 0.56 140 0.60 1,502 1.11 1,968 0.89 
21 1 1.02 422 1.02 207 0.88 782 0.58 1,622 0.73 
227 1.10 427 1.04 178 0.76 746 0.55 1,578 0.71 
97 0.47 220 0.53 92 0.39 493 0.36 902 0.41 
51 0.25 91 0.22 64 0.27 462 0.34 668 0.30 
20 0.10 49 0.12 28 0.12 153 0.11 250 0.1 1 
7 0.03 10 0.02 5 0.02 132 0.10 154 0.07 
9 0.04 30 0.07 14 0.06 43 0.03 96 0.04 
29 0.14 53 0.13 38 0.16 271 0.20 391 0.18 
Total . . . . . . . . . . .  1,039 5.04 2,337 5.67 1,244 5.29 7,371 5.42 11,991 5.42 
'per 200,000 employee-hours of exposure. 
2~erious injuries include those classified as permanently disabling and those that caused the employee to miss more than 20 days of 
work. 
Machinery accidents are the third most common type of 
accident resulting in serious injuries. They account for 
13.5% of the total and occur at a rate of 0.73. Powered 
haulage accidents, with a rate of 0.71, account for 13.2% 
of the serious injuries reported by underground coal 
mines. In contrast to the previously noted trends across 
mine size categories, the trend is for serious powered 
haulage and machinery accidents to occur at successively 
lower rates as mine size increases. From the smallest to 
the largest mine size category, the rates for both categories 
of accidents decrease by about half. 
Other differences relative to mine size include a slight 
decrease in the rate of serious ground fall accidents with 
increasing mine size (from 0.47 to 0.36), and a slight 
increase in the rate of serious hand tool accidents with 
increasing mine size (from 0.25 to 0.34). 
FATALIlT AND INJURY RATES 
FOR SELECTED STATES 
Table 7 displays rates of fatalities, permanent dis- 
abilities, and serious injuries (injur~es resulting in more 
than 20 lost workdays), stra1ifit;d by State and mine sue 
for 1989-91. The tablc is limited to only those States with 
at least 50 very small underground mines. The "overall" 
rates listed at the bottom of the table, however, include 
fatalities and injuries in underground coal mines from all 
States. Data are not given for Tcnnessee mines in the two 
largest size categories because of the extremely small 
number of large mines in Tennessee. 
Fatality Rates.-As noted previously, looking across mine 
size categories, the overall fatality rate is highest for mines 
with 20 or fewer employees, then drops suddenly by almost 
half for mines with 21 to 50 employees, and drops by half 
again for mines with more than 50 employees. For the 
most part, this trend of decreasing fatality rates with in- 
creasing mine size is evident within each of the five States. 
The major exception to this overall pattern occurs in 
Virginia where the fatality rate for mines with 21 to 50 
employees is slightly higher than that for the smaller 
mines. The last column in table 7 shows the overall fatal- 
ity rates for each of the five States. They range from 0.015 
for Pennsylvania to 0.114 for Kentucky. Of the five States, 
West Virginia and Kentucky have the highest fatality rates 
for very small mines, 0.223 and 0.180, respectively. It is 
interesting that these also happen to be the two States with 
the largest number of small mines. 
Permanent Disability Rates.-The trends observed in 
fatality rates relative to mine size are not as clear and pro- 
nounced in the permanent disability rates. For example, 
although the overall fatality rate for very small mines 
(0.175) is five times as great as the fatality rate for very 
large mines (0.033), the overall permanent disability rate 
for very small mines (0.228) is only 1.2 times as great as 
that for the largest mines (0.183). Mines in the 51- to 100- 
employee category actually have the highest overall rate of 
permanent disabilities (0.238). 
Serious Injury Rates.-Again, the clear trend that was 
observed in fatality rates relative to mine sue  is not pres- 
ent in the overall serious injury rates. The overall serious 
injury rates for very small mines (4.82) is actually less than 
that for the largest mines (5.24). 
Other Trendr.-Looking down the last column at the 
overall rates across States, one sees that the three meas- 
ures of safety for Pennsylvania mines lead to conflicting 
conclusions. Although Pennsylvania had the lowest fatality 
rate among the five States, it had the second highest per- 
manent disability rate (0.236) and the highest serious in- 
jury rate (6.81). 
Looking across mine size categories within States, a 
few trends are apparent. In Pennsylvania, both the perma- 
nent disability and serious injury rates increase with in- 
creasing mine sue, a twofold to threefold increase from 
the smallest to the largest mine size category. Conversely, 
in Virginia, the serious injury rate decreases with increas- 
ing mine size, from 6.43 to 5.03, a 22% decrease from the 
smallest to the largest mine sizes. 
Table 7.-FIates1 of fatalities, permanent disabilities, 
and serious injuries2 stratified by State and mine 
size (number of employees) in 1989-91 
Number of employees 
State and rate 1 to 21 to 51 to Over Overall 
20 50 100 100 rate 
Kentucky: 
Fatality . . . . . . . . . .  0.180 0.100 0.094 0.105 0.114 
Permanent disability 0.252 0.288 0.216 0.1 77 0.227 
Serious injury . . . . . . 4.36 5.36 4.97 4.50 4.79 
Pennsylvania: 
Fatality . . . . . . . . . .  0.156 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.015 
Permanent disability 0.078 0.1 55 0.199 0.259 0.236 
Serious injury . . . . . . 3.05 4.82 6.46 7.30 6.81 
Tennessee: 
Fatality . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 12 0.073 Neg. Neg. 0.058 
Permanent disability 0.224 0.366 Neg. Neg. 0.259 
Serious injury . . . . . . 4.60 4.46 Neg. Neg. 3.97 
Virginia: 
Fatality . . . . . . . . . .  0.122 0.166 0.050 0.013 0.084 
Permanent disability 0.171 0.1 81 0.250 0.139 0.177 
Serious injury . . . . . . 6.43 5.89 5.85 5.03 5.68 
West Virginia: 
Fatality . . . . . . . . . .  0.223 0.066 0.021 0.015 0.047 
Permanent disability 0.241 0.173 0.338 0.146 0.1 76 
Serious injury. . . . . . 4.88 5.65 5.04 4.66 4.96 
Total: 
Fatality . . . . . . . . . . 0.175 0.097 0.047 0.033 0.060 
Permanent disability 0.228 0.221 0.238 0.1 83 0.200 
Serious injury. . . . . . 4.82 5.45 5.05 5.24 5.22 
Neg. Negligible. Data are not reported because the number 
of mining operations in this category was extremely small. 
'per 200,000 employee-hours of exposure. 
21njuries, other than those classified as permanently disabling, 
which caused the employee to miss more than 20 days of work. 
EMPLOYEE-HOURS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Table 8 displays total employee-hours and productivity 
during 1989-91 for each of the five States where the ma- 
jority of small mines are located, broken down by mine 
size. Across the five States, productivity ranges from 
1.60 t/h for Tennessee to 2.69 t/h for West Virginia. 
Across the different categories of mine size, productivity 
ranges from 2.27 t/h for very small mines to 2.69 t/h for 
mines with 21 to 50 employees. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SERIOUSLY 
INJURED MINERS 
Table 9 displays the mean age of seriously injured 
miners during 1989-91, as well as the number of years 
of experience they had (1) working at their current mine, 
(2) working in their current job classification, and 
(3) working as a coal miner. The overall means as well as 
the means for four mine size categories are presented. 
The means for each of the four victim characteristics 
steadily increases as mine size increases. The mean for 
"experience at mine" displays the most dramatic increase, 
from 1.95 for very small mines to 11.0 for mines with over 
100 employees. This may largely reflect the fact that most 
small mines do not remain open for nearly as long as large 
mines. It may also reflect a tendency for younger, less 
experienced miners to be hired by small mines rather than 
large mines, and that when larger mines have had to lay 
off workers during the 1980's, it was the younger miners 
who lost their jobs. 
Table 8.-Total employee hours' and productivityZ stratified 
by State and by mine size (number 
of employees) in 1989-91 
-- 
Number of employees 
State and variable 1 to 21 to 51 to Over Total or 
20 50 100 100 overall 
rate 
Kentucky: 
Employee-hours 16.646 29.876 14.835 41.926 103.282 
Productivity . . . 2.24 2.68 2.81 2.60 2.59 
Pennsylvania: 
Employee-hours 2.557 3.860 6.041 39.344 51.803 
Productivity . . . 1.40 2.39 2.17 2.17 2.15 
Tennessee: 
Employee-hours 1.782 2.734 1.254 1.177 6.946 
Productivity . . . 1.43 1.60 Neg. Neg. 1.60 
Virginia: 
Employee-hours 8.21 1 13.274 8.006 15.826 45.317 
Productivity . . .  2.23 2.30 1.93 2.14 2.17 
West Virginia: 
Employee-hours 10.787 30.1 13 9.479 68.61 7 1 18.996 
Productivity . . . 2.59 3.02 2.59 2.56 2.69 
Total or overall rate: 
Employee-hours 41.203 82.383 47.025 271.820 442.431 
Productivity . . . 2.27 2.69 2.58 2.44 2.49 
Neg. Negligible. Data are not reported because the number 
of mining operations in this category was extremely small. 
 ours are in millions. 
2~umbe r  of metric tons per employee-hour. 
Table 9.-Mean age and experience of seriously injured1 
miners stratified by mine size (number 
of employees) i n  1989-91 
Number of employees 
Victim characteristic 1 to 21 to 51 to Over Overall 
20 50 100 100 
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32.3 34.0 36.7 40.3 38.0 
Experience at mine . . . 1.95 2.6 5.3 11.0 8.0 
Experienceinjob . . . . .  5.6 5.8 6.0 6.7 6.1 
Total mining experience 12.1 13.0 13.4 14.9 14.2 
'serious injuries include those classified as permanently dis- 
abling and those that caused the employee to miss more than 
20 days of work. 
It is interesting to note that the age distribution of 
miners at various sizes of mines appears to have changed 
since the NAS (6) study was conducted. The NAS re- 
searchers reported finding no age differences relative to 
mine size. However, the present data show a difference of 
8 years between the average age of injured miners at small 
mines (32.3) versus large mines (40.3). (A note of caution: 
One must keep in mind that the ages of injured miners 
may not necessarily correspond to the ages of all miners 
in the work force.) 
MINE-LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data on mining accidents, employment, and production 
can be aggregated or grouped at various levels of analysis. 
Throughout the tables of statistics discussed thus far, the 
data have NOT been based on mine-level analyses. The 
data from all mines that fell within a specified size cate- 
gory were aggregated or pooled together in the calculation 
of statistics. For instance, accident rates have been cal- 
culated by adding together all the accidents that occurred 
throughout all the mines in a particular size category, 
dividing this number by the sum of all the employee-hours 
worked throughout those same mines and then multiplying 
by 200,000. 
However, in table 10 the statistics are based on data 
aggregated at the mine level of analysis. In this procedure, 
the first step is to calculate an accident rate for each mine. 
The mean accident rate for mines in a particular size 
category is then computed by finding the average of the 
rates for each of the mines in that size category. An 
important feature of using the mine level of analysis is 
that each mine is treated as a single data point and given 
the same weight as any other mine. An advantage of this 
procedure is that it allows one to see the variation that 
exists among the mines in a particular size category. Ta- 
ble 10 presents mine-level descriptive statistics for produc- 
tivity, seam height, and rate of serious and fatal accidents 
during 1989-91. 
Productivity.-Statistics arc: reported for all underground 
coal mines as well as for each of four mine size categories. 
The differences in the figurcs for mean mine-level produc- 
tivity bctwecn different mine size categories correspond 
fairly closely to what was reported in table 3. The smallest 
mines have the lowest mean productivity rate (2.07), and 
mines in the 21- to 50-employee category have the highest 
productivity (2.66). 
Seam Heig1lt.-As was reported in the NAS (5) study, 
there is still a clear trend toward larger mines operating 
in higher coal seams. The overall median seam height is 
109 cm (33 in). The median for the category of very small 
mines is 102 cm (40 in). As mine size increases, the 
median seam height steadily increases, such that mines 
with over 100 employees have a median seam height of 
168 cm (66 in). 
Rate of Fatalities and Serious Injuries.-Looking at the 
mean and median rate of fatalities and serious injuries 
across mine size categories, there appear to be no clear 
trends. However, the standard deviations (std dev) show 
a decreasing trend with increasing mine size. The dif- 
ference between the largest mines (std dev = 3.16) and 
the smallest mines (std dev = 17.10) is particularly dra- 
matic and is further reflected in the differences between 
the medians for these two categories. The median of 0.00 
for mines with 20 or fewer employees indicates that at 
least 50% of the mines in this size category reported zero 
serious injuries or fatalities for the period 1989-91 even 
though the average number of such incidents reported for 
these small mines is almost 6. 
In contrast, for mines with more than 100 employees, at 
least 50% of these mines reported almost 5 fatalities or 
serious injuries and the average number reported is 5.71. 
With regard to this particular characteristic, smaller mines 
look very different from one another relative to the homo- 
geneity exhibited by larger mines. 
Table 10.-Mine-level descrlptive statistics for productivity, 
seam height, and rate of fatalities and serlous 
lnjurlesl stratified by mine slze (number 
of employees) In 1989-91 
Mine characteristic Number of employees 
and rate 1 to 21 to 51 to Over Overall 
20 50 100 100 
~roductivity:~ 
Median . . . . . . . . . . .  1.92 2.46 2.54 2.30 2.15 
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.07 2.66 2.60 2.49 2.31 
Stddev . . . . . . . . . . .  1.34 1.24 1.05 1.07 1.31 
Seam height:3 
Median . . . . . . . . . . .  102 117 135 168 109 
(40) (46) (53) (66) (43) 
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . .  112 127 145 180 124 
(44) (50) (57) (71) (49) 
Std dev . . . . . . . . . . . 43 46 46 53 51 
(17) (18) (18) (21) (20) 
Rate of fatalities and 
serious injuries:' 
Median . . . . . . . . . . .  0.00 4.82 4.69 4.92 3.21 
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.57 6.20 5.25 5.71 5.76 
Std dev . . . . . . . . . . . 17.10 6.30 3.24 3.16 13.28 
Std dev Standard deviation. 
'serious injuries include those classified as permanently dis- 
abling and those that caused the employee to miss more than 
20 days of work. 
2~umber of metric tons per employee-hour. 
3~entimeters (numbers in parentheses are in inches). The U.S. 
mining industry refers to seam height in terms of inches. 
4 ~ e r  200,000 employee-hours of exposure. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It was found that fatality rates decline substantially 
as mine size increases. The fatality rate is 0.175 deaths 
pcr 200,000 h for mines with 20 or fewer employees. The 
rate drops by almost half for mines with 21 to 50 employ- 
ees, and drops by half again for mines with more than 
50 employees. Likewise, rates of permanently disabling 
ilijuries declice as mine size increases. However, there is 
no clear-cut trend in the relationship of mine size to the 
rate of other types of serious accidents-ones that cause 
the employee to miss more than 20 days of work. The 
rate of serious accidcnts is lowest for mines that employ 
1 to 20 employees, highest among mlnes that employ 21 to 
50 people, and intermediate for mines that employ more 
than 50 people. 
Fatality rates are currently substantially lower than they 
were in the late 1970's. Although fatality rates decreased 
during the 1980's for each mine size category, the per- 
centage of decrease was lowest among the smallest size 
mines and highest among the largest size mines. In look- 
ing at the differences between rates of various types of 
fatal accidents at small versus large mines, it appears that 
ground fall accidents are a particularly important problem 
for small mines. The rate of fatal ground fall accidents is 
over 10 times greater at mines with 20 or fewer employees 
than it is at mines with over 50 employees. 
Several trends become evident when looking at differ- 
ences in the rates of specific categories of serious accidents 
across mine size categories (see table 6). In particular, the 
rates of accidents classified as "handling materials" and 
"slips or falls" increase with increasing mine size. Con- 
versely, rates for accidents classified as "machinery" and 
"powered haulage" decrease with increasing mine size. 
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PILLAR DESIGN AND STRATEGIES FOR RETREAT MINING 
By Frank E. chase '  and Christopher   ark* 
ABSTRACT 
One of the keys to miner safety and an efficient re- Mines is in the process of field testing and refining a "user 
covery of the reserves is to design sufficiently sized pro- friendly" computer program called Analysis of Retreat 
duction pillars that will prevent pillar squeezes, excessive Mining Pillar Stability (AKMPS) to estimate abutment 
pillar spalling, severe floor heave, roof falls, and pillar pressures developed during pillaring. Analyses of 68 pillar 
bumps. Currently, few mine operators design sections that design case histories using the ARMPS program indicate 
will be retreat mined using empirical formulas or numer- that it can be successfully employed to predict pillar line 
ical models that estimate abutment pressures generated stability during retreat mining operations. 
by adjacent mined-out workings. The U.S. Bureau of 
INTRODUCTION 
Use of remote-control miners, extended-cut waivers 
up to 12 m (40 ft), and mobile roof supports have enabled 
room-and-pillar retreat mining (also referred to as pil- 
laring, robbing, and second mining) to be competitive with 
longwall mining. While longwall mining can claim an ad- 
mirable safety record (12); the same cannot be said of 
retreat mining. During the period between 1989 and 1993, 
29% of the roof fall fatalities occurred on retreat mining 
sections. One of the most hazardous underground oper- 
ations during retreat or any other type of mining is the 
removal of the push-out stump. Over a recent 10 year 
period, 10% of the fatalities resulting from roof or rib falls 
occurred during the removal of the push-out stump (11). 
Roof fall accidents are not the only problem associated 
with retreat mining. Each year, considerable amounts of 
coal are lost because of squeezes, heave, pillar line roof 
falls, and pi!lar bumps. Yet few empirical formulas or nu- 
merical models are available that can estimate abutment 
pressures that develop when gob areas are created dur- 
ing pillar extraction. As part of its goal to reduce injuries 
and fatalities. the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) is field 
testing and refining a method called Analysis of Retreat 
Mining Pillar Stability (ARMPS) to aid in the design of 
pillar retreat sections. This payer presents the findings 
thus far. 
ARMPS METHOD 
The ARMPS formula is based on the Analysis of Long- longwall pillar design (8-9). The ALPS method was orig- 
wall Pillar Stability (ALPS) method that is widely used for inally developed from measurements of abutment loads in 
five longwalls and later validated by back analysis of more 
than 100 longwall mining case histbries. To be useful for 
' ~ e o l o ~ i s t .  
%lining engineer.  pillar retreat mining, the ALPS method had to be modified 
Pi t tsh l rgh Research Center, U . S .  Bureauof Mines, Pi  t t sh rgh ,  PA. fOT t h e  different ... extraction geometries that are created 
3 ~ t a ~ i c  m tms  i n  pmtheses refer to itm i n  tfie l i s t  of r e f e w  during pillar extraction. 
a t  t he  end o f  t h i s  paper. 
The goal of the ARMPS method is to help ensure that more representative of conditions than an SF calculated 
the pillars developed for eventual extraction (production for individual pillars. 
pillars) are of adequate size for all anticipated loading The load-bearing capacity of thc AMZ is calculated as 
conditions. The most severe loadings usually develop on the sum of the load-bearing capacities of the pillars within 
the extraction front (or pillar line), particularly whcre it. The strength of an individual pillar (SP) is dctcrmined 
older gob areas from previously extracted panels are using the Bieniawski forinula (3): 
nearby. The ARMPS method determines a stability factor 
(SF) as- SP = S1 [0.63 t (0.36 w/h)], (2) 
S F  = LBC/LT, (1) where S1 = in situ coal strength [assumed value 
= 6.2 MPa (900 psi)], 
where LBC = estimated load-bearing capacity of pil- 
lars within active mining zonc (AMZ) w = pills wiclt11, 
and LT = estimated load applied to pillars within and h = pillar height. 
AMZ. 
Longwall studies have indicat~ci hat 6.2 MPa (900 psi) 
The AMZ is defined as being the width of the extraction is normally the appropriate value for S, for use in this 
front and three pillars deep (fig. 1). formula (8), and this value was used in all the case history 
Studies of longwall gate entries have indicated that analyses discussed. Current indications are that both coal 
three rows of pillars typically behave as a single system strength and floor strength may be more important during 
and that an S F  calculated for the system as a whole is pillar retreat than they are in longwall operations. 
I-- GL - I  AMZ -I 
KEY 
AMZ Active mining zone H Depth of cover 
6 Abutment angle LA Abutment load 
EFW Extraction front width LD Development load 
GL Mined-out area 
Figure 1 .-Schematic of active mining zone. 
The loading applied to the AMZ (fig. 1) is the sum of- 
* Development loading present before pillar retreat 
and 
Abutment loads created by load transfers from adja- 
cent gobbed-out areas. 
The development load (LD) is estimated using the tribu- 
tary area formula- 
LD = (H) (7) (AT), 
where H = depth of cover, 
7 = unit weight of overburden, 
The abutment angle value is dependent upon the caving 
conditions in the mined-out area. Three possible caving 
conditions have been found to occur. If good caving has 
developed in the gob areas and few stumps have been left, 
then the abutment angle is assumed to be the same as that 
used for longwall mining, or 21". At the other extreme, if 
few stumps have been left, but caving has not occurred in 
the gob, then B = 90". A third case arises when caving 
has not occurred and significant remnant pillars (fenders 
or stumps) have been left in the gob. In the later case, it 
is assumed that the remnant pillars have yielded and their 
strength is assumed to be 50% of that calculated from 
equation 2. Then B is adjusted so that the remnant pillars 
carry only the load they are capable of and the remainder 
is transferred. 
and AT = total area of AMZ. In its current form, the program can analyze four 
loading configurations, as illustrated in figure 2. The 
Abutment loads (LA'S) are determined using either equa- simplest-loading condition 1-is development loading only. 
tion 4 or equation 5, depending on the length of the Loading condition 2 occurs where a panel is being fully 
mined-out area (GL): retreated and no other mined-out areas are nearby. The 
total applied load is the sum of the development loads 
When GL 2 2  (H tan B), and the front abutment load. Loading condition 3 occurs 
where the AMZ is surrounded on two sides by mined-out 
LA = H~ (tan B) (712) (EFW), (4) areas and the pillars are subjected to development, side 
abutment, and front abutment loads. When the pillar line 
and when GL < 2 (H tan B), is surrounded by gob on three sides (sometimes referred 
to as bottleneckgg), an additional kde-abutment load 
[(H)(GL) - a2 ] results and loading condition 4 is produced. LA = 
2 8 tan B (7) (5) Unfortunately, the irregular mining geometries that 
sometimes occur in practice can be difficult to categorize 
where B = abutment angle into one of these four loading conditions. Efforts are cur- 
rently underway to expand the number of available loading 
and EFW = extraction front width. configurations with numerical modeling. 
VERIFICATION OF ARMPS METHOD 
Design criteria have been established for the ARMPS 3. Severe sloughage. 
method through back analysis of 68 case historics of pil- 4. Exccssivc heave. 
lar design from 10 different States. The case histories 5. Numerous roof falls. 
were obtained from mine visits and from the literature. 6. Coal pillar bump. 
Case histories cover an extensive range of geographic lo- 
cations, roof rock cavability characteristics, extraction Case history loading conditions were categorized as 
methods, and loading conditions. In addition, overburden being successful abutment loading, unsuccessful abutment 
thicknesses ranged from 53 to 591 m (175 to 1,938 ft), loading, and unsuccessful development loading. Figure 3 
coalbed heights ranged from 0.9 to 3.4 m (2.8 to 11 ft), clearly suggests that many failures, but few successes, have 
and pillar width-to-height ratios varied from 1.0 to 11.1. resulted when designs with ARMPS SF'S of less than 0.75 
Each case history was categorized as being either suc- were employed. Between SF'S of 0.75 and 1.50, there 
cessful or unsuccessful. Unsuccessful cases (table 1) were seems to be a "middle ground," where both successful and 
deemed as being such because one or more of the follow- unsuccessful cases arefound. Based on figure 3, failure 
ing unfavorable conditions occurred: is unlikely when an ARMPS SF of 1.5 is employed. 
Bieniawski also recommends an SF of 1.5 for short-term 
1. Squeezes. pillars subjected to development loads only (3). 
2. Massive pillar failure and resultant airblast. 
Loading cond i t ion  1 Loading condi t ion 2 
Loading condi t ion 3 Loading cond i t ion  4 
Figure 2.-Retreat mining loading configurations. 
Table 1.-4RMPS values for unsuccessful pillar design case histories 







Pillar squeeze caused panel to be abandoned. 
Squeeze conditions caused 20 pillars 21 by 
21 m (70 by 70 ft) to be lost. 
Arblast generated by sudden collapse of 204 
Alabama . . .  Blue Creek . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mine visit . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
Colorado . . .  Cameo " B  . . . . . . .  Abel (1) . . . . . . . .  
by 402-m (670 by 1,320 ft) of 3 by 24 m (10- 
by 80-ft) fenders. 
Roof falls, 56 cm (22 in) of floor heave, and 
severe sloughage. 
Inability to break roof caused excessive pillar 
spalling and heave. 
Coal pillar bump fatally injured roof bolter 
operator. 
Squeeze conditions caused 14 rows of pillars 
to be lost. Most of main entries were closed 
entirely. 
Extensive pillar line heave, sloughage, and roof 
falls caused 9 rows of pillar to be lost. 
Squeeze conditions caused 10 rows of pillar to 
be lost. Numerous roof falls and continuous 
miner was buried. 
Severe pillar line weighting. Scores of fenders 
were lost after pillar splits. 
Squeeze conditions caused numerous pillars to 
be lost. 
152 m (500 ft) of pillars were lost in 3 days. 
Large-scale squeeze 1,600 ft outby pillar line. 
Squeeze conditions essentially closed 671 m 
(2,200 ft) of main entries. 
Section and barrier pillar abandoned because 
of squeeze conditions. 
Section abandoned because of violent coal 
pillar bump. 
Excessive roof slaking and subsequent bump 
due to idle pillar line. 
Numerous coal pillar bumps. 274- by 396-m 
(W by 1,300-ft) area of pillars was aban- 
doned because of squeeze. 
Continuous miner was buried for 2 weeks. 
Crushed out cribs due to 0.9 to 1.2 m (3 to 
4 ft) of heave. 
Coal pillar bump during pillar split fractured 
roof bolter operator's leg. 
Squeeze that occurred in partially pillared 
workings caused 2 rows of 12- by 15-m (40- 
by 50-ft) pillars with SF of 1.37 to be lost. 
Arblast generated by approximately 100 fend- 
ers collapsing blew out 26 cinder-block stop- 
pings and fan-house weak wall. 1 miner was 
injured. 
10 rows of 12- by 12-m (40- by 40-ft) pillars 
were lost because of squeeze conditions. 
Dangerous pillar sloughage caused scores of 
pillar to be lost. Barrier pillar was also lost. 
Arblast generated by massive pillar failure 
blew out 38 stoppings. 
Massive pillar failure, pillar squeeze, and 
severe spalling. 
Do. 
After losing several rows of pillars because of 
squeeze conditions, section was abandoned 
for fear of losing bleeders. 
Illinois . . . . .  Herrin No. 6 . . . . . .  
Kentucky . . .  Coalburg . . . . . . . .  
Harlan . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Chugh (6) . . . . . .  
Unrug (16) . . . . . .  
Mine visit . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
Hazard No. 4 . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
Wallins . . . . . . . . . .  
Ohio . . . . . .  Pittsburgh . . . . . . .  
Pennsylvania . .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Tennessee . .  Beech Grove . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Utah . . . . . .  Gilson . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Virginia . . . .  Pocahontas No. 3 . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
Artler (2) . . . . . . . .  
Mishra (10) . . . . . .  
Mine visit . . . . . . .  
. .  do..  . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do.. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . .  Campoli (4) 
. . . . . . . . .  West Virginia Beckley Mine visit . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Coal burg . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . .  . .  do. . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
. . .  Dorothy . .  do. . . . . . .  
Lewiston . . . . . . . .  Tang (15) . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  
No. 2 Gas . . . . . . .  
. .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  
Mine visit . . . . . . .  
See footnotes at end of table. 
Table 1.-ARMPS values for unsuccessful pillar design case histories--Continued 
Location Coalbed Source Loading ARMPS sta- Comments 
condition' bility factor 
West Virginia 
. . . . .  . .  (cont.) Pocahontas No. 4 Campoli (4) 3 0.32 Crushed pillars and floor heave. . . . .  
. . . . . . .  . .  do. . . . . . . . . . . .  Mine visit 1 1.03 Airblast generated by failure of 11 7 pillars. 
Sewell . . . . . . . . . .  Peng (13) . . . . . . .  3 1.45 Section abandoned because of concern that 
floor heave [0.6 to 0.8 m (2 to 2.5 ft)] might 
prevent equipment retrieval. 
Stockton . . . . . . . .  Mine visit . . . . . . .  1 .74 Airblast generated by 140 fenders collapsing 
blew out 32 stoppings and fan-house weak 
wall. 
. . d o  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . d o  . . . . . . . . . . .  1 .72 Airblast generated by 90 fenders collapsing 
blew out 40 stoppings. 
. . d o  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . d o  . . . . . . . . . . .  1 1.29 Airblast generated by 72 fenders [6 by 12 m 
(20 by 40 ft)] and 50 pillars [9 by 9 m (30 by 
30 ft)] blew out 70 stoppings. 
. . d o  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . d o  . . . . . . . . . . .  2 1.17 Squeeze conditions caused 22 pillars [12 by 
14 m (40 by 45 ft)] to be lost. 
NI . . . . . . . .  Lower Kittanning . .  Tang (14) . . . . . . .  1 (‘7 A massive failure of pillars occurred when pil- 
lars to left of chain pillar " A  were split. 
Severe entry roof falls occurred. 
NI . . . . . . . .  Taggart . . . . . . . . . . .  do. . . . . . . . . . .  1 1.14 Massive pillar failure 15 crosscuts outby pillar 
line. 
- - 
Do. Same as above. 
NI Not indicated. 
'~oading condition 1 = development loading; 2 = development and front abutment loading; 3 = development, front abutment, and 
side abutment loading; 4 = development, front abutment, and loading from two side abutments. 
2~butment angle = 90". 
3~i l lars measuring 4.6 by 12 m (15 by 40 ft) had an SF of 0.45. 
4~i l lars  measuring 6 by 6 m (20 by 20 ft) had an SF of 1.32; pillars measuring 3.8 by 13.7 m (12.5 by 45 ft) had an SF of 1.08. 
Successful abutment 
Unsuccessful abutment 
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 
ARMPS STABILITY FACTOR 
Figure 3.-ARMPS stability factors for case histories. 
ADDITIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING PILLAR LINE STABILITY 
Abutment loads are not the only factor that should be 
considered in pillar design for retreat mining. Pillar line 
conditions are also markedly affected by multiple-seam 
interactions, the rate of pillar line advancement, and roof 
rock cavability characteristics. In the case of multiple- 
seam interactions, the best case scenario is to begin with 
the uppermost seam and to extract it as cleanly as pos- 
sible. Any barrier, production, or remnants of production 
pillars (miners refer to these as stumps or sprags) left in 
the upper seam gob can transfer loads to pillars in the 
lower seam. However, this is dependent on the thickness 
and the geology of the interburden and the depth of cover 
(5, 7). The load transfer is more intense if the pillars 
and/or stumps left in the upper seam gob are under- 
designed. In one mine visited in southern West Virginia 
that had extremely competent roof, the only unintentiocal 
fall that ever occurred on the pillar line or in the mine 
happened directly beneath a barrier pillar. Ic room-acd- 
pillar retreat mining, the mains, barrier pillars, and panels 
that are to be retreated should be superimposed for opti- 
mum ground conditions. 
In virtually every mine visited, operators indicated that 
the rate of pillar line advancement played a crucial role in 
overall pillar line conditions. When the pillar line moved 
slowly or remained idle over the weekend or during a 
miner's vacation, normally stable pillars began to take 
weight, as evidenced by sloughage, heave, and even 
squeeze conditions. Mine operators also remarked that 
timely pillar line advancement was even more critical when 
the coalbed thickened because high ribs taking weight 
caused large rib rolls, which are dangerous to the mine 
operator and helper. 
The caving characteristics of the roof also affect pillar 
line stability. The Pittsburgh Seam has gained the reputa- 
tion of having very weak roof where the Pittsburgh Sand- 
stone Member is absent. During pillar retreat, the roof 
usually breaks directly inby the breaker posts, providing 
excellent pillar line conditions. 
The other extreme roof condition, fairly common in 
portions of southern West Virginia and areas of eastern 
Kentucky, occurs where massive sandstones or siltstones 
[I2 m (40 ft) and thicker] are directly above the coalbed. 
Such roof conditions have been associated with sudden, 
widespread pillar collapses that, in turn, can cause dam- 
aging airblasts (fig. 4). Evidence indicates that massive 
and competent roof rock units are able to bridge relatively 
wide spans, particularly when they are aided by the sup- 
port provided by the regularly spaced remnants of produc- 
tion pillars. When the extraction area is still small, the 
remnant pillars are not subjected to the full overburden 
load because of the stiffness of the roof. A pressure arch 
is created, with most of the weight being carried by 
barriers surrounding the extracted area. Eventually, the 
bridging capability of the main roof can be exceeded, 
either by overextending the extraction area or by the 
weakening of the roof and/or remnant pillars over time. 
Once the pressure arch breaks down, the structural char- 
acteristics of the system are such that sudden, massive pil- 
lar failures can occur (17). For example, at one of the 
mines visited during this study, production pillars meas- 
uring 12 by 12 m (40 by 40 ft) were split down the middle, 
leaving 3- by 12-m (10- by 40-ft) fenders in the gob. 
Shortly after one panel was completed, an area measuring 
152 by 152 m (500 by 500 ft) and containing approximately 
100 fecders ccllapsed suddenly. The resulting airblast 
damaged the fan-house weak wall and 26 stoppings, and 
closed the mine for days. Fortunately, because of the 
location of the blast, only one miner was injured. 
Underground observations and analysis suggest that two 
alternative strategies may be successful in preventing air- 
blasts under competent roof conditions. One approach is 
to limit the partial pillaring conducted in a panel with the 
intention of designing for long-term stability. This can be 
accomplished either by increasing the size of the remnant 
pillars or by periodically leaving rows of unsplit pillars as 
barriers between smaller areas of split pillars. The latter 
was successfully employed in a southern West Virginia 
mine that experienced two moderate-to-severe blasts. The 
second strategy is to go to full pillar extraction. By re- 
moving the support provided by the fenders, the bridging 
capacity of the roof should be substantially reduced. If the 
roof does not break during full pillar extraction, caving can 
be induced through explosives (16). 
In another mine visited, pillar splitting was responsible 
for three significant airblasts. Wanting to arrest the situa- 
tion, the "Virginia three-cut method" was employed (fig. 5). 
The sequence in which the lifts are extracted are num- 
bered as shown in figure 5. In the collapsed areas where 
12 x 12 m (40 x 40 ft) pillars were split, the extraction 
percentage was 78% as opposed to 74% using the 3 cut 
method. However, the 3 cut method leaves non-uniformly 
spaced stumps that have an irregular geometry in the gob. 
According to the mine operator, these stumps routinely 
yielded and crushed out. Since the 3 cut method has been 
used in this mine, no airblasts have been recorded, 
Finally, it appears that massive pillar collapses may be 
more likely where the floor and roof are strong. Where 
the floor is weak, the pillars should be more prone to 
punch, resulting in a pillar line squeeze. 
- -  
Figure 4.--Concrete stopping damaged by airblast. 
0 Scale 40ft 
Figure 5.-Virginia three-cut pillar extraction method. A, First pillar mined; B, second pillar mined. (Numbers 
indicate sequence in which lifts are extracted.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
Information gathered during this investigation lends 
credence to the following conclusions: 
1. Properly sized production pillars that are designed 
considering the front and/or side abutment pressures 
generated by gob creation can result in better miner safety 
and more efficient recovery of reserves. 
2. Case histories analyzed using the ARMPS method 
examined an extensive range of geographic locations, 
depths of cover, width-to-height ratios, roof rock cavability 
characteristics, floor conditions, and extraction methods 
that are representative of the population as a whole. It 
appears that production pillars with an ARMPS SF of 1.50 
or greater have a high probability of being extracted 
without a problem. 
3. Multiple-seam interactions can have detrimental 
effects on pillar line stability. The effect is dependent 
upon the sequence in which the seams are mined, the 
thickness and geology of the interburden, overburden, and 
the presence of production pillars or stumps left in the 
gob. 
4. Normally stable pillar line conditions often deteri- 
orate if the pillar line moves slowly or remains idle for an 
extended amount of time. This deterioration can manifest 
itself in the form of excessive sloughage, heave, and 
squeezes. 
5. Airblasts or squeezes have occurred in mines that 
have competent and massive roof rock units that will not 
cave. If partial pillaring is to be conducted under com- 
petent roof that will not cave, the long-term stability of the 
gobbed-out area should be considered. This can be ac- 
- 
complished either by increasing the size of the production 
pillar remnants or by leaving rows of unsplit pillars as 
barriers between smaller areas of split pillars. 
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SHIFTWORK: A GUIDE FOR SCHEDULE DESIGN 
By James C. ~uchon'  
ABSTRACT 
Based upon the perturbed performance, increased or 
more serious accidents, lowered production, higher absen- 
teeism, health problems, familial problems, low morale, 
and job dissatisfaction due to working nights and shift- 
work, the U.S. Bureau of Mines has analyzed shiftwork 
schedule design at mining operations. The purpose of this 
paper is to discuss in practical terms what mining com- 
panies can do if they are considering changes in their 
shiftwork practices. It is not the intent of this paper to 
persuade management or any workers that they should 
change their shiftwork schedule. 
This paper discusses various design considerations or 
dimensions that may vary. These dimensions are (1) fmed 
versus rotating schedules, (2) speed of rotation, (3) di- 
rection of rotation, (4) length of shift, and (5) starting 
time of shift. Also, extended workdays and other manage- 
ment considerations, such as training and evaluation, are 
discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the ~ n i n g  industry, the proportion of employees 
working shiftwork is increasing. Data from the U.S. Bu- 
reau of Labor Statistics indicate that in 1991, 28.4 pct of 
all mine employees worked evening, night, or rotating 
shifts, as compared with 21.9 pct in 1985. Further, the 
percentage of miners working shifts other than straight 
days is considerably larger than the combined average of 
all U.S. industries (17.8 pct). 
There are several practical reasons why shiftwork in 
mining is prevalent, including (1) the increased demand for 
goods and services combined with limited overhead; (2) 
the need to maximize costly equipment for quick capital 
recovery; (3) the need to take advantage of lower utility 
costs at offpeak-hour utility rates; and (4) the need to keep 
equipment running continuously because of high startup 
costs. 
It has been demonstrated in published studies that 
workers in various industrial groups, such as mining, pow- 
er, chemical, nursing, factory, and oil refineries, have dis- 
played perturbed performance, increased or more serious 
accidents, lowered production, higher absenteeism, health 
problems, familial problems, low morale, and job dissatis- 
faction due to working nights and shiftwork (1-10).2 An 
excellent review of these effects can be found in a recent 
document completed by the U.S. Congress, Office of Tech- 
nology Assessment (1). It is easy to understand, therefore, 
why there is a growing interest among all industries, in- 
cluding mining, to examine shiftwork interventions. 
A discussion of alternative work schedules provided oth- 
er reasons why there is a recent trend in the United States 
toward new and better schedules (11). For instance, an 
increase in relative affluence creates a climate where many 
of life's privileges and comforts have become necessities. 
Employees are examining alternative schedules consistent 
with this. Also, cultural changes, changes in employment 
rates, an aging work force, labor force participation, and 
a shift to service work all contribute toward this move to 
seek alternative schedules. 
' ~ n g i n e e r i n ~  research psychologist, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Twin 2~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
Cities Research Center, Minneapolis, MN. at the end of this paper. 
For thcsc rcasons the U.S. Burcau of Mines (USBM) pcrsuadc management or any workers that they should 
has been involved in rcsearch on various shiftwork issucs change their shiftwork schedule. In many cases, currcnt 
to enhance the safcty of the minc worker. The purposc of work scheduling practices arc used succcssfully. Changes 
this paper is to discuss in practical terms what mining in such situations may, in fact, worsen their situation in 
companies can do if they are considering changes in their spitc of all good intentions. 
shiftwork practices. It is not the intcnt of this paper to 
ERGONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SCHEDULE DESIGN 
The perfect shift docs not exist. Figure 1 illustrates 
that thcre are three ergonomic considerations for any 
schedule that are  associated with various causes and ef- 
fects, such as production, abscntecism, accident rates, 
worker fatigue, and morale. These coilsiderations include 
biocompatibility, socioco~npatibility, and job compatibility. 
A comprehensive assessment of any schcduic, thcrel'ore, 
must consider cach of these co~nponcnts. While each of 
these consideratioils arc iilterrelatcci, they will for the sake 
of simplicity be  discusscd and trcatcd indepcndcntly. 
Biocompatibility refers to how a schedule conforms 
or does not conforin to human physiolobry that may af- 
Gcct performance. It is well known that humans have in- 
nate "biological clocks" that control certain physiological 
%unctions. Circadian rhythms are thosc functions that 
have an  approximately 24-h cycle, such as the excretion 
sf  human growth hormone and cortisol potassium, varia- 
tion of body temperature, and sleep-wake cyclc. The 
sleep-wake cycle refers to the body's natural tendency to 
maintain wakcCulncss during the daylight hours and slccp 
during the night, Therc arc two observable conscqucnces 
that can occbr as d icsult of Jisuptiilg [lit: sleep-wake 
cyclc. First, remaining awakc at night results in fatigue or 
a fccling of being tired. This fatigue occurs cven when 
"enough" sleep is taken prior to the night shift. Fatigue 
occurs at night I ~ e c a ~ i ~ , ~  of ;l piiy4ioiogicai push [or sleep 
manifested by sleepiiic~s, perform:lncc: dclicicncies, low- 
ered body temperature :~nd hcart rntc, and other sign5 
a~sociatcd with a need for sleep. When body temperature 
is used as an indicator of alerincss, the trough of this cycle 
tends to occur at approximately 3:00 a.m. for an individual 
who is not adjusting to a diffcicnt sclictlule or time ;lo~lc. 
A second situation related to circadian rhythms is re- 
fcrrcd to as ciccupation:ll jct l'lg. Just as our bodies adjust 
to different time 7ones during [ravel, so loo must our 
bodics adjust to rotalions from day or evenin2 shifts to 
night shifts. Faligue, malaise, diqturbcd sleep, and general 





Job Compatlbllity Soclocompatlbllity 
ERGONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS EFFECTS 
Figure 1.-Ergonomic considerations and effects of shiftwork schedules, 
desynchronization and physiological adjustment to the new 
shift (time zone). Such a biological adjustment to new 
time zones may take from 3 to 10 days, whereas adjust- 
ment to a night shift may take longer or may never occur 
because of conflicting day-night cycles, i.e., working during 
the night and sleeping during the daylight hours, as well as 
conflicting social and family cues on workdays and off 
days. 
Sociocompatibility refers to a compatibility between 
work schedule design and social-family life schedules. 
This design consideration is perhaps the most critical as- 
pect from the perspective of the shift worker. The 
norm in our society is an 8-to-5, Monday-through-Friday 
schedule. Deviation from this could potentially create 
social conflict. For many workers, the most disliked shift 
in this respect is the evening shift. Working between 
3:00 p.m. and 11:OO p.m. precludes a satisfactory family- 
social life. Working weekends, an unavoidable conse- 
quence of continuous operations, is a major source of so- 
cial incompatibility. 
Job compatibility refers to how a schedule conforms 
with or competes with job or organizational demands. For 
instance, certain companies or industries require training 
days to be built into a schedule. Some underground min- 
ing companies have blasting periods that should be con- 
sidered in a schedule. Such things as need for weekend 
work, need for equal personnel across the 24-h day, com- 
muting times for employees, union regulations, exposure 
to harmful environmental agents, etc. should be considered 
in the choice of schedule design. Any schedule that in- 
volves evening, night, or rotating shifts will create prob- 
lems for some people. 
MANAGEMENT-LABOR DIFFERENCES 
The focus of "important" schedule considerations can 
be different depending upon one's perspective. Figure 2 
illustrates the concerns management and labor typical- 
ly consider critical in a "good" schedule. Traditionally, 
management tends to emphasize issues of job compatibil- 
ity, while labor tends to emphasize issues of sociocom- 
gatibility. This is not to say that management ignores the 
welfare of its employees or that employees do not consider 
the job considerations that are necessary for company sur- 
vival. In  fact, insight into each position is ultimately 
necessary for a successful and workable schedule. Until 
recently, biocompatibility issues in schedule designs were 
often ignored. However, research in the past 10 years has 
evaluated human sleep, biological rhythms, nutrition, etc. 
in relation to shiftwork schedules and has offered impor- 
tant considerations that should be of value to all parties. 
Figure 2.--Critical schedule concerns. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
While there are virtually unlimited schedule designs, 
there are limited dimensions of the schedule that can vary. 
These dimensions are (1) night and evening shift, (2) futed 
versus rotating shifts, (3) slow or fast rotation schedules, 
(4) forward or backward rotation, (5) early or late shift 
start times, and (6) length of shift. The following is a dis- 
cussion of each of these. 
NIGHT AND EVENING SHIFT 
As mentioned earlier, working night shifts has been 
associated with a variety of health and performance meas- 
ures. It is the night shift that is incompatible to our body's 
natural rhythms. The night shift is also disliked by many 
workers because of social factors. There are situations, 
however, where individuals prefer working nights because 
of certain benefits, such as pay differentials and less pres- 
sure or less supervision at work. Working nights also 
allows for more parental involvement in child care and the 
associated cost savings. 
Considering only the criteria of adequate sleep, the 
evening shift is for most people the perfect shift. Virtually 
all studies have indicated that the evening shift is associ- 
ated with the greatest sleep length when compared with 
the day or night shift. Nevertheless, it is the eyening shift 
that is the least preferred by workers. Clearly, this dislike 
for the shift is due to issues of sociocompatibility. 
Recommendations: 
1. Before anything else, an employer should consider 
the possibility of decreasing use of night shifts. 
2. The use of overtime should be avoided for work- 
ers on night shifts. Many workers nap prior to the shift 
and begin sleep immediately following the night shift. 
Therefore, any overtime may eat into the worker's total 
sleep length, which is already shortened. 
3. When night shifts are used, several special precau- 
tionary measures should be taken. These are- 
a. Longer or more frequent mandatory rest breaks 
when work is between midnight and 6:00 a.m. 
b. Physically or mentally difficult assignments 
should be left for the day or evening shifts. 
c. Ample opportunity for a hot and healthful 
variety of foods via machine or food cart should be 
made available to these "offshift" workers. 
d. Lunch breaks should occur at a consistent time 
of the night shift, i.e., meals should be eaten at approxi- 
mately the same time each night. 
FIXED VERSUS ROTATING SHIFTS 
Fixed or permanent shifts are more common in 
Monday-through-Friday, 24-h operations. In these 5-day 
operations, three crews each working day, evening, or 
night shifts can cover a 24-h operation with either perma- 
nent or rotating shifts. However, in continuous opera- 
tions, utilizing 8-h shifts, where each job totals 168 h per 
week (24 h/d times 7 d/wk), a minimum of four crews is 
needed to cover all three shifts. Therefore, at least some 
shift rotation is typically required. The question then 
becomes, Should the use of permanent shifts be minimized 
or maximized when possible? Table 1 shows one of the 
most commonly used schedules in continuous operations. 
This schedule maximizes rotating shifts by requiring all 
workers to rotate on a weekly basis. In contrast, table 2 
shows a schedule that utilizes three futed crews (1, 2, and 
3) and one rotating or "grasshopper" shift (crew 4). 
Table 1 .-Schedule consisting of four-crew, 8-h, 7-day backward rotating 
"Southern Swing" pattern 
Crew-week Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
1 - - . . . . . . .  E E E E E 
2 . . . . . . .  E E - M M M M 
3 . . . . . . .  M M M - - G G 
4 . . . . . . .  G G G G G - - 
E Evening shift. 
G Night shift. 
M Morning shift. 
NOTE.-Dashes indicate off days. 
Table 2.-Schedule consisting of 6-day-on and 2-day-off pattern, 
repeating every 8 days 
Crew Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
E Evening shift. 
G Night shift. 
M Morning shift. 
'~ ixed.  
2~rasshopper shift, rotating every 2 days. 
NOTE.-Dashes indicate off days. 
One argument in favor of using fured shifts, such as 
permanent days, evenings, and nights, is to allow workers 
on the night shift to "adjust." However, research has 
consistently shown that night workers never completely 
adapt to that shift. Nearly all night permanent shift 
workers revert to a "normal" day schedule on their days 
off. They are, therefore, constantly rotating their work- 
sleep cycles in spite of having a fured shift. Several studies 
have indicated that permanent night workers, as do 
rotating shift workers, tend to sleep several hours less 
before the night shift than any other shift. Working 
consecutive night shifts, therefore, may result in a cumula- 
tive "sleep debt." A summary of the pros and cons of fured 
versus permanent shifts is as follows: 
Advaiz tnges of Fixed Shifts: 
1.  Often allows workers to choose.the e.vening or night 
shifts. These shifts are actually more sociocompatible for 
some workers. 
2. Allows a large percentage of employees to avoid the 
night shift altogether. 
3. Less disorienting since rotation among the other 
shifts is not required. 
Advaiztages of Rotatitzg Shifts: 
I. A "fair" schedule. No preferences given to individ- 
uals for the favored shifts. 
2. Minimizes the exposure to the night and evening 
shift to any particular group of employees by "spreading 
out" the exposure among all employees. 
3. If rotations are fast (see next section) then there 
may be less physiological disruption of circadian rhythms, 
i.e., occupational jet lag would not be an issue. 
1. The primary consideration should be the possibility 
of the reduction of the work force on the night shift. 
2. Unless the night shift and the evening can be filled 
by workers voluntarily choosing to work permanent shifts, 
rotating shifts are recommended. 
SLOW OR FAST ROTATION SCHEDULES 
Rotating shifts can differ with respect to how quickly 
workers rotate from one shift to another, or the number 
of contiguous days on each shift. In  U.S. mining opera- 
tions, rotations tend to be as short as 1 week and as long 
as 2 or more weeks on the same shift. It is not typical to 
find "rapid" rotations of 1 or 2 days, as is found in some 
service industries or as is typical in the European commu- 
nity. The rapid rotation will be discussed below. 
There are reasonable hypotheses for suggesting either 
the 1 week, or the slower rotation cycles of 2 or more 
weeks. O n  the one hand, it can be argued that it  is more 
advantageous to work shorter stretches of nights to avoid 
a cumulative sleep deprivation that may occur with too 
many contiguous night shifts (12). On the other hand, it 
can be argued that a slower rotation has the advantage of 
letting workers adjust to night shifts, thereby lessening the 
negative effects of night work (13). 
The USBM conducted a study to determine whether or 
not there is an advantage to working the second week of 
a 2-week cycle, as would be indicated by reports of more 
positive health, mood, and sleep items on the second week 
as compared with the first week (14). Forty-two workers 
at a surface mine in the Midwest filled out the work, food, 
and sleep diary for 4 to 6 weeks. They rotated every 
2 weeks, going from days to nights to evenings with all 
weekends off. The dependent measures were defined as 
(1) health, the daily frequency of reported symptoms; (2) 
mood, based on a self-evaluation of four descriptors- 
alert, sleepy, grouchy, and relaxed; (3) total sleep length; 
and (4) sleep quality. Results indicated that on the second 
week of the night shift, workers reported significant im- 
provements in all four mood descriptors for the second 
half of their shift. Also, sleep quality as measured by 
awakenings during sleep improved on the second week of 
the night shift. None of the variables showed a worsening 
on the second week of nights. These results do not sup- 
port a "cumulative trauma" effect for the schedule stud- 
ied in this paper. O n  the basis of this study, it could be 
recommended that 2-wcek cyclcs arc supcrior to I-week 
cycles. 
However, a truly last rotation schedule, rarely used 
in U.S. industries, is common in European countries. Ta- 
ble 3 shows a typical fast rotating schedule. Experts agree 
that there are several advantages to fast rotating shifts 
(15-17). First, individuals do not have time enough on any 
shift to adjust his or her circadian 'rhythms, thereby avoid- 
ing the physiological dyschrony associated with working 
stretches of night shifts. Second, working only two or 
three consecutive nights does not allow a sleep debt to 
occur, which is associated with working several consecutive 
nights. Third, short stretches of nights allow for more 
regular social contacts. 
Reconzmendations: 
I. On a rotating schedule, it is recommended that 
schedules have 2 weeks of a particular shift (with days off), 
as compared with I week. Table 4 shows an example of 
a schedule for an eight-worker continuous operation, uti- 
lizing 2-week rotations. 
2. A fast rotation, such as the one shown in table 3, 
may be considered as an alternative for those groups of 
workers wanting to avoid long stretches of night shifts. 
Table 3.-Rapid rotation schedule often used in European work systems1 
Crew-week Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
1 . . . . . . .  M M E E G G G 
2 - - . . . . . . .  M M E E E 
3 . . . . . .  G G - - M M M 
4 . . . . . . .  E E G G - - - 
E Evening shift. 
G Night shift. 
M Morning shift. 
 h his schedule requires four crews working a repeating 2-2-3 pattern. For instance, 
crew 1 works 2 days, two evenings, three nights, 2 off days, two day shifts, two evening 
shifts, etc. 
NOTE.-Dashes indicate off days. 
Table 4.-Crewless schedule consisting of 2 contingent weeks of nights1 
Employee-week Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
1 - . . . . . . . . . . .  M M M M M M 
2 . . . . . . . . . . .  M - - M M M M 
3 . . . . . . . . . . .  M M M - - M M 
4 . . . . . . . . . . .  E E E E E - - 
5 - . . . . . . . . . . .  G G G G 6 6 
6 . . . . . . . . . . .  6 - - G G G G 
7 . . . . . . . . . . .  G G G - - E E 
8 . . . . . . . . . . .  E E E E E - - 
E Evening shift. 
G Night shift. 
M Morning shift. 
 h his schedule requires eight shift workers covering two positions around the clock. The 
shift workers are placed at 4-week intervals in an 8-week cycle. 
NOTE.-Dashes indicate off days. 
Source: Circadian Technologies, Inc. 
FORWARD OR BACKWARD ROTATION 
One popular suggestion offered by shiftwork expcrts is 
to prescribe schedules that rotate in a forward direction. 
Rotating from a day to evening to night shift (table 5) is 
preferred over rotating from a day to night to evening shift 
(table 1). Unfortunately, there are virtually no published 
studies that have systematically reversed ONLY the 
direction of the shift rotation in a mining or industrial 
setting that would show the benefit of such an intervention. 
There are, however, a few studies that have made shift 
changes, which have ii~cluded direction of rotation as one 
part of the total change. For instance, the most widely 
cited study is the intervention study at Great Salt Lake 
Minerals (10). In this study, the group that changed to a 
forward direction AND went from a weekly to a 21-day 
rotation schedule improved on measures of health, produc- 
tion, and turnover. 
There are two viewpoints as to why thcre may be bene- 
fits using a forward rotating schedule: 
Premise 1: First, Knauth and Rutenfranz (16) state that 
for a discontinuous three-shift system with a five-shift, two- 
days-off pattern: (1) a forward rotation produces a 72-h- 
off period between a day and evening shift, a 72-h-off 
period between an evening and night shift, and a 48-h-off 
period between a night and day shift, and (2) a backward 
rotation produces a 56-h-off period between a night and 
evening shift, a 56-h-off period between an evening and 
day shift, and an 80-h-off period between a day and night 
shift. The shortcr the off period, the less time for rest and 
recovery. Therefore, they conclude that since a forward 
rotation produces only one short, between-shift interval 
and a backward rotation produces two short, between-shift 
intervals, the forward rotation is recommended. 
Premise 2: A second and more popular reason for pre- 
scribing the forward rotation relates to circadian rhythms 
that are disrupted during phase advances or delays. Since 
humans have circadian rhythms that are over 25 h, it is 
easier to phase delay than to phase advance. Phase ad- 
vances merely refer to adjustment of our circadian rhythms 
to earlier clock times. Phase delay refers to adjustment to 
later clock times. Research has shown that transmeridian 
air travelers have a much easier time adjusting to west- 
ward travel ("phase delay" or forward rotation) as opposed 
to eastward travel ("phase advance" or backward rotation) 
(18-20). Based on this research, many authors have rec- 
ommended that shift rotation schedules take advantage of 
this finding by constructing schedules with forward rota- 
tions to hasten adjustment to each new shift (10, 16, 21- 
22). Unfortunately, no single study has compared the pat- 
terns of adjustment or completeness of adjustment for a 
group of shift workers who have rotated in each direction 
with all other factors being equal. In fact, no study has 
demonstrated complete circadian adjustment for shift 
workers rotating in either direction. 
The USBM challenged these viewpoints using an analy- 
sis based upon sleep times taken from survey data and at- 
tempted to evaluate the argument that forward rotations 
are BETTER than backward rotations. The primary con- 
cern in rotating shiftwork is rotating onto and off of the 
night shift. Therefore, each between-shift interval prior to 
or subsequent to a night shift was scrutinized. This paper 
is based on sleep timing only. Other factors that could 
influence adjustment, such as eating and social behaviors, 
internal biological functions, and rhythms should not be 
ignored. 
Night shifts are typically considered either the first or 
third shift, depending upon the placement within the over- 
all schedule. For instance, in a Monday-through-Friday 
workweek, a night shift is the first shift if it begins at or 
about Sunday night and ends Monday morning. However, 
a night shift is considered the third shift if it begins late 
Monday night and ends early Tuesday morning. 
Table 5.-Schedule cons~sting of four-crew, 8-h, 7-day forward rotating pattern 
Crew-week Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
E Evening shift. 
G Night shift. 
M Morning shift. 
NOTE.-Dashes ~ndicate off days. 
It was shown that when nights are the third shift, the 
recovery interval after the night shift on both the forward 
and backward rotations are "short" intervals (figs. 3-4). 
However, the forward rotation contains only one full 
night's sleep and two shortened sleep times. Further, the 
day shift follows this, which could itself contribute to sleep 
deprivation. On the backward rotation, the recovery inter- 
val after a night shift contains two full night's sleep, fol- 
lowing a shortened day sleep. The next afternoon series 
could actually help in recovery since these shifts are 
associated with the longest sleep lengths of any shift. 
When nights are the first in the series, the recovery 
intervals after a night shift are relatively long for both 
forward and backward shifts. However, the backward ro- 
tation contains a potential for three full night's sleep, 
as opposed to only two full night's sleep for the forward 
rotation. 
Therefore, when primary importance is placed upon 
recovery from night shifts, if nights are the third in the 
series, the backward rotation is the most desirable. 
The amount of slcep and time off prior to working a 
series of night shifts was also inspected (figs. 3-4). Ideally, 
individuals who are well rested will have a better chance 
of adjusting and coping with their night shifts. Where 
nights are the third in the series, both the forward and 
backward rotations have a long between-shift interval prior 
to the night shift, 72- and 80-h, respectively. Both allow 
three separate sleep periods to recover from the night 
shift. 
Where nights are the first in the series, both thp, 
forward and backward rotations have a "short" between- 
shift interval, 48-h and 56-h, respectively. The day-to-night 
shift change on the backward schedule and the evening-to- 
night shift change on the forward schedule have only two 
nighttime sleep periods. 
Therefore, when analyzing sleep behaviors prior to 
night shifts, having nights as the third shift for both for- 
ward and backward shifts are more desirable than having 
nights as the first shift. 
Perhaps the more popular reason for promulgating thc 
forward rotation is its apparent consistency with the idea 
that it is biologically quicker to adjust when rotating in the 
forward direction than in the backward direction. Forward 
rotations have been compared with east to west travel, 
where sleep-wake cycles are phase delayed; i.e., sleep 
occurs later than what has been typical for an individual. 
Just looking at work start times, it appears that workers 
are phasing in a forward direction; i.e., day to evening to 
nights. However, when looking at the sleep-wake cycles of 
actual workers, they are not consistently rotating forward. 
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Figure 3.-Forward rotation with night as third shift. (Mid. = midnight) 
hased upon typical sleep times, the number of phase ad- EARLY OR LATE SHIFT START TIMES 
vances and phase delays are exactly equal for forward and 
backward rotating shift workers. Adjustment, therefore, Various factors can influence a preferred start and end 
'should be the same for both conditions. time. In the realm of job-compatibility, certain factors 
should be considered. For instance, daily blasting sched- 
R ecomnzendafiotzs: ules are often coordinated with shift start times for under- ground mines, since evacuation of the mine is necessary. 
1. Where the speed of rotation is relatively slow (i.e., ~oc iocom~at ib i l i t~  issues involve such concerns as driving 
1 week or more), the preferred direction of rotation is through rush hour and being home at particular times to 
llinked to the amount of time off between changes. The coincide with meal times or child care. Biocompatibility 
amount of time off is related to the position of the night issues include such concerns as sleep quality and sleep 
shift, first versus third. An analysis of time off and typical 
sleep periods indicates that the backward rotation wlth 
nights as the first shift may be more conducive for 
recovery from a stretch of nights. However, a backward 
rotation with nights as the third shirt offers the best 
opportunity for sleep in preparation and recovery from the 
night shift. In general, it is suggested that there should be 
at least 56 h bctween the last of a series of night shifts and 
the next of a series of shifts. 
length, as well as individual differences such as morning 
and evening types. Morning types or larks are those indi- 
viduals who tend to prefer to go lo bed early and wake up 
early. Evening types or owls are those individuals who 
prefer to go to bed late and wake up late. This factor may 
be an important consideration as the work force ages. 
Older workers are associated with being morning types. 
In general, research has shown that when working a day 
shift, sleep length decreases with earlier work start times. 
2. For fast rotations, as shown in table 3, forward Also, sleep taken between night shifts are of shorter dura- 
rotations are recomn~ended. tion the later the work times start and end. Therefore, to 
I 8o.m.  4 p.m. Mid. 8 a.m. 4 p.m. Mid. 8 a.m. 4 p.m. Mid. 8 a.m. 4 p.m. Mid. 8 a.m. 4 p.m. I 
Day t o  n i g h t  185 wl r l  
I 
rn 
80 h o f f  ~-1 
N i g h t  t o  a f t e r n o o n  
A f t e r n o o n  t o  day 
1 56 h off--4 
KEY 
i-1 Sleep  t i m e s  
Figure 4.-Backward rotation with night as third shift. (Mid. = midnight) 
maximize sleep length before the morning shift, the shift 
should not start too early. However, to maximize sleep 
length after a night shift, the shift should not end too late. 
Knauth and Rutenfranz (16) discussed studies of start 
times in various industries. In a coal mine, an experimen- 
tal change on the day shift from a 6:00 a.m. to a 7:00 a.m. 
start time was associated with a 23.8 pct accident rate 
decrease. Similar findings of later start times being 
associated with fewer accidents or error rates have been 
found with bus drivers and train drivers. The study also 
suggested that earlier start times on,a "late shift," between 
1:OO p.m. and 4:00 p.m., was associated with more frequent 
accidents. 
1. On a one-shift system (i.e., a day shift), a 7:00 a.m. 
to 9:00 a.m. start time is suggested. 
2. For 24-h operations, it is suggested that a 7:00 a.m., 
230 min start time be employed. A latcr start time will 
hamper the ability of night shift workers to get adequate 
sleep. 
3. Ideally, a flexible start timc should be uscd if 
possible. This allows for individual preferences and 
differences. 
LENGTH OF SHIFT 
There is very little doubt that "extended workdays," 
regular shifts of 10 or 12 h, maintaining an approxinlately 
40-h week, is a very popular alternative among the work 
force because of the significant increase in days off, in- 
cluding weekends, especially when compared with tradi- 
tional rotation schedules of working seven straight shifts or 
having only one weekend off every 4 to G weeks. 
While the popularity of extended workdays has been on 
the increase, there are some serious concerns by managc- 
ment, workers, unions and various governmental policy- 
makers that working 10- or 12-h days may create an addcd 
risk of accidents and health problems (23). Unfortunately, 
there is very little objective information available regarding 
the nature and degree of safety and health risks associated 
with the application of extended workday schedules (1, 24- 
25). As a consequence, when it comes to questions of de- 
signing and managing extended workdays, decisionmaking 
by management must now proceed on limited information. 
Health and safety issues are not important considera- 
tions for the implementation of 12-h shifts in relatively 
safe workplaces such as white collar settings. However, in 
labor-intensive and environmentally stressful conditions as 
in mining, where accidents and health are major concerns, 
or where safety is a public concern as in the nuclear power 
industry, the application of Boilg workdays must be care- 
fully analyzed. Since all indications are that the applica- 
tion of extended workday schedules by U.S. industries will 
become increasingly widespread over the decade, it is im- 
perative that a careful and comprehensive evaluation of 
safety and health risks associated with such schedules be 
initiated. In a report requested by the House Committees 
on Appropriations; Energy and Commerce; Science, Space, 
and Technology; Veterans Affairs, and the Senate Subcom- 
mittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Office of 
Tcchnology Assessment, it was stated that there is "... a 
compelling need for inore studies of the interactions be- 
tween work schedules and safety in the workplace" (I, 
p. 18). 
The change from an 8-h rotating shift to a 12-h rotating 
shift implies scvcral critical schedule differences (26). 
Below are thc crucial similarities and differences between 
8-h rotating shifts and 12-h rotating shifts. These are the 
factors that could make a difference in workers' tolerance 
to their schedules: 
1. Length of the workday.-An extended workday is 
typically considered a 10- or 12-h workday, while still 
maintaining an approximately 40-h workweek. Table 6 
shows an example of "2-3-2 every other weekend off' 
extended workday scheduleO3 
%is schedule is the continuous pattern of the days on-days off 
sequence; i.e., two shifts on, followed by 3 days off, followed by two 
shifts on, foliuweJ by two shirts oCC, etc. 
Table 6.-Schedule consisting of two-three-two,' every other weekend off, 
12-h shift pattern 
Crew-week Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
1 - . . . . . . .  D D - - D D 
2 . . . . . . .  D - - D D - - 
3 - N . . . . . . .  N - - N N 
4 . . . . . . .  N - - N N - - 
D 12-h day shift. 
N 12-h night shift. 
 his schedule is the continuous pattern of the days on-days off sequence; i.e., two 
shifts on, followed by 3 days off, followed by two shifts on, followed by two shifts off, etc. 
NOTE.-Dashes indicate off days 
2. Amount of time off between workdays.-Extended 
workdays typically have less off-time between shifts. This 
would have implications for physical recovery from fatigue 
and potentially less time for sleep. 
3. Length of the workweek.-Extended workweeks typ- 
ically have shorter workweeks at the expense of longer 
workdays. This could have implications for adaptation of 
circadian rhythms or less cumulative fatigue across a 
workweek (27). 
4. Amount of time off, i.e., length of "weekends."- 
Extended workdays usually allow more days off. This 
would have implications for recovery from fatigue or sleep 
deficit. 
5. Speed of rotation.-U.S. shift workers usually rotate 
slowly, 1 week or more on any one shift. Exzended work- 
days usually require faster rotations, 2 to 4 consecutive 
days, which would have implications for adaptation to cir- 
cadian rhythms. 
6. Time of day.-Both 8-h schedules and 12-h sched- 
ules can involve around-the-clock operations. Therefore, 
working the night shift will still be an issue in extended 
workdays. 
The USBM conducted a study designed to examine the 
safety and health implications of extended workdays at 
an underground copper, lead, and zinc mining operation 
(28). Measures were taken before and after a change 
from the old 7-days-on, 2-days-off, 8-h continuous schedule 
to the new 4-days-on, 4-days-off, 12-h continuous scheduIe. 
These measures included (1) behavioral performance 
measures to analyze perceptual-motor changes, (2) con- 
tinuous heart-rate monitoring and aerobic capacity to 
measure physical fatigue, (3) pulmonary-respiratory meas- 
ures to examine air coiltaminant exposure, and (4) a vari- 
ety of self-report questionnaires to measure perceived 
adaplion and satisfaction will1 the new schedule. A control 
group consisting of 5-days-on, 2-days-off day shift workers 
at the same mine was also included. 
Survey results indicated an overwhelming support for 
extended workdays at the underground copper, lead, and 
zinc mine (25). However. self-reported mood scales and 
the Stanford Sleepiness Scale indicated that workers on the 
12-h night shift expericnced more sleepiness and lowered 
energy-alertness levels altcr the eighth hour into their 
shift. The 12-h shifts did not seem to be associated with 
a decrease in most measures of performance across the 
shift. Only on one measure of physical endurance task 
(tapping lapses) was there a decrease in performance 
across the shift for the 12-h night shift. Most of the phys- 
iological and pulmonary data indicated few differences 
between the 8- and 12-h shifts. 
In this study, because of the remote location of the 
mine, the workers on 12-h shifts were expected to lodge at 
the minesite during their 4-day shift week. This undoubt- 
edly had a beneficial effect on the sleep and rest between 
shifts. This was confirmed by the diary data that indicated 
improved sleep quality and no lessening of sleep length, as 
compared with the workers' 8-h schedule. 
Based upon the overall acceptance of the new schedule 
by the workers and lack of evidence to suggest serious per- 
formance decrements, it was recommended that the mine 
retain the 12-h schedule, with certain precautionary meas- 
ures to ensure the safety of the workers. Such measures 
included maintenance of the on-site lodging for 12-h work- 
ers, continuous observation and evaluation of group and 
individual adjustment, and customizing work tasks and 
work breaks to accommodate longer work hours. 
In  an area fraught with inconsistencies, there are sev- 
eral valid comments that can be safely made: (1) workers 
tend to embrace the use of extended workdays; (2) in spite 
of item 1 above, some studies in some industries have 
shown performance and/or safety decrements associated 
with extended workdays; and (3) more research on extend- 
ed workdays is needed, especially for companies and in- 
dustries considering the use of extended workdays where 
safety is of major importance. These conclusions under- 
score the need for caution by companies using or consider- 
ing the use of extended workdays. Based upon this review, 
it is recommended that the use of extended workdays be 
accompanied by special efforts to create safe working 
conditions. Also, since no a priori predictions from prior 
research can be made with certainty about the probable 
consequences of introducing 10- or 12-11 shifts into a min- 
ing company, evaluation of each miner should be made on 
a periodic basis. 
Recommendations: 
The use of extended workdays is recommended pro- 
vided that certain precautions are considered. These are- 
1. Extended workdays should not be considered where 
the frequency of accidents or near-miss accidents are at 
unacceptable levels. The use of extended workdays should 
not be expected to reduce the likelihood of accidents. 
2. Extended workdays should not be considered for 
jobs that require extremely high physical workloads. For 
example, the American Industrial Hygiene Association 
recommends a workload not to exceed one-third VO,,, 
(maximum aerobic capacity) for an 8-h workshift. While 
similar recommendations have not been made for extend- 
ed workdays, this standard should be strictly enforced. 
3. Job sharing and cross training should be considered 
where extended workdays are used. Since vigilance, bore- 
dom, and mental or physical fatigue can lead to errors, 
changing job tasks may alleviate these stressors. 
4. Workers should not be expected to work overtime evaluate schedules before and after changes are made 
on extended workdays. Working on scheduled days off is (29). Also, long-term monitoring of health, accident, and 
not recommended. production effects should be considered. 
5. If extended workdays are used, regular evaluation 6. Hybrid schedules that utilize both 8- and 12-h shifts 
and assessment should be undertaken. For instance, should be considered. Table 7 is an example of a schedule 
survey methods have been developed by the USBM to utilizing both 8- and 12-h shifts. 
Table 7.-Hybrid schedule consisting of both 8- and 12-h shifts 
Crew-week Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
E Evening shift. 
G Night shift; third shift of the day, running from 11 p.m. to 7.a.m. 
GI2 Shifts from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. 
M Morning shift. 
M I 2  Shifts from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. 
NOTE.-Dashes indicate off days. 
Source: Circadian Technologies, Inc. 
MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Changing a schedule: Equally important to the new 
schedule itself is how the process of choosing a schedule 
is carried out. There is not a single method that has been 
shown to be the best. A prescription for failure is for any 
one manager to take it upon himself or herself to decide 
upon a schedule and i~nplement it without consulting thosc 
workers who would be affected by the change. This meth- 
od, although seemingly efficient, sets up the potential for 
suspicion and inaccurate assumptions that could lead to 
possible rejection of the schedule, regardless of how good 
it is. 
The following steps are recommended as one way that 
has proven effective: 
3. Determine operational requirements. 
4. Design alternative work schedules that consider the 
information from steps 2 and 3. 
5. Evaluate alternative work schedules. This evaluation 
is based upon the opinions of the shiftwork committee, 
experts in the field, and/or other workers. 
6. Choose three alternatives for a vote. 
7. Make the shiftwork change. 
8. Evaluate the change 6 months, 1 year, and every 
year thereafter. If the presurvey was used for evaluation, 
a postsurvey can be used as a basis of comparison. Inform 
the work force of the results of the evaluation. 
9. Decide to keep or reject the schedule. 
I. Construct a company-wide shiftwork committcc. Traitlittg atzd followzly: Offer training to the shift 
2. Evaluate work problems and worker needs. Social workers in ways to cope with shiftwork. Involve family 
requirements of a schedulc can be determined at [his timc. members in this training. 
Focus groups or surLfcys can bc: used at this slep. 
SUMMARY 
For thc vast majority of the work force, any schedule reported upon. The literature is full of studies and reports 
that involves hours outside [he parameters of a "normal" of actual work settings that have changed schedules with 
schedule (i.e., 9 to 5), will involve sacrifice and physical positive outcomes. Shiftwork practice is an ergonomic 
and psychological distress. There seems to be, however, consideration, where the fit between the worker and 
schedules that are better than others. This paper presents workplace may have serious consequences caused by job, 
various aspects of schedules that have been studied and sociological, and biological compatibility. 
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NATURE AND COST OF LOW BACK PAIN 
By Sean ~ a l l a ~ h e r '  and Christopher A.   am rick^ 
ABSTRACT 
Low back pain (LBP) represents a huge expense to the current state of knowledge regarding LBP-the causes, risk 
mining industry and to society as a whole. Any effort to factors for LBP, effectiveness of treatments, recovery from 
control the problems associated with LBP requires an back pain, and methods that can be used to help control 
understanding of the nature of LBP. This review paper the problem. 
was written by the U.S. Bureau of Mines to describe the 
INTRODUCTION 
Low back pain (LBP) is very common in Western coun- 
tries and is a major cause of worker disability, limitation 
of activity, and economic loss. Many studies have indi- 
cated that up to 80% of the general population are af- 
fected by LBP at some time during their lives (26, 35).3 
Furthermore, it is estimated that approximately one in sev- 
en Americans are currently experiencing LBP (25). The 
cost of back injuries in the United States in 1989 was var- 
iously estimated to be anywhere from $27 to $56 billion 
(38). These costs have undoubtedly risen by a substantial 
amount since that time. 
Few need to be reminded of the magnitude of the back 
pain problem in the mining industry. Back injuries 
consistently rank as the leading cause of lost workdays, 
account for up to 40% of worker compensation payments, 
and cost the industry tens of millions of dollars every year 
(20). In underground coal mines alone, back injuries cost 
the industry in excess of $30 million in 1991. The average 
cost of a back injury that year was over $8,000.4 As part 
of its mission to enhance the safety and efficiency of 
mining, this review paper was written by the U.S. Bureau 
of Mines to describe the current state of knowledge 
regarding LBP-the causes, risk factors for LBP, effective- 
ness of treatments, recovery from back pain, and methods 
that can be used to help control the problem. 
CAUSE OF LBB 
While a great deal of knowledge has been accumulated individual ages. It is thought that the changes that occur 
regarding LBP in the past couple of decades, doctors and as one gets older may lower the resistance of the spine to 
scientists still cannot explain the exact mechanisms causing heavy workloads. Consequently, heavy loads on the spine 
pain in the majority of patients with LBP. Many experts trigger the onset of low back symptoms (26-27, 34, 41). 
believe that LBP is caused by changes in the spine as an 
'~esearch  physiologist. 4~npublished data prepared by C. A. Hamrick in 1994; available 
2~ndustrial engineer. upon request from S. Gallagher, BuMines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
3~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this paper. 
TYPICAL LBP HISTORY 
LBP typically begins fairly early in life (usually in one's (radiating back pain) are more frequent, and there is often 
twenties). Back pain during this period is typified by a residual pain between attacks. Improvement is frequently 
mild and diffuse pain of relatively short duration, which is seen in the fifties. This period is characterized by less 
followed by a return to full activity. In one's thirties, there severe pain, which appears to be arthritic in nature (morn- 
are often more frequent attacks of LBP, which are relieved ing stiffness) and is largely relieved by activity during the 
by rest and followed by relatively pain-frcc periods. Back day. The sixtics often bring substantial relief from pain for 
pain typically peaks in the forties; episodes of sciatica the LBP patient (41). 
BACK INJURY RlSK FACTORS 
Effective control of LBP requires an understanding of 
activities that increase the risk of an injury. Some of the 
major factors associated with increased risk of back pain 
follow: 
Manual materials handling (especially lifting). 
Twisting of the trunk. 
Bending the trunk forward. 





Highly physical jobs. 




As can be seen, a wide variety of activities arc associated 
with back injuries (from prolonged sitting to heavy lifting). 
The following sections give some additional detail with 
regard to these risk factors. 
SPECIFIC RISK FACTORS FOR LBP 
Manual Materials Handling.-According to a study per- 
formed by Bigos (7), manual handling tasks are associated 
with almost two-thirds of all low back compensation 
claims. Lifting is a particular concern, being associated 
with 49% of low back compensation cases (43). Studies 
have shown that lifting is especially hazardous if the object 
workers have to lift is excessive, i.e., greater than 15.9 kg 
(35 lb) in weight (13, 30, 42). Perhaps more important 
than the actual weight of an object is the moment that is 
imposed on the low back. Figure 1 illustrates this point by 
posing the question: Which is more stressful on the low 
back, 15 kg (33 Ib) of feathers or 15 kg (33 Ib) of lead? In 
this example, 15 kg (33 lb) of feathers actually makes the 
load experienced by the spine greater. This is because the 
15 kg (33 lb) of feathers must be packaged in a bulky 
container, which causes the worker to hold the object fur- 
ther away from his or her body (creating a larger mo- 
ment). This increases low back stress. Fifteen kilograms 
(thirty three pounds) of lead, on the other hand, makes for 
a compact load that can be carried quite close to the body, 
which will decrease the stress on the low back. Many 
othcr aspects of manually lifting a load have been shown 
to be potential hazards to the musculoskeletal system. 
These include horizontal and vertical location of the load, 
shape and size of the load, lifting frequency, load stability, 
couplings, duration of lifting, workplace geometry, asym- 
metric lifting, environmental issues, etc. (21). 
Figure 1.-Fifteen kilograms (thirty-three pounds) of feathers 
result in Increased loading on the spine compared with 15 kg 
(33 Ib) of lead. The Yead (being compact) can be held much 
closer to the body, which decreases the horizontal distance (H) 
from the low back to the center of gravity of the object The 
result is a decreased load on the low back. (Adapted from "UAW- 
Ford Job Improvement Guide," copyright 1988, Regents of the 
University of Michigan. Used by permission.) 
Body Motions.- Twisting of the trunk is associated with 
a significant proportion of low back compensation cases 
(approximately 18%). Bending the trunk forward is also 
associated with such cases, but to a somewhat lesser de- 
gree (12% of cases)? More recent studies have also 
shown that the more quickly one twists the trunk or bends 
the trunk to the side, the higher the back injury risk (32). 
Other studies have demonstrated that excessive reaching 
(for example, reaching over obstacles or handling bulky 
objects) is associated with higher back injury rates (3, 48). 
Falls are responsible for only about 10% of compensation 
cases (9, but these cases lend to be somewhat more se- 
vere and costly (7, 47). 
Environmental Factors.-Workers who are required to 
sit for prolonged periods of time have a higher risk of 
back pain (31). 'l'his may be due in part to the lac1 [hat 
the spine is almost fully bent forward in a relaxed sitting 
posture (4). It appears that jobs with low physical de- 
mands (sedentary jobs) and jobs possessing high physical 
demands both have somewhat higher incidences of LBP 
(36). A moderate amount of physical work is related to 
lowest back injury rates. Exposure to whole-body vibra- 
tion (such as that experienced by shuttle car drivers) has 
also been implicated as a risk factor (9, 19). Another en- 
vironmental factor that has received a great deal of atten- 
tion recently is that of job satisfaction. Several studies 
have recently reported that an employee's satisfaction with 
his or her job, working environment, and/or first line 
supervisor is related to LBP (6, 45). One reason for this 
relationship may be that workers who enjoy their jobs are 
willing to work through minor bouts of back pain, while 
persons who do not like their job will use the same type 
of pain as a chance to get away from an undesirable 
situation. 
Personal Factors.-A recent study has demonstrated that 
smokers have an increased risk of LBP (17). In fact, this 
study showed a dose-response relationship between 
cigarette smoking and LBP. What this means is that the 
more a person smokes, the greater is his or her risk of 
LBP. The reasons for a smoker's increased LBP risk are 
probably due to two factors: (1) Smokers develop a deep 
cough, which places increased stress on the low back, and 
(2) smoking decreases blood circulation to the spine, which 
prevents essential nutrients from being delivered, causing 
tissues to be increasingly vulnerable to injury. Other per- 
sonal risk factors involve body size. Back pain appears to 
be about twice as common in the 20% most obese (17). 
Furthermore, exceptionally tall individuals seem to have a 
higher incidence of LBP (3). Certain types of LBP (es- 
pecially those cases involving intervertebral disk problems) 
seem to have a genetic component, as well (39). 
MULTIPLE RISK FACTORS 
Although the exact relationship is not known, it is be- 
lieved that the various personal and task risk factors listed 
above interact with one another (21). That is, several risk 
factors may be present at the same time, which may in- 
crease the chances of a worker experiencing a back injury 
(14). Thus, in a general sense, the greater the number of 
risk factors an individual has, the greater the likelihood 
will be that an individual will experience an episode of 
EBP. 
As an example, let's look at a truck driver, whom we'll 
call Charlie. In his everyday job, Charlie may be exposed 
to a large number of back injury risk factors. As a truck 
driver, Charlie typically has to remain seated for prolonged 
periods of time and is exposed to whole-body vibration 
when driving. Charlie is a two-pack a day smoker and is 
also very obese, both of which Iliay increase the likelihood 
of experiencing LBP. Furthermore, Charlie has to do 
heavy lifting to unload his truck. In the unloading process, 
Charlie is forced to bend and twist to get some of the 
loads off of the truck. One can easily see that Charlie has 
a large number of risk factors that increase the likelihood 
that he will experience an injury to his lower back. 
S~r iva te  communication from Stover W. Snook, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., Aug. 1989. 
Contrast Charlie's situation with that of Frank. Frank 
works in an office. While he sits at his desk a fair amount 
of the time, he's often called upon to do other jobs that 
require him to be up and around the office. Frank is rare- 
ly required to do any heavy lifting, but is called upon to do 
light lifting every so often. Frank is a nonsmoker and 
takes pride in keeping himself in shape. Compared to 
Charlie, it should be fairly obvious that Frank has fewer 
risk factors for LBP and would be less likely to experience 
an injury. The authors want to make it clear that it is 
possible that Frank might experience a back injury, while 
Charlie may remain injury-free. However, the probability 
is that we would expect Charlie to be the one to most like- 
By experience bouts of LBP and disability. 
Looking at these two cases brings up another point. 
Let's suppose that both Charlie and Frank are experienc- 
ing a moderate amount of back pain. Frank may well be 
able to go to work and tolerate his LBP and still be able 
to do his job effectively. However, the same amount of 
back pain might be disabling for Charlie, because the pain 
may well prevent him from being able to perform the tasks 
that are required in his job. So not only does Charlie's job 
increase the chances that he will experience a back injury, 
it also increases the chances that his back pain will result 
in lost time. 
TREATMENT OF LBP 
CHOICE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT 
The majority of individuals who experience EBP cope 
with their pain without seeking any sort of medical treat- 
ment. While a large number of therapies have been at- 
tempted to combat LBP, most studies have demonstrated 
relatively little difference in the effectiveness of various 
therapies (49). One therapy that clearly fares worse than 
others is extended bed rest (49). It is clear that a few days 
of bed rest may be necessary during episodes of acute 
LBP; however, it is important that the patient be mobilized 
as soon as possible. 
MANIPULATION 
One difference that was noted in a large, carefully con- 
trolled study was that patients who received "chiropractic- 
type" rotational manipulation of the spine reported more 
immediate relief than that of the control group. However, 
over the long run there was no difference in pain relief 
between those receiving spine manipulation and those who 
did not (24). 
EXERCISE 
There is some support for the use of exercises to de- 
crease the degree of incapacity and increase the mobility 
of the spine that typically accompanies LBP. Furthermore, 
endurance training of the back muscles appears to have 
some benefits in patients with postural LBP. Finally, ex- 
ercise appears to have a significant effect in decreasing 
stress, improving the patient's attitude, and allowing better 
RETURN TO WORK 
sleep; exercise may provide a positive alternative to pro- 
longed use of medication in the chronic LBP patient. 
BACK SCHOOLS 
Back schools appear to reduce sick leave, improve work 
status, decrease pain intensity or duration, and increase the 
activity level of patients. The "self-care" approach taught 
at back schools generally consists of enhanced knowledge 
of the anatomy and physiology of the back, better body 
mechanics and work techniques, and improved muscle 
strength and flexibility. Back schools have been used for 
patients with chronic pain, short-term (acute) pain, and as 
a preventive technique for industrial workers. Of the three 
groups, back schools appear to provide most help to 
patients with acute p a h 6  
SURGERY 
Surgery is only helpful in a very small segment (1% to 
2%) of back pain cases. Successful surgery is reliant upon 
careful selection of the patient. The successful surgical 
patient must have unrelenting sciatica (back pain that 
radiates down the leg), and even then, only 5% to 10% of 
such patients should be candidates for surgery. The 
unfortunate fact is that surgery often only provides short- 
term benefits to the patient. Comparisons of surgical and 
nonsurgical patients indicate that surgical patients do 
somewhat better after 1 year, but after 4 years have 
passed, surgical and nonsurgical groups fare about the 
same (18). 
RECOVERY FROM LBP 
A study of compensation cases in 22 States for 1982 in- 
dicated that the average duration of a lost time back injury 
was 14 scheduled workdays (48). However, data from the 
U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration records of 
mining accidents in 1990 indicated that the average 
days lost for a back injury was more than three times as 
long as that mentioned in the previous study (an avcrage 
of 43 days lost)! Table 1 illustrates the percentage of 
compensation cases returning to work, by time (44). This 
table illustrates that almost two-thirds of patients returned 
to work within 2 weeks and four out of five returned with- 
in 6 weeks. However, after 6 weeks, the return to work 
was much slower. Seven percent of compensation cases 
lasted longer than 1 year. 
Table 1.-Low back compensation cases 
returning to work, by time (44) 







PROBABILITY OF RETURNING TO WORK 
Data show quite clearly that there is a limited time to 
get workers back on the job once they have experienced a 
'see footnote 5. 
back injury. Table 2 illustrates the probability of a worker 
returning to active employment after various durations of 
being off work, based on data collected in two different 
studies (33, 40). This table shows that if a worker is off 6 
months with a back injury, the chances are even that he or 
she will return to productive employment. If the worker 
is off for 1 year, there is only a one in four chance that the 
worker will return to work. But if the worker is off for 
2 years, the chances are very slim that the worker will ever 
return to the active work force. 
Table 2.-Probability of worker returning to work 
for low back compensation cases, percent 
DETERRENTS TO RETURNING TO WORK 
There are several factors that may act as barriers to the 
worker returning to work. Malingering by the worker is 
sometimes observed, but studies generally find that maling- 
ering is less prevalent than is generally believed. More 
likely deterrent factors associated with workers are psy- 
chological disability (anxiety and depression associated 
with chronic pain) (5) or illness behavior (a magnified or 
abnormal response to illness) (50-51). Management may 
also prevent an early return to work through policies that 
it may put in place. Often management does not provide 
followup or encouragement for the injured worker. Pro- 
viding modified, alternative, or part-time work to an in- 
juredemployee may help facilitate his or her early return 
McGill (33) Rosen (40) (16). Other deterrents to a quick return to work may in- 
Off work over 6 months . . . 50 35-55 clude specific contract rules, extended treatment by the 
Off work over 1 year . . . . . . 25 1 0-25 medical practitioner (IS), or situations where legal pro- 
Off work over 2 years . . . . . Nil 2- 3 
ceedings result. 
CONTROL OF LBP 
There are three traditional approaches to the control of unnecessary bending and twisting. Appropriate packaging 
back pain that will be considered here. These are (in of objects (to ensure that object weights match worker 
order of effectiveness) job design (ergonomics), worker capabilities) will also reduce exposure to excessive loads. 
selection and job placement, and education and training. In addition, proper seat design (providing an adjustable 
These will be discussed briefly below; however, a more seat with good lumbar support and vibration damping) can 
extended treatment of job design is given in a companion reduce the stress on the low back (28, 46). 
paper in this proceedings (23). Management is sometimes .reluctant to redesign jobs 
because of the costs involved. However, many companies 
JOB DESIGN (ERGONOMICS) have learned that devoting capital to job redesign is indeed 
a sound business in~es tment .~  Reduced compensation 
Ergonomics is a science that strives to improve job de- costs and increases in worker productivity will return the 
sign so that job or task demands do not exceed the physi- cost of the initial investment over time. Determining the 
cal capabilities of the worker. This approach has become payback period will help persuade management of thc cost 
quite popular in general industry over the past couple of effectiveness of redesigning jobs. 
decades, and a scattering of ergonomic committees have 
been created in the mining industry over the past several WORKER SELECTION AND JOB PLACEMENT 
years (37). Studies have indicated that the proper design 
of jobs can reduce up to one-third of all low back compen- Medical Examination 
sacion by reducing the onset of painful episodes, allowing 
the worker to stay on the job longer and permitting the 
worker to return to the job more quickly (43). 
The job design approach begins with the evaluation of 
existing jobs to identify risk factors that may lead to back 
injury. As identified previously, back injury risk factors 
may include manual handling tasks; body movements such 
as bending, twisting, and reaching; excessive loads; pro- 
longed sitting; prolonged work in static postures; and ex- 
posure to whole-body vibration. Job redesign consists of 
reducing the risk factors associated with the job. For 
example, exposure to excessive Ioads may be reduced by 
providing the worker with mechanical aids. Improving 
the layout of the workplace may also help to reduce 
It has been estimated that a maximum of 1 in 12 young 
(first hire age) workers susceptible to low back problems 
may be identified by performing a careful examination and 
obtaining a thorough medical history (41). The effective- 
ness of this approach for older workers may be somewhat 
higher (41). However, it should be pointed out that there 
is no guarantee that the workers screened out through this 
process will ever experience a bout of LBP. Use of X-rays 
in the examination process has been controversial, with the 
majority of physicians recommending that routine pre- 
placement X-rays not be used (2). 
'see footnote 5. 
Strength and Fitness Testing may be to concentrate training efforts on workers with a 
history of LBP, rather than attempting to train the entire 
Studies have indicated that the chance of a musculo- work force. 
skeletal injury is up to three times higher when the lifting 
- - - - 
requirements of a job approach or exceed a worker's iso- 
metric lifting capacity (12, 29). However, it is important 
to note that if strength testing is used to place workers in 
jobs, there is a risk of possible legal problems involving 
discriminatory hiring practices. To prevent such accusa- 
tions, it is crucial that the strength tests used to select 
workers match the job demands as closely as possible. 
In recent years, a large number of sophisticated 
strength testing devices have appeared on the market. 
However, thus far, there are no data regarding the ef- 
fectiveness of these devices in reducing LBP. 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
Training in Safe Lifting 
Teaching workers the proper method of lifting would 
appear to be a useful way to prevent back problems. 
However, the studies examining the effectiveness of this 
approach have failed to demonstrate that training has any 
effect on LBP (8, 15, 43, 52). There may be several rea- 
sons why these studies have shown no effect. For one 
thing, the quality of training in industry is typically lacking. 
Presentations are generally poor, the content of programs 
uneven, and there is usually no followup associated with 
training programs. Furthermore, workers tend not to 
Strength and Fitness Training 
Some research appears to support the notion that im- 
proving worker fitness decreases the chances of worker 
compensation claims (10). Table 3 shows the results of a 
study examining the fitness of 1,652 Los Angeles firefight- 
ers. The firefighters were divided into three fitness cate- 
gories based on strength, flexibility, heart rate and blood 
pressure, and physical work capacity. This study demon- 
strated that the most fit workers had fewer back-related 
compensation claims, the least fit had the highest number 
of claims, and those in between had a moderate number 
of claims. In a separate study (11), compensation costs 
were compared between workers with the greatest and 
least flexibility, strength, and physical work capacity. This 
study showed that workers with the greatest flexibility, 
strength, and work capacity had much lower compensation 
costs compared to those with the least flexibility, strength, 
and work capacity. The authors concluded that physical 
fitness and conditioning may have some preventive effect 
with regard to back disorders. 
Table 3.-Low back compensation claims for 1.0s Angeles 
firefighters, by level of fitness (10) 
comply with safe lifting rkcommendations, unless a Fro- Most Middle Least 
gram of performance feedback is provided (I). Safe lifting fit fit fit 
is not a way lift, more energy to per- Number of firefighters . , . . . . . . . . 266 1,127 259 
form, and is generally harder to do (22)- Uninjured work- LOW back compensation claims . . % . . 0.77 3.19 7.14 
ers are particularly hard to motivate. A better approach 
SUMMARY 
The economic costs of LBP are overshadowed only by injury does occur, there is a limited amount of time to get 
the pain and disability experienced by the sufferer. De- the worker back on the job. The longer the worker is off 
spite significant advances in knowledge of the low back, the job, the greater the chances are that the worker will 
the exact causes of LBP remain largely unknown. We do not return. Three main approaches have been used to 
know that there are several risk factors that increase the control LBP: job design (ergonomics), worker selection 
chances of experiencing LBP. These include lifting, bend- and job placement, and education and training. Of these, 
ing and twisting of the trunk, prolonged sitting, expo- job design appears to offer the greatest ability to reduce 
sure to whole-body vibration, and smoking. The best the occurrence of LBP; however, most effective back injury 
. . 
methods for controlling EBP in the workplace is to reduce control efforts use a combination of the approaches listed 
the worker's exposure to these risk factors. If a back above. 
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A SClENTlFlC LOOK AT BACK BELTS 
By Sean ~ a l l a ~ h e r '  and Christopher A.  amr rick^ 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years there has been a tremendous increase of these have been based on sound scientific evidence. In 
in the use of back belts by companies attempting to con- fact, there is contradictory information on the value of 
trol back injury costs. Many claims have been made re- back belts. The U.S. Bureau of Mines reviewed literature 
garding the effectiveness of back belts; howcvcr, not many relating to the effectiveness of back belts in the workplace. 
A tremendous increase in the use of back belts by com- 
panies attempting to control back injury costs has been 
seen in recent pears. Numerous belt designs are being 
made available to industry, based on the premise that they 
reduce the risk of low back pain. Many claims have been 
made regarding the effectiveness of back belts; however, 
not many of these have been based on sound scientific 
evidence. In fact, there is contradictory information on the 
value of back belts. Some studies have supported the use 
of belts, while others havc suggested that workers would 
be better advised to refrain from their use. As part of its 
program to enhance safety for the underground mine 
worker, the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) has reviewed 
evidence relating to the effectiveness of back belts and 
provided some suggestions relating to the use of back belts 
in the workplace. This paper is largely based on a review 
of back belt literature by the noted spinal biomechanist 
S. M. McGill (ll).3 
There are several potential benefits and drawbacks 
associated with wearing back bclts that should be con- 
sidered before a responsible policy call be established. Let 
us first examine the hypothesized benefits associated with 
back belt usage and the related scientific evidence. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF BACK BELTS 
The following list details the major benefits that might 4. Provide a safety margin by increasing an individual's 
be provided by back belts: tolerance to heavy loads. 
5. Decrease back injury incidence when used in indus- 
I. Decrease the load experienced by the low back. trial settings. 
2. Help to "stiffen" the spine to make it stronger. 
3. Restrict spine mobility and prevent hazardous The following sections will address the scientific evidence 
movements. related to these hypothesized benefits. 
' ~ e s e a r c h  physiologist. 
2~ndustrial engineer. 31talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. a t  the end of this paper. 
Do back belts decrease the load experienced by the low 
back? 
One of our best methods for establishing the answer to 
this qucstion is to examine muscle activity. If back belts 
decrease the load on the low back, we would expect to see 
a decrease in thi: electrical activity of the powerful back 
muscles. However, studies have convincingly shown that 
there is no difference in bxck n~uscle activity when wearing 
a belt compared with not wearing one (8, 13). Thus, back 
belts do not appear to lessen the load experienced by 
muscles of the lumbar spine (low back). 
Some have hypothesized that back belts help to reduce 
the load on the low 'back by increasing intra-abdominal 
pressure (IAP). Indeed, lifting while wcaring a belt does 
appear to increase IAP (5, 9).  Years ago, higher IAP was 
thought to be beneficial by adding supporting forccs to the 
low back (3, 14). However, recent data have caused this 
theory to be reevaluated (12, 16). It now appears that 
increased IAP has little, if any, efSect that would decrease 
the load on the spine. 
Do back belts help to stifl'en tlie spine (niake it stronger)? 
While it is generally believed that increased L4P does 
not reduce the spinal load, the pcxsibility exists that higher 
I A R  may assist thc low back by increasing the st;rfncss of 
the spine, Unfortunately, this is a difficult claim to test 
scientifically. Curreill thinking is that even if higher IAP 
does provide some additiondl stiffness, tllc advantage 
gained is probably fairly small (13, 19). Thus, at the 
present time, most back in~ury experts fcel that the justifi- 
cation for wearing belts based on increased IAP is prob- 
ably not warranted. 
Do back belts restrict spine mobility and hazardous 
movements? 
There is evidence to suggest that certain types of belts 
restrict the amount of side-to-side bending and trunk twist- 
ing that a worker can perform (19). This may be in part 
responsible for the reporlccl perception of incrcased sta- 
bility of the trunk by wedsers. However, belts currently 
available do not appear lo restrict forward bending of the 
lumbar spine. This appears to be an important exception, 
because of the fact that [he strength of the spine and its 
ability to tolerate loads arc considerably lower when the 
worker is in a forward bent position (1). Furthermore, 
this posture is associated with increased risk of back injury 
(IS). Therefore, while the reduction in side bending and 
twisting is viewed as generally positive, the fact that cur- 
rent belts do not restrict forward bending means that back 
belts still allow individuals to subject their spines to haz- 
ardous postures. 
Do back belts improve an individual's load tolerance? 
One possible benefit of back bclts is that they might 
provide a "safcty margin" by increasing the tolerance of 
individuals to heavy loads. Flowever, data from recent 
studies have indicated that wearing a back belt does not 
increase an individual's ability to sustain additional loads 
in forward bending, side bending, or twisting ( lY) .  Thus, 
it does not appear that belts provide an additional safety 
margin by increasing a worker's tolerance to heavy loads. 
Does use of back belts in industry decrease the incidence 
of back injuries? 
Several recent studics have been performed that at- 
tempted to determine whether belts actilally do reduce the 
incidence of injury (2, 6, 18, 20). Ul~fortunately, the 
studies performed thus far have bcen ol  widcly varying 
quality. Only t\vo back belt studies have bcen performed 
that use the method that provide:, 11ie hishest quality data 
(i.e., prospective studics udng rnalched control groups). 
These studies were performed by Reddell (IS) and Walsh 
(20) 
The Walsh (20) study is thc one pointcd to most fre- 
quently by back belt proponents as cvidence of the effec- 
tiveness of back bclts. Thc investigators studied 81 work- 
ers in an industrial warehousr setting. Results of this 
study did, in fact, demonstrate a reduction in lost-time 
back injuries due to use of back belts, but careful scru-. 
tiny of the data inclicates that the benefit was found only 
among workers who had experienced previous back inju- 
ries. No benefit was obscrved for previously uninjured 
cniployees. 
The second of these studics examined the effectiveness 
of back bclts, in which 642 airline baggage hanct'ers were 
observed (18). These researchers found no differences in 
back injury incidence rates between groups using back 
belts and those not using belts. However, these research- 
ers did discover a disturbing trcnd. Workers who started 
the study wearing back bclts and dropped out (discon- 
tinued use of the belts) had a higher incidence of back 
injury than any other group. The researchers in this study 
concluded that back belt use may cause some physical de- 
pendency, leaving the back at increased risk when the de- 
vice is withdrawn. 
It is important to noie that neither of the studies (18, 
20) demonstrated that bclt use haci any benefits for un- 
injured workers. However, i t  is noteworthy that belts did 
seem to help workers who had experienced prior back in- 
juries. This indicates that belts may have some usefulness 
in the workplace under certain circumstances. 
POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF BACK BELTS 
The following arguments are typical of back belt does not appear to increase an individual's load tolerance. 
detractors: However, studies have indicated that workers are willing 
to lift up to 20% more weight when wearing a belt (10). 
1. Back belts may lead to weakened back muscles Thus, it appears that workers who use belts appear willing 
(muscle atrophy). to place higher strain on the back and, in fact, are willing 
2. Back belt use causes workers to develop a "false to work at a higher percentage of their maximum load 
sense of security." tolerance. Therefore, workers who wear belts may be 
3. Increased IAP observed during back use may working with a decreased safety margin with regard to the 
result in adverse physiological changes. low back. 
Let us examine the cviilencc with regard to these issues. Do back belts result in adverse physiological changes? 
Do back belts cause back museles to become weaker 
(atrophy)? 
Several studiec h a r e  rxamincd this issue, and all of 
these studies seem to agrcc that back belts do not lead to 
a decrease in muscle strength, at lcast over the short term. 
This is consistent -; i r i ~  the observation that back muscle 
activity is not decreased with belt use, as mentioned above. 
However, a recent Swedish study suggested that while back 
belt use does not result in loss of strength, muscular 
endurance may be decreased with prolonged belt use (6). 
Back belts do seem to cause certain unwanted physio- 
logical changes to occur. The most significant of these is 
the increase in blood pressure that has been observed 
when lifting using a belt. Blood pressure has been shown 
to be elevated almost 15 mm H g  when lifting with a belt 
(7). Any individuals with a history of heart problems or 
those with significant cardiovascular risk factors should 
consult a physician prior to donning a back belt. An in- 
crease in blood pressure by 15 mm Hg may lead to serious 
health problems among those with a history of cardio- 
vascular problems. 
Do back belts create a false sense of security? 
There is some evidence that belts may lead to a false 
sense of security in workers. As noted above, lifting belts 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The foregoing information indicates a somewhat mixed 
bag of evidence-some in support of back belts and some 
in opposition. Evidence supporting use of back belts in- 
cludes some restriction in end-range motion of twisting 
and side bending, clinical evidence of a decrease in lost- 
time back injuries among those with prior back injuries, 
and a suggestion of increased trunk stiffness that may be 
of some benefit. Evidence in opposition of back belt use 
includes an increased risk of injury upon discontinuing belt 
use, increased blood pressure, and a false sense of security 
that may lead workers to overstrain their backs. 
This review of the literature indicates that the following 
approach to use of back belts should be followed (11): 
1. Back belts should be treated as a prescription item 
and should be  provided only to individuals having had a 
previous back injury. These workers should be weaned 
froin the belts as soon as it is appropriate. 
2. Back belts should not be universally distributed to 
all workers a t  a worksite, gia'en the lack of demonstrated 
effectiveness among uninjured workefs and a potential 
increased risk of injury after discontinuation of use. 
3. Individuals considered for a back belt prescription 
should be screened for cardiovascular risk because of the 
increased blood pressure associated with belt use. 
4. Individuals using back belts should be required to 
participate in a mandatory exercise program and should 
continue in the program after being weaned from the belt 
during the period of increased back injury risk. 
5. Workers using back belts should be exposed to a 
mandatory education program to ensure that the back 
belts are used properly. 
6. A full ergonomic assessment of the workplace 
should be performed to reduce any physical hazards that 
may increase the incidence of back injuries. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that back 
belts have a rather limited role to play in controlling the 
costs and incidence of back injuries. Reliance on back 
belts as a sole method of combatting this problem clearly 
does not provide an effective solution. Effective back the USBMInformation Circular 9235 (4). Employers who 
injury control programs tend to emphasize job redesign, are interested in keeping the cost of back injuries down 
where the worker's job is changed to reduce the amount are encouraged to focus on job design as a primary 
of manual lifting that has to be done (or the lifting that method of injury control, and if back belts are to be used, 
must be done is made easier) (77). Methods of job re- careful consideration should be given to the factors 
design applicable to the mining industry are contained in discussed above. 
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JOB DESIGN: AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING BACK INJURIES 
By Christopher A.   am rick' and Sean ~ a l l a ~ h e r ~  
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Bureau of Mines conducted research to re- 
duce musculoskeletal injuries. Occupationally related mus- 
culoskeletal injuries pose a significant problem to the min- 
ing industry. Ergonomics can help to reduce the costs 
associated with these injuries. Mines can institute com- 
mittees to solve ergonomic problems. These committees 
should include representatives from management, the la- 
bor force, and the medical department. Various analysis 
techniques, such as job safety analysis, task analyses, 
materials-handling flowcharts, and preliminary hazards 
analysis can be used to identify ergonomic problems in and 
around a mine. 
Once hazards have been identified, then solutions can 
is to redesign the job by eliminating the hazard, removing 
the worker from exposure, or mechanizing the task. If 
these strategies are infeasible, then the job should be 
designed so that it can be performed within the workers' 
capabilities. After any ergonomic solution is implemented, 
a followup analysis should be performed to ensure the ef- 
fectiveness of the change and to guard against the intro- 
duction of any new ergonomic or safety hazards. Physical 
fitness programs and training can be used to suppfement 
job redesign. By effectively instituting sound ergonomic 
implementation strategies, the costs associated with mus- 
culoskeletal disorders can be reduced. 
be formulated and implemented. The preferred strategy 
The U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) has undertaken rc- 
search to reduce musculoskeletal injuries as part of its 
mission to improve the health and safety of the Nation's 
miners. Given the unique hazards in mining such as 
cramped work spaces, rocky and uneven walking surfaces, 
walking surfaces covered with water, hot and cold tem- 
peratures, low levels of lighting, and rough terrain over 
which heavy vehicles operate (12),3 one would expect that 
musculoskeletal injuries are a ma~or  portion of all injuries 
in mining. According to an analysis of all underground 
coal mining accidents from the 1991 U.S. Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) accident database, 34% 
were classified as sprains or strains, 21% occurred to the 
'Industrial engineer. 
'Research physiologist. 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
3~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this paper. 
back, 24% were due to "overexertion," and 24% involved 
the handling of materials. 
In addition to the pain and human suffering created by 
these injuries, they result in a significant amount of lost 
time and, hence, lost productivity and contribute to high 
health care and compensation costs. In fact, Plummer, 
(14) reported that back injuries alone account for close to 
20% of all payroll dollars. According to an informal 
USBM analysis, in 1991 the average coal mining back in- 
jury cost over $8,400 and the total cost to society for coal 
mining back injuries was over $30 million. 
Many musculoskeletal injuries are a result of cumulative 
trauma, or wear and tear that occurs over a relatively long 
period of time (8). One science that deals with the reduc- 
tion of such injuries is ergonomics, the study of how hu- 
man beings relate to their work environment. By using er- 
gonomics, the occurrence of musculoskeletal disorders in 
the workplace can be reduced. One approach that has 
been successfully used by the general industry, and the period after the establishment of ergonomics committees 
mining industry as well, to combat musculoskeletal injuries at the mine sites studied. These ergonomics committees 
is to establish an ergonomics committee. O'Green (13) can form the basis of a successful ergonomics program. 
reported a 41% reduction in back injuries over a 4-year 
ERGONOMICS COMMllTEES 
The implementation of a successful ergonomics pro- 
gram into the workplace usually requires a multidiscipli- 
nary approach. A number of individuals from throughout 
the mining company should participate. A team approach 
should be used whcrc a committee is established to pro- 
vide a forum for the exchange of ideas and the execution 
of strategies to solve ergonomic problems. 
Effective committees should include management, la- 
bor, engineering, maintenance, personnel, and front-line 
employees; furthermore, support from each of these 
groups must be secured. In addition, the mine medical 
personnel and the safety specialist or corporate ergonomist 
should take part. Educating those involved is of utmost 
importance. According to Pope (16), it is crucial that all 
personnel be informed about "methods, goals, risk factors, 
and the possibility of prevention." Small mine operators 
may not have access to all of these personnel, but the 
committee should be comprised of as many of the above 
as is feasible. 
Including representatives from the front-line work force 
is a key element to the success of an ergonomics 
committee. Imada (10) outlines three reasons workers 
should be included in the ergonomic problem-solving 
process. H e  states that the workers are already aware of 
ergonomic principles and ergonomics simply provides 
labels for ideas already in use. Second, he reports that the 
likelihood of successful implementation of ergonomics is 
increased if the worker has some ownership in the ideas. 
Finally, Imada asserts that by the end-user implementing 
the technology, he or she "will be able to modify it to solve 
future problems," thus providing long-term benefits. 
Often times, the mine management must be sold on the 
idea of using ergonomic intervention strategies. A particu- 
larly good argument for the use of these strategies can be 
made through a cost-benefit analysis (15). When perform- 
ing such an analysis, one must include both direct and in- 
direct (or hidden) costs. Direct costs include such items 
as medical expenses, worker compensation, and liability 
costs. Indirect costs often outweigh direct costs and in- 
clude such items as lost productivity, cost of rehiring and 
retraining a new employee, and loss of employee morale 
(5). 
IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS 
After the infrastructure is in place and support is se- 
cured, the next task is to identify ergonomic problems 
through various analysis techniques. These analyses can 
vary in sophistication from informal conversations with 
employees to more formal techniques, such as job safety 
analyses. An excellent place to start identifying ergonoinic 
problems is by examining the company salety records. By 
making a table of incidence rates by job classification, 
activity at the time of the occurrence, type of injury, etc., 
one can identify particular jobs or activities that contribute 
to the most musculoskeletal injuries. One must keep in 
mind, however, that musculoskeletal injuries are often a 
result of cumulative trauma; so assigning a single cause to 
a particular claim may be erroncous in many cases. 
After the records are examined, the committee can then 
rank the jobs and the activities that need to be examined. 
Prime candidates for job redesign are those jobs that have 
a particularly high frequency of injury or those activities 
that result in particularly severe trauma. The jobs should 
be ranked by the committee and the jobs with the most 
severe ergonomic problems should bc analyzed first. 
Task analyses can then be performed so that ergonomic 
hazards associated with a particular job or task are iden- 
tified. These analyses usually involve describing in detail \, 
each motion or action required to execute a task. By 
closely examining each motion or action, the ergonomic 
stressors or the risk factors associated with a job can then 
be identified. Andersson (1) outlines the following work 
attributes as risk factors for low-back pain: heavy physical 
work, static (not moving) work postures, frequent bending 
and twisting, lifting and forceful movements, repetitive 
work, and vibration. 
One particular type of task analysis, job safety analysis, 
has recently received much attention in the mining industry 
and is ideally suited for identifying and correcting ergo- 
nomic hazards. MSHA (20) has developed a set of guide- 
lines that detail the job safety analysis process for the 
mining industry. The guidelines detail four basic steps 
involved with a job safety analysis: (1) Select the job to be 
analyzed, (2) separate the job into its basic steps, (3) iden- 
tify the hazards associated with each step, and (4) control 
each hazard. By using this method, accidents can be 
prevented by foreseeing and abolishing accidents before 
they happen. 
Since many ergonomic hazards in mining result from 
manual materials handling, Gallagher (6) suggests that the 
materials supply-handling system be examined in addition 
to the jobs. A flowchart can be developed that represents 
the movement of supplies from the delivery at the mine to 
the supply item's end use. By closely examining the flow- 
chart, unnecessary manual materials handling can be iden- 
tified and eliminated, thus reducing the miners' exposure 
to lifting hazards. Figure 1 presents an example of flow- 
charts for handling concrete blocks at two different mines. 
There is much manual handling of the materials in mine 
A, while the blocks are handled mechanically until their 
end use in mine B. 
Daling (3-4) has outlined safety analysis techniques that 
are useful for the mining industry, based upon certain cri- 
teria that the techniques must meet. The methods should 
not be too complex and should apply to most mining situa- 
tions. Furthermore, the methods should be able to gen- 
erate checklists and be cost effective. One of the hazard 
identification analyses identified as suitable for the mining 
industry that could be used to identify ergonomic hazards 
is the preliminary hazards analysis. 
According to Hammer (9), the preliminary hazards 
analysis is broad in scope and performs the following 
functions: (1) identifies possible hazards, (2) looks for 
ways to eliminate the hazard, and (3) if the hazard cannot 
be eliminated, investigates the best way to control it. A 
form is often developed where the hazard, contributing 
events, estimated probability, and means of control are 
listed. Hammer suggests a procedure of "signing off' on 
the form once the proper controls are taken so that these 
controls are sure to be carried out. Furthermore, Daling 
(4) warns of the dangers of the analyst simply filling out 
the form and caution that the analyst pay attention to sub- 
tle items and minute details. 
The mine worker should not be overlooked as a valu- 
able resource when identifying ergonomic stressors. Ask- 
ing the miner to explain conditions that contribute to 
ergonomic hazards can often provide enlightening informa- 
tion, since the miner probably knows the job requirements 
and methods better than anyone. The miner may have al- 
ready changed the workplace to lessen an existing problem 
that could result in an ergonomic stressor. 
One effective means of getting information about pos- 
sible ergonomic deficiencies from miners is with the crit- 
ical incidence technique. This method collects data based 
on "hazards, near-misses, and unsafe conditions and prac- 
tices from operationally experienced personnel" (9). The 
miner is asked about events that have happened to him or 
her or that he or she has seen first hand, similar to an 
accident investigation. If the critical incident technique is 
used to identify ergonomic problems, the work force must 
be informed about ergonomic principles. Once the ergo- 
nomic hazards have been identified, then solutions must be 
developed to eliminate or reduce the risk of these hazards. 
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DEVELOPING SOLUTIONS 
Gallagher (6) presents a model for solving materials- 
handling problems (fig. 2); this model can be used to get 
rid of other ergonomic stressors as well. The ergonomic 
problem-solving strategies in the model include redesigning 
the job, using worker selection procedures, and training 
the work force in proper work methods. 
The preferred solution to any ergonomic problem is to 
eliminate the hazard or remove the miner from any expo- 
sure. Proper planning can eliminate the need to perform 
a task at all. Gallagher (6, p. 25) provides an example in 
which an underground coal mine cut the number of manu- 
al lifts required to deliver a supply car of materials from 
800 to 400 by keeping the supplies on the supply car dur- 
ing storage. This solution requires the purchase of an 
additional supply car, but can result in great savings by 
reducing the direct and indirect costs associated with 
occupational low-back pain. 
If the hazard cannot be eliminated, the miner can be 
removed from any exposure to the hazard. For example, 
if a continuous miner operator is being exposed to dan- 
gerous levels of whole-body vibration while seated in a 
machine cab, the task could be redesigned so that the 
miner operates the machine from outside the cab using a 
remote control. The miner would then be removed from 
the vibration exposure. 
The next strategy that should be considered to redesign 
the job, providing the previous strategies cannot be used, 
is to mechanize the task. One requirement for any piece 
of mechanized equipment is that it be rugged enough to 
withstand the harsh mining environment. Conway (2) has 
provided plans for six mechanical-assist devices that can be 
used to eliminate lifting associated with some underground 
mining tasks. These devices can be easily fabricated in 
most mine shops and include such items as a timber car, 
a scoop-mounted lift boom, and a container-work station 
vehicle. If the above strategies cannot be carried out, 
then the job must be designed so that it can be performed 
within the miners' capabilities. For example, it may not be 
possible to entirely eliminate a miner's exposure to whole- 
body vibration. However, the vibration levels should be 
lessened so that they are within existing standards. Fur- 
thermore, manual materials-handling tasks can be designed 
to fit the miners' capabilities. 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) (11) provides guidelines for manual lift- 
ing that can prove useful for many situations in mining. 
Lifting capacity can be significantly lower, however, if the 
task is being performed in low coal, where the miner must 
work in constrained postures (7). One way that tasks can 
be designed to fit within a worker's capacity is to reduce 
the weight of the object being lifted. For example, 
Gallagher (7) reports that rock dust packaged in 18-kg 
(40-lb) bags is a more appropriate size than 23-kg (50-lb) 
bags, given the reduced lifting capacity in restricted 
postures. 
After any ergonomic solution is carried out, it is crucial 
that a followup analysis be performed. This followup is 
done to ensure that all ergonomic problems in the original 
job design are resolved and to guard against the introduc- 
tion of any new ergonomic or safety hazards. 
According to Snook (19), worker selection and training 
techniques alone are not an effective control for low-back 
injuries and the ergonomic redesign of jobs and worksta- 
tions is the preferred approach. However, it is often "im- 
practical, if not impossible, to design a job in such a man- 
ner that no training was required" (17). Thus, training 
should be an integral part of an effective ergonomics pro- 
gram. Furthermore, ergonomics training should be given 
to those workers who are serving on the ergonomics com- 
mittee, as expressed earlier. Training should include an 
introduction to biomechanics (including safe lifting), an- 
thropometry, and work physiology. In addition, ergonomic 
stressors common to mining, such as thermal stress, vibra- 
tion, noise, and lighting, should be discussed. Annual 
refresher training could provide an excellent forum for 
such instruction. 
Another strategy that supplements job redesign strat- 
egies to reduce occupationally related musculoskeletal 
injuries is the implementation of an exercise program. 
Exercise leads to improved strength and cardiovascular 
fitness that can, in turn, lead to a reduction in the costs 
associated with musculoskeletal injuries. However, one 
must be care-ful when implementing such a program: 
Gallagher (6, p. 28), advises that "the worker should 
consult with a physician prior to participation in any 
exercise program." 
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CONTROL OF COSTS ONCE BACK INJURY HAS OCCURRED 
The previous sections have detailed methods that can 
be useful in preventing low-back injuries. However, it is 
important for management to realize that some back injur- 
ies probably will occur, despite eflorts to prevent them. 
When back injuries do occur, the policy that management 
puts in place to deal with the injury may have a significant 
role in determining the duration of the disability and the 
costs incurred by the company. 
As discussed by Snook (la), management often does 
not respond properly whcn workers experience a back in- 
jury. The injured worker may be accused of malingering 
either by direct accusation or through innuendo. This, in 
turn, causes the workers to look for ways to get back at 
management. As such adversary situations develop, the 
costs of the injury may significantly increase for both the 
worker and management. However, as discussed by Snook 
(la), studies have indicated that enlightencd management 
can often reduce and perhaps even prevent the disability 
associated with low-back pain through a program that in- 
cludes positive acceptance of low-back pain, early in- 
tervention, good cominunicatio~l and followup, and early 
return-to-work programs. 
POSITIVE ACCEPTANCE OF LOW-BACK PAIN 
BY MANAGEMENT 
The most appropriate response by a supervisor to a 
back injury experienced by one of his or her workers is to 
show concern for the needs of the employee, and to avoid 
making rash judgments and setting up adversary relation- 
ships because of the injury. Such judgments are usually 
incorrect and may serve to make the situation worse than 
it should be. Instead, managemcnt should be trained to 
realize that a certain number of back injurics are likcly to 
occur and should be taught to rcspond in an appropriate 
manner when they do occur. The supervisor should en- 
courage the worker to seek immediate medical treatment 
and (if possible) adapt the workplace or modify the task so 
that the employee can continue to work on the job. One 
company that instituted a policy of positive acceptance of 
low-back pain immediately and dramatically reduced its 
worker compensation costs. Over a 3-year period, costs 
were reduced from over $200,000 per year to about 
$20,000 per year (18). 
EARLY INTERVENTION 
One key feature of the program described above was 
the fact that all workers complaining about low-back pain 
were immediately referred to the company clinic for 
treatment--even those with minor complaints. Treatment 
was given during work time by the company nurse. This 
treatment consisted of heat applications and nonprescrip- 
tion analgesic-anti-inflammatory drugs, such as aspirin. 
During the treatment sessions, worker education was ini- 
tiated on a one-to-one basis. The education program con- 
sisted of basic spinal anatomy and physiology, the expected 
results from the treatment regimen, proper posture, and 
suitable exercises. Light-duty work and rest periods were 
provided by managemcnt to the injured employee. If the 
initial in-house treatment was ineffective, the worker was 
referred to the company physician for further medical 
treatment. The physicians were familiarized with the phys- 
ical demands of the jobs at the company to place injured 
workers in appropriate job positions. 
Because this company encouraged the reporting of all 
episodes of low-back pain (even minor cases), it is not 
surprising that the number of cases reported actually 
increased. However, the amount of lost time due to low- 
back pain was significantly reduced. This indicates that 
the workers were able to stay on the job and did not rely 
on outside practitioners for treatment, thus reducing the 
company's cost because of low-back pain. 
FOLLOWUP AND COMMUNICATION 
When workers do become temporarily disabled, it is im- 
portant that management establishes and maintains good 
communications with the worker and appropriate medical 
personnel. Supervisors should be instructed to followup 
every disability case with a telephone call or visit before 
2 days of lost time have elapsed. The purpose of the call 
is to let the worker know that the company is concerned 
and to inform the supervisor of the status of the worker's 
rccovery. 
One company recently instituted a program that 
increased the communication between the worker, em- 
ployer, practitioner, and insurer (18). When a worker- 
compensation claim was received, the employer made im- 
mediate contact with the worker and insurer and followed 
up with calls at regular 10-day intervals to make certain 
that the claim was progressing smoothly. The possibility 
of retraining was explored for extended claims, and a liai- 
son was established between management and the insurer 
if a gradual return to work was indicated. The focus of all 
communications was that every action taken was in the 
best interest of the worker. This program significantly re- 
duced the proportion of long-term worker's compensation 
claims and also significantly reversed a trend of increasing 
accident rates (18). 
EARLY RETURN-TO-WORK PROGRAMS 
The data from several studies have shown that the long- 
er a worker is off from work because of a back injury, the 
less likely the worker will be able to return to productive 
employment. These studies underscore the importance of 
providing modified, alternative, or part-time work to the 
injured employee to facilitate a quick return to the job. 
Unfortunately, management will often extend the period of 
disability by requiring workers to be fully recovered before 
returning to work. This policy can often be more costly 
than providing modified, alternative, or part-time employ- 
ment to the injured employee. Because there appears to 
be a limited amount of time to act before losing control of 
the disability and the claim, efficient management should 
do everything in its power to encourage the worker's time- 
ly return to work. Data indicate that an early return to 
work is in the best interests of everyone: the worker, the 
company, and the union. In this regard, it may benefit 
both the company and the union to ensure that work rules 
in the current contract do not interfere with early return- 
to-work programs. 
SUMMARY 
Occupationally related musculoskeletal injuries pose a 
significant problem to the mining industry, and ergonomics 
can help to reduce the costs associated with these injuries. 
Mines can start committees to solve ergonomic problems. 
These committees should include representatives from 
management, the labor force, and the medical department. 
Various analysis techniques? such as job safety analysis, 
task analyses, materials-handling flowcharts, and prelimi- 
nary hazards anaIysis can be used to identify ergonomic 
problems in and around a mine. 
Once hazards have been identified, then solutions can 
be formulated and realized. The preferred strategy is to 
redesign the job by getting rid of the hazard, removing the 
worker from exposure, or mechanizing the task. If these 
strategies are infeasible, thcn the job should be designed 
so that it can be performed within the workers' capabili- 
ties. After any ergonomic solution is implemented, a 
followup analysis should be performed to ensure the effec- 
tiveness of the change and to guard against the introduc- 
tion of any new ergonomic or safety hazards. Physical fit- 
ness programs and training can be used to supplement job 
redesign. By effectively instituting sound ergonomic im- 
plementation strategies, a healthier work force can be 
maintained and the costs associated with musculoskeletal 
disorders can be reduced, thereby reducing health care and 
compensation costs. 
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DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING SAFETY PROGRAMS FOR IMPROVED 
WORKER PERFORMANCE: DON'T FORGET THE BASICS 
By Michael J. ~lishis' and Ronald C. ~lthouse* 
ABSTRACT 
While mines are safer today than they were in the past, 
miners are still being injured, maimed, and killed, and the 
incident and severity rates for the mining industry are still 
higher than those for most other industries. What's more, 
fatality rates are higher in the Nation's smaller mines and 
highest in the smallest mines. What can be done to im- 
prove safety in small mines? 
One key to improved safety is worker performance. To 
be effective, companies need proactive safety interventions 
involving training, changes in policies or procedures, 
and/or modifications to equipment that address mine- 
specific needs and eliminate situations where the miner's 
actions unnecessarily expose him or her to hazards. 
While outside resources such as governmental agencies, 
academic institutions, and equipment manufacturers can 
provide assistance to mine operators, it is up to individual 
mines and companies to develop effective safety programs. 
This paper reviews the basics of developing safety in- 
terventions aimed at improving worker performance and 
describes approaches for maintaining program effective- 
ness. This information is based on research conducted at 
West Virginia Uni~ersity.~ Emphasis is given to identifying 
performance discrepancies (hazardous behaviors) by obser- 
vations (safety sampling), accident data analysis, and input 
from workers and supervisors. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent decades have seen safety regulations, improved 
mining techniques, safer mining equipment, and mandated 
safety training. Efforts by governmental agencies, equip- 
ment manufacturers, management, labor, and university re- 
searchers have resulted in these safer approaches, proce- 
dures, and equipment. While mines are safer today than 
they were in the past, miners are still being injured, 
maimed, and killed, and the incident and severity rates for 
the mining industry are still higher than those for most 
'~ssistant professor, Safety and Environmental Management. 
2~rofessor and chair, Sociology and Anthropology. 
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV. 
other industries What's more, fatality rates are high- 
er in the Nation's smaller mines and highest in the small- 
est mines (3). 
Worker performance is the key to improved safety. 
Unfortunately, small mine operators with minimal re- 
sources and safety and training personnel often feel they 
lack the time, work force, and skills to develop and 
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Cooperative Agreements (3167023 and (3178052, J. M. Peay, Technical 
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at the end of this paper. 
implement effective safety programs. T o  be effective, Company records. 
companies need proactive safety interventions involving Observation of employees. 
training, changes in policy or procedures, and/or modifi- Ideas from workers and supervisors. 
cations to equipment. These innovations and changes 
must address specific mine needs and eliminate situations If safety interventions do not consider information 
where the miner's actions unnecessarily expose him or her from all of these sources, they may be based on faulty 
to hazards. 
assumptions and fail to identify an organization's under- While outside resources such as governmental agencies, lying safety problcms or the most effcctive ways to elim- 
academic institutions, and equipment manufacturers can inate those problems. Mine managers, safety officers, and provide assistance to operators, it is up to individual mines 
trainers often do not get this information. This may be a 
and companies to develop and maintain effective safety 
programs. The effectiveness of any program begins with result of inadequate planning, inappropriate information, 
the information that forms the basis of that program. The lack of time, or outdated and inadequate methods of ob- 
primary sources of information for a safety program are- taining and maintaining data. 
DATA COLLECTION AND RECORDKEEPING 
Obviously, company records should be the easiest data 
to obtain. Company records of value include reportable 
accident reports, nonreportable accident information, ci- 
tations, and the mines' roof control plan. Information on 
equipment modifications or changes, and even mainte- 
nance and production data, also may indicate a safety 
problem. 
T o  be useful, however, such records must be easy to 
obtain and in a format that is complete and detailed. 
Often, this is not the case. For example, while companies 
maintain records of reportable accidents, these records are 
often inadequate and may be functionally unusable. A 
cabinet full of accident forms is ineffective as a safety tool 
since it is difficult to analyze the data to determine prob- 
lem areas and, if only reportable accident data are main- 
tained, information about many other real or potential 
hazards may be missed. 
Many managers, safety officers, and trainers now have 
access to easily maintained, computerized accident data- 
bases. These databases may be maintained on a personal 
computer (PC) or a company minicomputer or mainframe. 
A PC can be purchased at a very modest price, and there 
are many approaches to keeping accident, violation, main- 
tenance, and production data. They may be off-the-shclf 
materials such as William's "FingerTips," or The Pennsyl- 
vania State University's (PSU's) "Management Incident 
Reporting System," or they may be  developed specifically 
for your company. In addition, there are many commer- 
summarizing accident data. Once accident information is 
summarized, it is possible to get an idea about the types of 
injuries that are occurring, the equipment or job classifi- 
cations involved, sections or shifts that have a high number 
of accidents, etc. 
However, simply maintaining accident information is 
not enough. Many accident reports do not include enough 
information about the circumstances surrounding the ac- 
cident to permit managers and/or safety officers to  make 
judgments about methods of preventing future occurrences 
of such accidents. Consider the following information 
taken from an actual report of a bolting-related accident: 
Example A: 
Job Title: Roof Bolter Helper. Work at: 
Object: Roof Bolter Galis Body Parts: Leg 
Description of Accident: Bolting roof and strained his leg. 
This description, and others like "hit by rock while bolt- 
ing," do not provide any clue to the actions of the miner at 
the time he or she was injured or if any subsequent train- 
ing, equipment modifications, policy changes, or personnel 
actions might be appropriate. 
The next description provides details about the action 
of the bolter operator at the time of the accident. This is 
the first step in gaining enough information to determine 
if some safety intervention is appropriate. 
cialspread sheets and database programs that can be B: 
easily adapted for accident and violation recordkeeping. 
If it is impossible to obtain the resources needed to 
~ , b  rit le: shuttle car opr. work at: operating machine 
establish and maintain a computerized database, some Object: ~ o o f  Bolter. Body Parts: Finger 
minimal data summarizing can be accomplished with the Description of Accident: Preparing to push resin bolt into hole 
use of simple forms. ~h~ appendix includes several with machine; as he aligned bolt head & bolt wrench, glove got 
sample forms that might be useful for collecting and caught on bolt, wrapped around bolt, pulled finger. 
SAFETY OBSERVATIONS OR BEHAVIOR SAMPLING 
Observations of workers performing their normal work 
routine is a second key to the implementation of safety 
programs. Called behavior sampling or safety sampling, 
these observations permit a connection between the ac- 
cident and the situation and hazards leading to the 
accident. 
The performance discrepancies noted during observa- 
tions may be quite different from those assumed from a 
mere analysis of accident data. For example, a large 
number of back injuries might lead one to believe that 
training workers on proper lifting procedures is in order. 
However, on-site observations may reveal that in ordcr to 
complete certain tasks, miners must twist their bodies 
whiie in awkward postures or overextend their reach; 
therefore, lifting training would not reduce the hazards 
that led to these accidents. 
Another example of the importance of observations 
concerns injuries from falling roof material. In roof bolt- 
ing, the most frequently occurring accidents involve 
injuries to the hands, arms, and shoulders caused by falls 
of roof material. Observations of bolters show that they 
often have their hands on the drill steel or drill pod-boom 
while drilling. This unnecessarily exposed them to falling 
roof material at a time when they are disturbing and frac- 
turing the top, a situation that is likely to cause falling 
rocks and/or coal. 
Observations can easily be made by managers, safety 
personnel, and/or supervisors, but there must be some sys- 
tematic approach to conducting observations to ensure that 
the data are easy to collect and meaningful. If time per- 
mits, the observer could spend half a shift watching the 
bolting operators at work, but this is not necessary. A face 
boss could gather similar information by spending 5 min/d 
at some point wheil he or she was on the section. A Roof 
Bolting Observation Sheet (see figure 1) was developed to 
help when observations of bolter operators are conducted. 
This checklist allowed the observer to record behavior for 
the most common actions performed by bolter operators. 
CONDENSING AND ANALYZING DATA 
Observations must be put in some condensed form to 
be useful. For example, the Roof Bolting Observation 
Sheet enabled the authors to make a simple tally of safe 
and exposed behaviors to determine where problems exist. 
Table 1 is a simple tally complcted from observation 
sheets collected at a multiple section mine. It was easy to 
calculate the percentage of operator actions that resulted 
in hazard exposure (i.e., unsafe acts). It was also possible 
to determine the number of operators who consistently 
performed in a manner that left them exposed to hazards. 
After collecting the observational data, they must be 
reviewed and analyzed in light of accident data to deter- 
mine specific problems. The next task is to determine the 
best approach for correcting those problems. In many 
companies, the tendency is to institute a training program 
that will instruct the miners on how to work in a safer 
manner. Depending on the nature of the hazard exposure, 
this may or may not be the most effective approach. 
Table 1.-Summary tally of  bolter operator observations 
Bolting work task Number of Unsafe acts % unsafe Problem 
observations bolters' 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Hands on rotating steel 160 29 18 3 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Hands on mast (drilling) 158 94 59 7 
Removing steels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  159 31 19 4 
Pinch points steels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77 1 1 0 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Align bolt wrench 75 4 4 0 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Hands on bolt wrench 76 25 33 5 
Hands on mast (inserting bolts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73 36 49 6 
-- - - - - - -- - - - 
 u umber of bolters observed = 12. 
ROOF BOLTING OBSERVATION SHEET 
(Single Boom Bolter - 20-foot cut) 





Crew I: - Cut I :  
Comments on unsafe acts andior 
exceptional performance 
Hand on MastIDrill Head 
Exposed 
Removing Steel from Hole 
Exposed SafeE££3 mm E!EEIRffl 
Drilling 
(W. finisher) Avoid Pinch Points 
Exposed 
Exposed 
Hand on Mast/ Drill Head 
Exposed 
Removing Steel(s) from Hole 
Exposed 
Boltinq Aligning Bolt & Wrench 
""m mm mm Exposed 
Hand on Bolt while lnserting (raisinglspinning) 
SafeE££3 mm mm Exposed 
Hand on Mast while Inserting Bolt 
Exposed 
Bolt Spin Times (fully grouted bolts only) Manufacturer's recommended time: 
Time in [TI ml ml 
seconds 
Bolt torqued Torque range: 
Y e s r r m  rrrnm r r m m  
Other Observations: circle observations (use the back of this sheet for additional comments) 
not done Methane Checks not done I Supply'ng done properly y 1 n 1 
Bslkdim not seen 
a) Jams bolt into ground (like bow! 
b) Bends over tire 
c) Bends elsewhere on bolter 
a) On ground 
b) On bolter 
c) Against rib 
Dust Box Emotied not done Canooy no canopy 
a) After bolting place 
b) When filled 
c) Due to no suction 
Figure 1 .-Roof Bolting Observation Sheet. 
B O I ~  pattern followed y 1 n 
I a) Done incorrectly 
(no extension rod, etc) I b) Done correctly 
a) Inadequate size 
b) Bolter stay under Personal protection worn Y 1 n 
Scaling done properly y 1 n 
a) Not properly positioned 
b) Not pressurized to roof 
c) Stab jacks not set 
Test Hole (if needed) 
Tramming properly y i n  
ANALYZING PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS AND THE DECISION-MAKING FLOWCHART 
Performance problems, whether relatcd to safety or worker's failure to perform the task correctly because he 
productivity, arise from many different sources and, in or she doesn't know how to do the job? If the worker has 
turn, have differing solutions. A hlit7tan perfon7tance dis- just been assigned to a new job, or must use a piece of 
crepaltcy (i.e., a worker action or behavior that isn't per- 
formed in a desired manner) must be examined in light of 
potential solutions. All too often, managers decide that 
the only ways to correct a performance discrepancy is to 
train or terminate workers when neither of these is the 
most appropriate action. 
In the book Ylnalyzing Pefomtance Problet7ts or 'You 
Really Ougltta Wanna"' (2)' a proccdure is discussed for 
analyzing performance problems and selecting appropriate 
solutions. Possible actions are suggested, such as formal 
training, practice, feedback, removing obstacles, arranging 
consequences, changing the job, and transferring or termi- 
nating personnel. To assist the manager, trainer, or safety 
officer in determining which solution is best, they devel- 
oped a decisionmaking flowchart. This flowchart was ex- 
panded by Klishiss and modified to reflect the "three E's" 
of safety: engineering, education, and enforcement. The 
modified version of the flowchart is shown in figure 2. 
This version describes possible solutions under four basic 
categories: education (training), enginecring (ergonomics), 
enforcement (policies-procedures), and personnel actions. 
To  use the flowchart, you begin by identifying the prob- 
lem, labeled on the chart as a 'pefon?7urtce discrepancy." 
Once a performance discrepancy is idcntified, decide if the 
problem is important. Just because a worker doesn't per- 
form in the appropriate manner does not mean that it is 
really a problem. Often, workers will develop their own 
patterns and routines for performing a task. These "idio- 
syncratic behaviors" may be a5 good as, if not better than, 
those in the operating or training manuals. If the bel~avior 
of the worker is safe, efficient, and productive, it is prob- 
ably not a problem and should be ignored. To use a 
sports analogy, if a batter has the wrong batting stance, 
doesn't keep his eye on the ball, "puts his foot in the 
bucket," etc., but manages lo bat .300 with power and 
doesn't strike out, does his form really matter? Getting 
the job done is the important thing. 
equipment that operates in a manner very differently from 
the old equipment, training is the best solution. 
On the other hand, perhaps the skill deficiency is a 
result of disuse of the skill. For instance, a miner who 
used to be a bolting machine operator months or years 
ago, but has been working as a continuous miner operator 
or as a shuttle car operator, is reassigned as a roof bolter. 
The worker's skills are "rusty" and he or she doesn't per- 
form in the manncr expcctcd. In this case, it is practice, 
not training that is needed to get him or her "up to snuff." 
Sometimes a worker may be performing in an unaccept- 
able manner and not realize it. No one has told the work- 
er that he or she is performing in an unsafe or unproduc- 
tive manner. The worker is doing what he or she thinks 
is right and will continue to do so until someone gives him 
or her appropriate feedback about his or her performance. 
Many of our skills or approaches will change over time, 
and perhaps we pick up an unfortunate habit or maneuver 
that isn't safe, event though it gets the job done and seems 
okay to us. If we aren't told we are performing a task in- 
correctly, we can't be expected to correct our errors. 
Perhaps the problem is not a skill deficiency; perhaps 
the task, as it is planned or designed, is not appropriate. 
That is, no matter how carefully the worker performs the 
task, there is unnecessary exposure to a hazard or ineffi- 
cient production. Then the solution is an engineering one. 
Perhaps the problem is not a skill deficiency; perhaps 
there are obstacles that prevent the task from being per- 
formed correctly. If a bolter operator doesn't have a 
torque wrench, or the methanometer is inoperative or 
missing the extension rod, the operator cannot perform the 
work safely. If there have been requests for a new torque 
wrench or mcthanometer, and none is forthcoming, it is 
not the operator's fault. In this situation, it is up to the 
manager, supervisor, or safety officer to ensure that the 
obstacle to performing a task correctly (lack of appropriate 
or functioning equipment) is removed (the miner is given 
However, if the worker's performance is unsafe or re- needed equipment). 
sults in inefficiencies that hurt production, then this is a At other times, the problem may be a case of "inappro- 
performance problem that should be corrected. The next priate consequences." Consider the situation where the 
step is to determine the cause of the discrepancy. Deter- worker's performance on a specific task may not matter, 
mine if the problem is a skill deficiency. That is, is the thus the task doesn't get performed. For example, if it is 
part of the bolter operators' job to rock dust the work- 
place after bolting it, but the supervisor ignores this task 
'OFR 113193. Coal Mine Injury Analysis: LZ Model for Reduction an inspector is around, or has general inside labor- 
Through Training. Vol. III-Accident Risk During the Roof Bolting 
Cycle: Analysis of Problems and Potential Solutions, by M. J. Klishis, ers dust it on the next shift, why would the bolter opera- 
R C. Althouse, T. J. Stobbe, R. W. Plurnrner. R. L. Grayson, L. A. tors perform the task? It matter to them if they 
Payne, and G. M. Lies. do it or not. In this case, it is up to the supervisor to 
performance 
Figure 2.-Decisionmaking flowchart. [Adapted from Mager and Pipe (2)] 
"consequate" the behavior, perhaps by "getting on" the 
bolters if they fail to rock dust. 
There are other types of inappropriate consequences. 
The most common situation involves a task that is "punish- 
ing" to perform correctly. Bolting a potted-out place 
where the automatic temporary roof support (ATRS) 
won't reach is a good example of this situation. If the 
ATRS won't reach, the roof still has to be bolted. The 
proper procedure in this situation would be to set jacks, 
build a ramp, add a crib block to the top of the ATRS, or 
use the ATRS extenders to gain the height necessary to 
get the ATRS to support the roof. Unfortunately, each of 
these choices requires considerable work, and most bolter 
operators admit that rather than go to all of this effort, 
including slowing down work on the production section, 
they will simply ignore the problem and bolt while under 
unsupported top. In this case, only a strongly enforced 
company policy that demands that the task be performed 
safely will counteract the aversive effects of performing it 
correctly. 
In other cases, the task may not be appropriate. That 
is? no matter how the worker tries, the task can't be per- 
formed safely. In these situations, the problem is an ergo- 
nomic one and the solution is an engineering one. To get 
the desired performance, the equipment will have to be re- 
designed, the environment changed, or the job redesigned 
before the worker can perform safely. For example, if the 
bolter operator can't stay under the drill canopy because 
it is too small, the canopy will have to be enlarged. If the 
bolter operator usually cannot reach the top to insert the 
glue and bolt and has to climb on top of the drill pod to 
get the necessary height, the bolting machine is obviously 
too small for the seam and only a more appropriate model 
will really solve the problem. However, an interim step 
may be to add a "step-up" device to the machine to permit 
the bolter operator to climb up on the drill pod in a safer 
manner. 
Another example might be an environmental problem. 
If an operation is plagued with bad ribs and bolter opera- 
tors are getting injured by rib rolls, then rib bolting may 
be one solution, purchasing a walk-through bolting ma- 
chine another, or perhaps both solutions are needed. 
The final alternative is a personnel action. If, after 
addressing the situation with the recommendations sug- 
gested above, the worker is still incapable of performing 
the task correctly, he or she should be transferred to a 
different job where it is possible to perform in an 
appropriate manner. If the employee is capable of per- 
forming [he task, but simply not willing to perform it cor- 
rectly, a transfer may also be in order. In either case, if 
the employee won't perform or is incapable of performing 
tasks correctly, termination should be considered, but only 
as a last option. Terminations are always a hassle, but 
may need to be considered if the safety of the employee 
and other workers is at stake. 
After going through the flowchart and looking at the 
various possibilities, there may be more than one solution 
to the problem. At this point, the best solution is select- 
ed and implemented. The best solution is determined by 
the nature of the problem, the time and resources 
available to correct the problem, and legal or contractual 
responsibilities. 
COMMUNICATION AND EMPLOYEE FEEDBACK 
Good interactive communication and employee feed- 
back are also essential in identifying, designing, and 
implementing any type of safety innovation. The workers 
are an important resource and their knowPedge can be crit- 
ical in identifying potential problem areas that have an 
impact on safety and efficiency, Today we hear much 
about total quality management and quality circles. Thcse 
techniques are effective because they rely on employees 
for input and direction. Workers have many ideas on Plow 
to improve safety and productivity. Often an individual 
employee will have developed a "gizmo" or procedure to 
make work easier, faster, and/or safer; unfortunately, 
these ideas usually don't go beyond the worker or a crew 
in the mine. 
Involving the workers themselves in the process will 
allow you access to these ideas, techniques, and mod- 
i5cations. Of course it is best to review these sug- 
gestions with experts who are knowledgeable about the 
process or equipment such as Federal or Stale agents, 
equipment manufacturers, representatives from educa- 
tional institutions, or the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) 
from the standpoint of safety and efficiency, bur usually 
these suggestions are very valuable and can be easily 
implemented. 
Another benefit gained by involving the miners them- 
selves is that they are usually more receptive to changes in 
their jobs or work routines when they are involved in plan- 
ning and/or designing those changes. The changes then 
become "their" changes rather than changes mandated by 
management. 
When a change is implemented, it is also important 
to be sure that the "message" gets through to the employ- 
ees. Effective communication requires reaching all the 
employees and informing them not only of the change, but 
the reason for that change. If not, they may not un- 
derstand why a change was made and may ignore or even 
subvert the intervention. For example, one operation 
decided to weld a small piece of pipe to the bolting 
machine. This pipe was supposed to serve as an "aid" 
when bending bolts. The change was agreed upon at a 
meeting that included the safety director and the union 
safety committee chairperson. Unfortunately, all of the 
bolter operators were not informed of the reason for this 
"modification." As a result, one operator had the pipe 
removed. Another oper-ator determined that the pipe was 
mountcd at the wrong angle, but instead of having the 
angle corrected, he or she also had the pipe cut off. As a 
result of the failure of management to communicate with 
the work force and of a worker to communicate with 
management, the well-designed intervention was a failure. 
Improved communication also means the transfer of 
ideas between sections of the same mine and/or other 
mines in the same company. In working with "umbrella" 
companies with several small mines, researchers have ob- 
served safety improvements installed in one mine but not 
in other mines of the same company. They have even ob- 
served improvements in one section of a mine but not in 
another. 
Communication also means keeping employees in- 
formed about what is happening in the mine. What kind 
of information does the face boss and/or the workers get 
when they start a shift? Are they told about safety-related 
probiems or bad conditions? Have any changes or innova- 
tions designed as a safety intervention be initiated? If so, 
what are they and why were they made? 
PROBLEMS FACED WHEN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A SAFETY PROGRAM 
Small operations, even "umbrella" operations that 
service several single unit mines, usually do not have 
enough data on accidents to make well-informed choices 
on safety and training interventions. Fortunately, accidents 
are a rare occurrence in any operation, but this results in 
a database that consists of a few, highly scattered in- 
cidences. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw con- 
clusions from such limited information. 
To  have enough information to make decisions, small 
operations need a database and hazard inventory built on 
a large accident pool. An example of one such database 
is the roof bolting accident database developed by re- 
searchers at West Virginia University's (WVU's) Mining 
Extension Se rv i~e .~  This database and the resulting haz- 
ards inventory served as a guideline for making observa- 
tions and taking actions to improve bolting safety at 
several small operations. 
Another problem safety personnel at smaller operations 
face is the need to make safety sampling observations with 
limited time and resources. Ideally, observations should 
be made by face bosses, but problems abound. There nev- 
er seems to be any time to train face bosses to make ob- 
servations, and if they are trained, they have so many de- 
mands on their time that they don't feel that they have 
time to make observations. 
Supervisors required to make observations face another 
dilemma. They don't want to look bad or have their sec- 
tion or people look bad, so they are hesitant of making 
"accurate" (truthful) observation reports for fear of actions 
against them and/or job loss. 
Although supervisors are the best persons to make safe- 
ty observations, we cannot forget the safety manager. It is 
important that safety officers go underground, learn what 
is really happening in the mine, and identify potential 
problem areas. 
TRAINING AS A SAFETY INNOVATION 
Another problem faced by operators of small mines is 
making effective use of mandated health and safety train- 
ing. Too often, training is done for compliance, not for 
safety. Training done by well-meaning, knowledgeable en- 
trepreneurs who have little knowledge of the operation's 
specific safety problems serve to comply with the law but 
do little to meet the "true" safety training needs of the 
operation. When these entrepreneurs are finished train- 
ing, the operator has a 5000-23 form with the correct 
boxes checked, but the safety level of the operation is at 
best maintained at an ongoing level, not improved. If 
training is to be an effective approach to improving safety, 
the trainer must treat training as an opportunity for im- 
provement, not just as an activity needed to comply with 
governmental regulations. 
To be effective, training must be tailored to identified, 
specific company or mine needs. Canned or generic pro- 
grams may include good information and many valid 
points, but do they really meet the needs of your orga- 
nization? Training should also go beyond mandated 
requirements. If a problem exists with a certain piece of 
equipment or job classification, take the time to give ap- 
propriate training on that area. It is easy to cut training 
to the bare minimum, but in the long run this is not cost 
effective. 
Finally, management must not view safety as a "one- 
shot" deal. Once there has been a successful implementa- 
tion of a safety intervention, the job is not over. Man- 
agement must consider safety as a continuous process that 
requires constant attention and effective communications 
to maintain quality and safety on all working sections. 
Effective training involves the entire organization in an 
attempt to keep the workers safe and productive. 
Management must demonstrate its support for the 
training effort. This means taking interest in the training 
program, meeting with workers during annual refresher 
training sessions, and encouraging them to work in a safe 
manner. It means demanding that supervisors work in a 
safe manner and that they ensure that work crews and in- 
dividual miners are also working safely. 
OTHER INITIATIVES 
While mine operators have the primary responsibility operators is needed from Federal and State agencies, 
for maintaining a safe workplace, it is difficult for them to technical schools, junior colleges, and major mining 
"go it alone." Safety and training assistance for small institutions with "outreach" services (WVU, PSU, etc.). In 
1980, a report by John Short & ~ssoc ia tes  (4) suggested 
%Vork cited in footnote 5. that the most effective approach to work force 
development and training in the nining industry would be 
a national mining extension service. Perhaps it is time to 
reexamine that idea and strengthen the service to small 
operators. In this light, WVU's Mining Extension Service 
has recently stepped up and expanded its service to small 
rr,ine operators in West Virginia. 
The USBM has long been involved in research that has 
been a tremendous assistance to the mining industry. To 
be most effective, the USBM should continue to place an 
increased emphasis on human factors and training for 
small mine operators while maintaining its traditional re- 
search orientation for equipment and mining techniques. 
The intcrcliange of information is one key to successful 
safety and training programs. All governmental agencies 
should encourage and support local, regional, and national 
meetings of safcty and training personnel, such as the 
Holmes Saie!y Association, S!ate grants meetings, training 
resnurccs applied to mining, and the National Mine In- 
structors Conference. 
Of course the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administra- 
tion (MSHA) has an important function and can be a key 
agency in the improvement of safety in small mines. It 
should continue its efforts to develop easy access of Safety 
and Health Technical Center (SHTC) data for all opera- 
tors (such as data on diskettes and user-friendly pro- 
grams), but it can also provide much needed data to the 
small operator and academic researchers by conducting 
Gncr grained, more useful analyses of accidents in the 
SHTC database. These analyses should be similar to the 
"microanalysis" conducted at W W ?  
What does this have to do with small mine operators? 
Simply put, while government agencies and educational in- 
stitutions strive to provide the assistance and services 
needed most by the mining industry, small mine operators 
need to make their needs and wishes known to these agen- 
cies and encourage the support and funding of programs 
that are beneficial and practical. 
CONCLUSIONS 
T ~ P ,  safety program basics suggcstcd here involve iden- 
tifying situations and conditions under which miners arc 
injured and using that information to develop interventions 
for critical areas in the job task. The key steps in this 
process are the analysis of accident and injury data, obser- 
vations of employees performing tasks, communications 
between workers and supervisors, and development of 
appropriate training. 
Although govcrnmcntal agencies can provide assistance 
to operators in the form of research, especially in the area 
of human factors, and assistance in the interchange of 
ideas, it is up to the operator to place the appropriate 
emphasis on safety and training at his or her operation. 
This means management's involvement in the effort and 
viewing safety and training as an ongoing, ever-changing, 
integrated process. 
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APPENDIX.-ACCIDENT DATA COLLECTION AND SUMMARY FORMS 
When building a safety program that will permit the dc- 
velopment and implementation of safely interventions, one 
resource is company data such as accident and injury in- 
formation. Other company records of value include cita- 
tions of the roof control plan, informallon on equipment 
modifications or changcs, and even maintenance and pro- 
duction data. To  be useful, however, such records must 
be easily obtainable and in a format that is complete and 
appropriately detailed, which means establishing a com- 
prehensive and useful database. 
The focus of any safety program begins with accident 
and injury data. Unfortunately, these accidcnt records are 
often inadequate or unusable. While accident information 
is required by regulatory agcncics (MSI-TA and State min- 
ing departments) and for insurance purposes (Worker's 
Compensation), it is often main1aint:d as a number of re- 
ports in a filing cabinet. These repurls may not be an 
effective safcty tool since (1) [hey a! c designed to meet the 
needs of outside agencies, not comp,iny safety ant1 training 
personnel, and (2) it is diffical~ to ~inclIy7c. data that arc in 
raw report form. 
The first step in establishing a n  cffcctivc database be- 
gins with the collection of accideni data that are useful t s  
a safety program. W h i l ~  thc inlorn~atinrl required by gov- 
ernment agencies may hr o I  soii~c. u w ,  rherlx are many 
"nonreportable" accidents that s1it:uld be considcred, In 
addition, the most important inforrxation in an accident 
report is thc description of the bnruarlon or circumstances 
that surround the accident: lVhrlr \v'ts file worker tieing 
just before and when he or s11c got injured; how dicl 11e or 
she get in[ (>  ihc situation; i f  t h~ l r t ,  \,b1:i< :In\! warning b~\ lore  
the incidcnt nccurrcd, ho,.,~ did t1;e worker r~.act: and what 
can be done LO prevent such an in (  iclcnt in tlic futurc! 
To  get this inlormalion you need an accident Form that 
specifies the leporting of incidcnts in enough Qctail and 
a company pol~cy rcquirlng the rzporting of all incidents 
wherc a wnrkcr i c  inji~r.c,d. Tliic rc r l~ i i r .c \  grltirig a report 
from the victim and/or the \*ictiln s supervisor, as well as 
a followup visit, especially in the case of nonfatal days lost 
(NFDL's), to discuss the accident with the victim, the su- 
pervlsor. and any witnesses. The two-gage mine accident 
form with its accompanying supplemental third page for 
evaluation by a safety officer is an example of such a 
method of collecting accident information (see figure A-1). 
You may find it useful for your operation 
The key to this form is the narrative description of the 
accident (second page) and the accident assessment (third 
pagc). Gctting detailed information on the incident rather 
than simplistic descriptions such as "hit by rock" will give 
you an idea of the kind of problems that rnay exist and a 
starting point for observations. 
The second step in maintaining accidcnt data is 
consolidation into a useful summary that permits safety of- 
ficials and mine management to maintain a "handle" on ac- 
cidents. Such a form may be similar to the mine's pro- 
duction reports. There are two forms in this package that 
may bc useful. The first, called the Accident Summary 
Shcct (fig. A-2), is designed to keep a running tally of 
acciden~s. The second, called the Lost Time Accident 
Summary Sheel (fig. A-3), serves as a simple way to sum- 
marlze accidents on a monthly and yearly basis. 
Once the mine's accident data has been summarized, 
the mine operator can look for trends or problem areas. 
Remember, it is necessary to couple the analysis of ac- 
cident data with a review of the narrative descriptions of 
the accidents and on-site observations to be able to pin- 
point both the problem and its cause, as wcll as to identify 
potential corrective actions. 
Don't forget the olher company data. Citations for 
safety violations from Federal and State inspectors or 
writcups from company compliance officers can help to 
pinpoint problem areas. As with accident information, 
there has to be some organization of the information. A 
simple listing made on a form such as the Violation Sum- 
mary Sheet (fig. A-4) might be helpful in identifying re- 
peated violations that can be a sign of a problem. 
Mine Accident Form 
N a m e :  Date of Accident: 
W i t n e s s :  Time of Accident: 
M i n e :  Date Reported: 
Age: Sex: M / F 
Days Lost From Work: Was there time lost from work (or) time lost and restricted work? Y / N 
Total lost days from work (if any) 
Occupational Information 
Regular J o b  Title: - 
Job/Activity When Injured: -- 
Total Years Mining Experience: Years a t  Present Mine: 
Years a t  Present Job title: 
Accident Information 
Location of Accident in the Mine: (Circle all appropriate choices) 
Underpound / Surface 
1. Face 4. Mantrip / transportation 
2. Intersection 5. Underground shop or office 
3. Haulage way 6.  Belt area 
7. O t h e r  
Source of Injury: 
What Object/Material caused the injury, i.e., drill steel, falling roof, electrical cable, crib ... etc.) 
Body Par ts  Injured and Type of Injury (list a s  many as applicable!: 
Part Inlured of b-cture. etc.1 
- 
Figure A-1 .-Mine Accident Form. 
Description of Accident 
Instructions: 
Please give a detailed description of the accident. The purpose of this 
form is to help in the development of safety and training materials to 
make it safer to work in this mine. The more information you give 
the more useful it  will be to you and your fellow workers. 
Thank you. 
Figure A-1 .-Mine Accident Form--Continued. 
Accident Form Supplement 
(To be completed by safety officer) 
N a m e :  Date of Accident: 
Mine:  Date Reported: 
Is there safetyltraining material that  is related to this accident on hand? Y 1 N 
If YES, is the material current? Y 1 N 
Has the injured received safetyltraining material related to this accident in the last year? Y 1 N 
Personal observations from accident site: 
Comments from supervisor1witnesses: 
Provide an assessment of the accident including what actions can be taken to prevent the 
reoccurence of this type of accident: 
Figure A-1.-Mine Accident Form--Continued. 
ACCIDENT SUMMARY SHEET 
TOTALS (per accident type): 
Date 
HANDLING MATERIALS HAND TOOLS FALL of FACE or RIB 
HAULAGE ROOF FALLS FALLING or SLIPPING OBJECTS 
MACHINERY STEPPING or KNEELING on OBJECTS OTHERS 
SLIPS and FALLS ELECTRICITY 
Figure A-2.-Accident Summary Sheet. 
Regular 
Job Classification 




Accident Type Details of Accident 
-- 







TOTAL INCIDENT RATES 
TOTAL E 
Figure A-3.-Lost Time Accident Summary Sheet. 
VIOLATION SUMMARY SHEET 
DATE SUBJECT OF STATEIFEDERAL VIOLATION REGULATION DESCRIPTION 
I 
Figure A-4.-Violation Summary Sheet. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING FOR SMALL MINES: WHO NEEDS IT? 
By Launa ~ a l l e t t , '  Michael J. Brnich, Jr., and Charles vaughtl 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses emergency response planning with past mine emergency situations are used to highlight the 
a special emphasis on small minesites. It addresses the discussion. The paper is intended to stimulate the thinking 
importance of an emergency response plan and offers of both small mine operators and those safety profes- 
some tips for developing a useful document. The content sionals who work with individuals from small mines. It is 
of the paper is based on U.S. Bureau of Mines research not meant to be the final word on emergency response 
focusing on mine emergency response. Examples from plans. 
INTRODUCTION 
Emergencies disrupt organizational routine. By their 
very nature, they create confusion and uncertainty. The 
expertise needed to respond effectively may not be com- 
mon in an organization. One reason is that emergencies, 
being rare events, demand certain skills that are not 
developed during normal operations. If no one on site has 
those skills, the natural confusion and uncertainty will be 
compounded: 
. . . the two owners . . . got there basically about 
the same time. . . I said, "Hey, . . . we've had a rock 
fall. We got one guy that's not accounted for. What 
do we need to do here?" . . . These guys have been 
in business 20 plus years each, and they had never 
had nothing like this happen before . . . 
when the unforeseen emergency occurs? Chaos is likely to 
be the result. 
One of the major factors determining how quickly a 
situation may be brought under control is the amount of 
emergency response planning that has been done previ- 
ously by mine management. Emergency response planning 
in larger organizations is often done as a matter of course 
by the safety or training specialist at the mine or by a 
special team at the corporate office. Small mine personnel 
do not have these luxuries and must therefore put forth a 
special effort to prepare themselves for the worst, even 
while hoping the worst never happens. Because small 
mines usually have fewer immediate assets to draw upon, 
this planning becomes especially critical. 
The insights about planning contained in this paper 
come from information that was obtained during U.S. 
The two small mine owners mentioned above had put Bureau of Mines (USBM) research that has been con- ducted over the past 4 years. The work is part of an over- together a management team that possessed the necessary 
all USBM effort to improve the efficiency and effective- 
expertise. They had a n  experienced safety director who 
ness of emergency response activities and thereby protect 
assisted Ihem through a lengthy recovery Is potential victims and response The authors 
there someone at every minesite has that re- have reviewed literature that addresses all types of emer- 
sponsibility, experience, and ability? If not, what happens gency response. They have also conducted in-depth inter- 
views with 28 individuals who have extensive eGerience 
managing large-scale mine emergencies and 10 people who l~esea rch  sociologist. 
 inin in^ engineer. played key roles in responding to a major mine fire. This 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. paper is based on preliminary analyses of these data. 
SOME DEFINING FACTORS OF A SMALL MINE 
For the purposes of this paper, a small mine is defined 
by a number of characteristics that are relevant to emer- 
gency rcsponse planning and activities. First, a small mine 
has limited resources, most of which go to production 
activities. There is little funding or personnel available for 
emergency response plan research, preparation, and train- 
ing. The person who is responsible for safety at the mine 
may also perform a number of other tasks during a work- 
day. This individual therefore has limited time and little 
(if any) money allocated to planning for a futurc event that 
may or may not happen. Second, the work force is small 
enough that management knows each employee and work- 
ers all know each other. If an injury or fatality takes 
place, responders know the victim and often also know 
that person's family. This increases the amount of stress 
on everyone during a response. A third characteristic of 
a small mine is local control. In other words, management 
personnel who conduct daily operations at the minesite 
will also be accountable for response efforts. There may 
not be experts from a corporate office who can be called 
or flown in to assist with decisionmaking. Even when they 
have a vast knowledge of mining, key decisionmakers at a 
small mine may have little or no experience with situations 
they will face during an emergency. All these factors pre- 
sent the operators of small mines with special concerns 
regarding mine emergency response. 
WHY PLAN FOR EMERGENCIES? 
According to the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Adminis- 
tration (MSHA) statistics for the 3-year period 1989-1991, 
there were 76 miners killed, 138 permanently disabled, and 
thousands more seriously injured at mines employing 50 
or fewer workers. When an incident occurs at a site, thcre 
will be an effort to rescue any trapped victims, get medical 
assistance, clean up the affected area, corrcct all hazards, 
and return the mine to production as soon as possible. If 
each of these activities must be planned as it is conducted, 
valuable time will be lost and responders who are under 
stress because of the event may not be able to make the 
best possiblt: decisions. If ernergcncy rcsponse planning is 
done before an event happens, it will be less difficult and 
take less time to return the mine to normal operation. 
A compelling argument for preplanning comes from 3 
situation created when miners survive the initial impact of 
an event and need immediate rescue. Take, for example, 
a roof fall that occurred in Pennsylvania (4).3 Two miners 
were attempting to pry down loose top a couple of feet 
inby permanent supports when the roof came down on 
them. One worker was covered completcly and the other 
was pinned from his knees down. Crew members removed 
the rock from these two victims. A miner who was an 
emergency medical technician (EMT) administered first 
aid at the scene and sent both victims outside to arriving 
ambulances. Initial reports stated that both individuals 
suffered broken legs. While this was true and one worker 
eventually recovered completely, the other worker's right 
leg had to be amputated. 
Frequently, self-protection is not the first thing that 
rescuers think about when someone is,in trouble. The 
State report on this accident docs not mention any safety 
precautions that the rescuers took while trying to remove 
the victims. It does not tell whether or not the rescuers 
had been trained to protect themselves in such a situation. 
It also docs not mention the added stress on two of the 
rescuers; one was the brother of a victim and the other 
was a cousin. The cousin was the section E M T  and was 
therefore called on to assess both victims' injuries and 
treat them. The State Bureau of Deep Mine Safety was 
not officially notified of the accident. While this violation 
may not be as important as the life and safety of two 
miners, it is an important response detail that was not 
dealt wilh when the event occurred. In this case, rock 
removal was relatively easy and the victims were soon on 
their way to a hospital. But, if the roof fall had been 
larger and the response longer, would the rescuers have 
been ready? Would the right telephone calls have been 
made eventually? Would the victims have time to wait for 
someone to decide what should be done? These questions 
cannot be answered for this event, but they should be 
considered at all mines before a serious injury occurs. 
WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY? 
A violation was written in the incident cited above their agency of the event. While it is not possible here 
because State investigators determined that mine manage- to go through all State regulations pertaining to coal mine 
ment had not complied with regulations and informed emergencies, thcre are Federal regulations that can be 
., 
reviewed (6). Both underground and surface mine opera- 
3 ~ t a ~ i c  numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references tors are required by Federal law to be prepared to man- 
at the end of this paper. age and respond to mine emergencies when they occur. 
Underground coal mines are covered under regulations 
in 30 CFR 49, 50, and 75 while surface coal mines and 
surface areas of underground coal mines are governed by 
regulations in 30 CFR 50 and 77. 
Regulations under 30 CFR 49 (section 49.9) require all 
underground mine operators to have a mine emergency 
notification plan. Within this plan, operators must outline 
procedures that are to be followed for notifying mine 
rescue teams when their services are required. Copics 
of the plan must be posted for workers' information and 
made available to the mincrs' representative where ap- 
plicable. Section 50.2 (h) of 30 CFR 50 stipulates the re- 
quirements for notifying MSHA of all accidents. Oper- 
ators of underground mines must also make arrangements 
for emergency medical assistance and transportation of 
injured persons, as specified in 30 CFR 75 (section 1713- 
1). In addition to making these arrangements, the oper- 
ator must post at appropriate ioca~ions the names, titlcs, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons or ser- 
vices that are currently undcr such arrangements to pro- 
vide medical assistance and transportation. 
Section 383 of 30 CFR 75 rcquires that underground 
mine operators conduct practicc drills to familiarize their 
miners with emergency escape procedures. At lcast once 
every 90 days, each miner, including thosc with work loca- 
tions between working scctions and main escapeways, is 
requircd to participatc in a practice drill. During the drill, 
each miner is rcquired to travel either the primary or 
alternate cscapeway from his or her working section to the 
point where the split of air ventilating the section inter- 
sects with a main aircoursc or 608 m (2,000 ft) outby the 
section's loading point, whichever distance is greatcr. All 
other miners arc to participatc in cscapcway drills by 
traveling at least 608 m (2,000 ft) in cithcr the primary or 
alternate escapeway from his or her work location toward 
the nearest escapc facility or drift opening. 
Besides the 90-day drills, at least two miners from cach 
production section who work on that scction and the 
supervisor must participatc in practice drills and travcl 
through the primary or alternate cscapeways to the sur- 
face, mechanical escape facilities, or to an underground 
entrance lo a shaft or slope to the surface at least once 
every 6 weeks. In addition, at lcast two miners and a su- 
pervisor on cach maintenance shift shall participate in 
escapeway drills by traveling through the primary or altcr- 
nate escapeways to the surfacc, mechanical escape facil- 
ities, or to an underground entrance to a shaft or slope to 
the surface at lcast once every G weeks. In all cases, each 
escapeway drill cannot be conducted in the same escapc- 
way as the immediately preceding drill. For the 6-week 
drills, operators are required to systematically rotate 
personnel to ensure that all miners participate. The prac- 
tice escapeway drills required undcr section 383 of 30 CFR 
75 may be used to satisfy the evacuation specifications of 
fire drills that are requi~cd by section 1101-23 of 30 CFR 
75. Either before or during practice drills, miners must be 
informed of the following: the route of escape and any 
changes to these routes; the location of fire doors, check 
curtains, or smoke-retarding doors; and the plans for 
diverting smoke away from mine escapeways. 
The remaining regulations that address emergency 
response for underground mine operators are related 
specifically to fires. An operator is required to adopt a 
program for instructing all mincrs in the use of fire- 
fighting equipment and in proccdurcs for evacuating their 
mine (30 CFK 75, scction 1101-23). This program, which 
is submitted to thc MSHA district manager for approval, 
must include a specific fire-fighting and evacuation plan 
designed to familiarize mincrs at an operation with proce- 
dures for (1) cvacuation of workers not ncedcd for fire- 
fighting activities, (2) rapid marshalling and deployment of 
ileccssarjr personfie!, fire-fighting eqaipment, and rescue 
apparatus to the fire scene, and (3) opcration of fire- 
fighting equipment at the mine. 
Under the provisions of section 1101-23 of 30 CFR 75, 
mine opcrators must cnsure that at lcast two workers per 
scction on each production shift are proficient in the use 
of all fire-fighting equipment available in that section. 
Those workers are also to know thc location of this ap- 
paratus in their section. Operators of attended equipment, 
such as continuous mincrs and shuttlc cars, must be pro- 
ficicnt in using the machine's fire-suppression system. On 
maintenance shifts, the shift forcman and at lcast one 
miner for every five working on that shift must be pro- 
ficient in the usc of firc-fighting cquipmcnt available in the 
mine. In addition, they arc rcquircd to know the location 
of this cquipmcnt. 
Section 1101-23 of 30 CFR 75 also compcls operators 
to ensure that all mincrs employcd undcrground partic- 
ipate in firc drills. Thcsc drills, which must takc place at 
intervals of not more than 90 days, arc to sinlulatc thosc 
actions rcquircd by thc MSHA-approvcd firc-fighting and 
evacuation plan. Mine operators also have to keep a 
record of all firc drills hcld at thc minc. Finally, mine 
opcrators must provide annual instructiun, based on the 
approvcd plan, to all miners aild to newly employed 
miners within 6 months cf thcir date of employment. 
Surfacc coal mines and surface areas of undcrground 
mines arc govcrncd by minc cmergcncy rcsponse rcgula- 
tions found in 30 CFR 77. Whilc the stipulations of these 
regulations are similar to those for underground mines, 
thcy arc considerably lcss stringent and subject to greater 
interpretation. Surfacc operations arc requircd to make 
arrangements for cmcrgcncy medical assistance and trans- 
portation of persons injured at the minc, as specified in 
section 1702 of 30 CFR 77. Tn addition to making thcse 
arrangemcnts, an operator must post at appropriate loca- 
tions the namcs, titlcs, addresses, and tzlcphonc numbers 
of all persons or seavices that are currently under 
such arrangements to provide medical assistance and 
transportation. 
There are also regulations specific to fire emergencies. 
Under 30 CFR 77, section 1100, operators are to provide 
fire-fighting facilities and equipment based upon the 
potential fire hazards at each structure or other facility at 
their mine. Operators must instruct persons working at 
these facilities and retrain them annually in the use of 
available fire-fighting facilities and equipment. Surface 
mines and surface areas of underground mines must have 
escape and evacuation plans. Section 1101 of 30 CFR 77 
specifies that operators are required to establish and keep 
up to date a specific escape and evacuation plan that is 
to be followed in the event of a fire. In addition, this plan 
has to include the designation and proper maintenance 
of adequate means for exit from all areas where miners 
or others are required to work or travel. This includes 
buildings, equipment, and all areas where persons normally 
congregate during the work shift. In addition, all employ- 
ees must receive instruction on the escape and evacuation 
plans, fire alarm signals, and applicable procedures to be 
followed in case of a fire. 
Therefore, in terms of general emergency response 
planning, all mine operators are required by law to do the 
following: 
1. Make arrangements for emergency medical assist- 
ance and transportation. 
2. Post information about medical assistance providers 
at appropriate locations. 
3. Develop evacuation and escape plans. 
4. Train miners in evacuation and escape. (Under- 
ground mines must also conduct drills.) 
5. Develop an emergency plan for notification of mine 
rescue teams (underground only). 
6. Post emergency plan (underground only). 
The minimal mine emergency response planning current- 
ly mandated by Federal law consists of addressing those 
regulations that cite details for fire emergency planning 
(discussed above) and the items listed here. 
IS MORE NEEDED THAN WHAT IS REQUIRED BY LAW? 
All rules and regulations only specify what is accept- 
able at a minimum. Policies attempt to ensure compliance 
under real-world conditions. Strictly adhering tc what is 
legally required in the way of mine emergency planning 
may offer enough protection for small-scale accidents or 
situations in which an evacuation can be accomplished eas- 
ily. When something more serious occurs, however, mini- 
mal planning will provide only for minimal activities 
related to mine evacuation, obtaining medical attention 
for any injured workers, and calling for assistance from a 
mine rescue team. There are no requirements to plan for 
a well-coordinated response that can protect personnel and 
return the mine to routine production in an efficient 
manner. 
There is a wide range of possible emergencies that can 
be encountered at a minesite. Many mining companies 
have not developed formal plans for dealing with these 
potential events. Instead, they have relied upon the skills 
of upper level mine managers and others in analyzing and 
responding to emergencies as they have arisen. In some 
cases, these informal procedures have worked well and 
many events have been managed successfully without the 
use of a formal emergency plan. At the same time, how- 
ever, managing a mine emergency without a formal plan 
can pose great risks and result in poor handling of the 
event. There may be mine emergencies that exceed the 
technical capabilities of initial responders. In some events, 
the best technical people can become involved in front-line 
rescue or exploratory work when they could be better 
utilized on the surface. A disaster may incapacitate or kill 
key management officials. In other cases, the emergency 
can be of such magnitude that successful management re- 
quires sizable outlays for personnel, materials, technical 
advisors, and services of external organizations. One way 
to be prepared is to develop an emergency response plan. 
An emergency response plan is an all-encompassing 
document. It covers many aspects of response, including 
the following: (1) evacuating the mine, (2) setting up site 
security, (3) dealing with the media, (4) providing infor- 
mation to family members, (5) determining where cars 
should be parked to lessen traffic problems, and (6) sched- 
uling shifts for workers, including decisionmakers. There 
are many other aspects of response that should be con- 
sidered. However, the resulting plan should not be an 
encyclopedia that is too long and complex to understand. 
Instead, the plan should be a living document that is kept 
up to date, is tested and refined during practica, and is 
useful if it is ever needed. Selected details of what goes 
into a plan will be discussed in the section "What's In- 
cluded in an Emergency Response Plan?" The first step 
in planning, however, is to decide that simple adherence to 
the laws regarding emergency response will not offer as 
much protection to a mine and the people who work there 
as is possible. Next, one must be willing to allocate 
resources to go that extra step toward being prepared for 
a large-scale mine emergency. 
HOW IS AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN DEVELOPED? 
When asked whether or not they have a mine emer- 
gency response plan, operators often point to a page of 
instructions hanging by a phone, or to a notebook or 
manual on a shelf. These documents may, in fact, be the 
written form of a good plan. But, for the plan to be suc- 
cessfully carried out, it must be more than a document 
that someone is to refer to when an event occurs. Having 
a workable plan starts with how it is developed. According 
to Auf der Heide ( I ) ,  "The process of planning is more 
important than the written document that results." 
A plan should be developed by the individuals who will 
be involved if it should have to be implemented. In his 
book "Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and 
Coordination," Auf der Heide ( I )  provides several reasons 
for this. He  states that developers will have a better 
understanding of the plan. They will also know their roles 
in it. Additionally, personal networking will take place 
between key responders. The education about emergency 
response combined with personal relationships people 
form while writing a plan will prepare them individually 
for the things they must do if an event occurs. An ex- 
ample of this was given by a safety director who led the 
planning process for his mine. When a large-scale re- 
sponse was needed, he did not think to refer to the docu- 
ment created. H e  led the activities based on the education 
and thinking he had done while creating their responsc 
plan: 
Sitting down ah, I guess, laying out a format at 
one time. I did lay out a format for some ah, mines 
that I was working for, you know, of what to do in 
case of an emergency; who to call, and what to do 
. . .As a matter of fact, I'd even made one for this 
mine, but at that time everything was happening, I 
didn't even think about it, you know. I had it 
hanging on the wall. Ah, it was there for everybody 
to ah, in case of an emergency, to go to. Had the 
list of all the emergency phone numbers, who to call, 
who to call first, what information to find out before 
you call, and so on. And um, it just, like I said, at 
that time it just, it just went blank that I had that. 
But I designed it any way, and I prepared it. So it 
was still in my mind, you know. What I should do. 
This responder had learned the plan as it was written and 
was prepared to carry out the protocols that he had helped 
develop. At the very least, having individuals with this 
kind of knowledge and experience at a response will save 
time and cut down on details being forgotten. 
During planning, as mentioned above, connections 
should be made with organizations a r~d  people who will be 
needed if a large-scale emergency occurs. This includes 
medical assistance and transportation organizations, mine 
rescue teams, local law enforcement personnel, equipment 
suppliers, government regulatory agencies, neighboring 
mines, and others according to local situations. Asking 
these people to meet during a nonemergency period is also 
an important aspect of the planning process: According to 
Auf der Heide (I), "A number of researchers have ob- 
served that predisaster contacts among representatives 
of emergency organizations result in smoother operations 
in subsequent disasters. . .Furthermore, in the process . . . 
participants become familiar with the roles of other 
individuals and organizations involved in the disaster 
response." 
Agreements for sharing resources between neighboring 
mines during an emergency may be made in the planning 
process. As one safety dircctor, reflecting on an experi- 
ence at his mine, relates: 
You're going to have to have urn, accesses to get 
equipment. . . Such equipment as extra scoop, or 
mantrips ah, due to your battery power being ex- 
hausted, and not having time to recharge, due to it 
being traveled in and out. 
. . .call . . . someone [at a local mine] up and say, 
"Hey,. . . in case of emergency, if I need a . . . This 
inight never happen, but um, if I was to need you to 
bring me supplies, or borrow your truck or some- 
thing . . . Just, you know, for my sake, can I feel 
comfortable calling you and say I can borrow your 
truck, or that you'll go to the store for me." . . . I'd 
have it like that. 
Setting up these relationships prior to an event will save 
time if such resources are ever needed. Of course, the 
bctter these agreements are worked out beforehand, the 
more effective they will be. 
Proper planning will result in experienced personnel 
and a more easily coordinated response. In terms of co- 
ordinating the various individuals and agencies who are 
involved in a response, having a smaller mine in a more 
rural area might be a plus. There may be fewer organiza- 
tions and individuals to coordinate, and it is likely that the 
people who respond will already know each other. This 
will cut down on the possibilities for miscommunications 
and could shorten the time that it takes for responders to 
know who is playing what role. 
WHAT'S INCLUDED IN AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN? 
Adequate mine emergency response plans need to be 
suitable for use in managing any situation that could arise 
at a mine. These range from easily foreseen predicaments, 
such as fires, explosions, inundations, or roof fall entrap- 
ments, to even the least probable event, such as a haz- 
ardous chemical spill near an intake. If a mine emergency 
plan is well prepared it can cover the worst foreseeable 
situation. And, if it is designed to utilize all available re- 
sources to achieve predefined objectives, then it is likely 
that the basic plan can be adapted to cover a wide range 
of possible emergency situations. The scope of this paper 
does not permit the presentation of detailed descriptions 
of all of the elements of a mine emergency plan. This sec- 
tion, however, provides insight regarding some of the 
major components that comprise a basic mine emergency 
response plan. The ideas presented were taken from the 
interviews discussed above and from related literature 
(51 7) .  
Plan Objectives.-A mine emergency plan must contain 
clearly defined objectives for each portion. If objectives 
are considered carefully and defined as an integral part of 
planning, then all individuals engaged in developing the 
plan, training in its use, or implementing it in an emer- 
gency will be better prepared to respond. Quite often, 
major events are handled initially by individuals who have 
little or no experience in dealing with a mine emergency. 
Determining the objectives and stating them within the 
plan helps personnel with less knowledge and experience 
deal with the emergency. 
Initial Response to the En1ergency.-As soon as possible 
after the onset of an emergency, certain tasks should be 
done. These items should be listed explicitly in the plan. 
Some things that the mine operator needs to consider 
having on this list follow: 
1. Determine if miners are trapped or missing and if 
they have been communicated with. 
2. Ascertain the exact nature of the emergency and its 
location in or about the mine. 
3. Notify mine rescue teams if necessary. 
4. Notify emergency medical services, hospitals, rescue 
squads, fire department, or other outside services if they 
are needed. 
5. Notify Federal and State regulatory agencies. 
6. Initiate fire-fighting or rescue-and-recovery 
operations. 
7. Determine if all mine fans are still operating. 
Conlmand Center and Otlzer Facilities .-Workplaces 
should be available for use by a number of individuals on 
the surface. These include company personnel, officials 
from State and Federal agencies, miners' representatives, 
and others who will be involved in directing a response 
to the emergency. An area needs to be set aside to serve 
as the command center. Space may also be required for 
meetings and briefings, servicing mine rescue equipment, 
first aid administration, a temporary morgue, and other 
functions. 
Definition of Roles and Respotisibilities .-Each person 
who will be participating in handling an emergency, from 
rank-and-file workers to the mine manager or superin- 
tendent, needs to know exactly what his or her responsi- 
bilities are during this event. Roles should be so well 
defined that any qualified person can be assigned any posi- 
tion and know what the associated duties are. This may 
he accomplished by developing task cards-pocket-size 
cards that clearly define the duties and responsibilities for 
each position. The cards can be distributed to responders, 
who will carry and refer to them at any particular moment 
during a situation. This will ensure that they have prop- 
erly attended to all assigned duties. 
Rotation of Conznznttding Persotztze1.-Depending on the 
nature of a mine emergency, company officials may be 
required to be at the scene for several days. In one re- 
ported case, a mine superintendent worked 37 h straight 
at a mine fire before leaving the command center (8). Re- 
search has shown that lack of adequate rest severely 
inhibits a person's ability to make quality decisions. Poor 
decisions in a mine emergency can jeopardize the lives of 
responders at the scene and/or severely hamper efforts 
to deal with the event. Company officials need to make 
arrangements for rotation of command personnel at the 
emergency site to ensure that those individuals who will be 
required to make critical decisions are well rested. 
Activities Lo@ng.-At least until additional personnel 
arrive at a scene, the company should assign someone on 
the surface to maintain a log of all rescue and recovery 
activities. This log should be detailed and include all 
major activities that have occurred since the onset of the 
emergency. 
Fan Operation.-When required, the mine operator 
should have all surface fans examined to determine their 
condition. The operator should assign a person to each 
operating surface fan to ensure its continued operation. 
Propetty Entrance Restn'ction-Secliritj~.-The operator 
should, as part of planning, establish a policy restricting 
entrance to authorized personnel in the event of a mine 
emergency. Only those required to handle the situation 
should be permitted on mine property. Guards should be 
assigned at each mine entrance. Often, local law enforce- 
ment agencies will provide officers to fill this job. 
( Mine Maps.-Up-to-date mine maps will usually be 
needed for use by mine rescue teams, company officials, 
and others. A sufficient number of current mine maps or 
Iprints should be secured and made ready for distribution. 
Supplies and Equ@ment.-Depending on the nature of 
a particular mine emergency, supplies such as crib blocks, 
timbers, brattice curtain, concrctc blocks, water line, rock 
dust, and other articles may be needed in quantity very 
quicGy. In the event of a mine fire or explosion, materials 
such as ready-mix concrete, steel plates, wood, and stone 
or gravel may be required for sealing the mine. Liquid 
carbon dioxide may be needed in an attempt to smother a 
fire. Provision should be made with suppliers and other 
mining opzrations to provide these items on short notice 
when needed. Machinery such as scoop tractors, auxiliary 
fans, foam generators, power centers, pumps, front-end 
loaders, bulldozers, drill rigs, and other equipment and 
tools may have to be brought on site quickly. Arrange- 
ments should be made in advance with company pur- 
chasing agents and suppliers of this equipment to ensure 
quick delivery to the minesite of these and all other 
neccssary items. 
Interacting With the Media.-Any major mine emergency 
will draw attention very quickly. In a matter of hours, 
media representatives will be at the scene to obtain cur- 
rent information about the situation. It is important to 
determine beforehand how the media is to be dealt with 
and who will interact with them to ensure dissemination of 
accurate information. One group of small mine owners 
are looking to their operators association for support in 
this area (2). During a response, mine management keeps 
the operators association staff updated and tells all media 
representatives to go to that staff for information. The 
association staff then prepares press releases and handles 
all inquiries from the media. Whether the media is to be 
handled by mine personnel or by some designated repre- 
sentative should be decided and communicated before an 
event occurs. 
Needs of Personnel on the Scene.-If a number of re- 
sponders are required on the scene of a mine emergency 
for a long period of time, arrangements should be made to 
provide these individuals with sleeping quarters, food, and 
other essentials. Agreements can be made in advance with 
area motels to provide lodging. Local restaurants and 
grocery stores can be commissioned to provide food as 
needed. 
Needs of Relatives and Friends.-When an emergency 
occurs, relatives and friends of miners working at the oper- 
ation may arrive on site seeking informatioil about loved 
ones. Mine officials should prepare to deal with relatives 
and friends by providing them with the latcst factual in- 
formation available. If possible, there should be arrange- 
ments to have counselors and clergy available to interact 
with family members during the emergency. A suitable 
facility might be necessary for family members who wish 
to remain on site during the response. 
Special Needs of Response Personnel and Others In- 
volved.-In a mine emergency, workers and rescue per- 
sonnel are faced with riumerous situations thal may result 
in severe emotional strcss and trauma (3). This conditio~:, 
called critical incident stress, can frcqucntly rzs111t in shot t- 
or long-term emotional difficulties that affLw one's ab~liiy 
to function. There should be arrangements to have coun- 
seiors, trained in critical incide~lt s t r~s s  de!!ricfin(~ b (GIST?), y 
available for workers who witnessed or wcr2 involvcd in 
the emergency. These counsclors could also assist indi- 
viduals who participated in the response. ClSD is a tech- 
nique for helping normal people cope with stress asso- 
ciated with abnormal events. 
Contmunicutiorzs.<ommunications is one of thc most / 
crucial elements in managing a mine emcrgcncy. Quality 
communication links are nceded between a command 
center and the emergency location. Thcre must also be 
good links between a command center and facilities away 
from the minesite. An operator needs to assign a person 
to ensure that mine telephones or other communication 1 
systems are in place and working. It is not uncommon for 
a mine to have only one telephone line servicing the 
operation. Depending on the nature of an ~mergency 
however, additional telephone lines may be necdcd. The 
capability to add additional lines during an emergency 
should be prearranged with the telephone company. 
The purpose of this portion of the paper was to 
stimulate thinking by illustrating some of the many items 
that must be dealt with during a mine cmcrgency. The 
elements of a mine emergency response plan that have 
been mentioned are but a few of the many components 
that could comprise a quality effort. An important point 
to remember is that the time to plan for a mine erner- 
gency is before an event occurs raihcr than in the middle 
of a situation. 
IS HAVING A WRITTEN 
When the planning process has resulted in a final 
document-a mine emcrgency response plan-then the next 
phase of preparation begins. ~ v e r y o n e  who works at the 
minesite should be trained in the plan's contents. They 
DOCUMENT ENOUGH? 
should also be introduced to the various roles included.( 
Individuals must know what they are likely to be asked to 
do if the plan were put into use. They should also be 
aware of company policy on response issues such as site 
security and interactions with the media. If possible, 
miners and responders should be given an opportunity to 
practice carrying out the plan or, at least, some portion of 
it. Less direction and coordination will be needed to start 
up a response if more people are trained to follow the 
plan. During training, the plan will also be tested and can 
be revised and refined to match minesite demands. 
Preparation for a large-scale emergency should be an 
ongoing process. Telephone lists and mine maps should 
be updated routinely. Newly hired workers should be 
introduced to the mine emergency response plan before 
they start to work. On occasion, everyone should be re- 
minded of the plan and of their role(s) in it. When there 
are changes to a mine, mine management, or local re- 
sources, the plan should reflect those changes. The result 
would be a work force that is more confident of manage- 
ment's commitment to their safety, inspectors who see that 
the extra step has been taken at this site, and responders 
and decisionmakers who are better prepared. If the worst 
happens, management will know that every effort was 
made to make an emergency response as efficient and 
effective as possible. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed previously, large-scale mine emergencies 
are infrequent events, and so it is difficult to put daily 
concerns aside to focus attention on them. They do, how- 
ever, occur with renslts that can be devastating econom- 
ically for the mining operation, and economically as well 
as emotionally for the individuals involved. These con- 
sequences can be mitigated with even limited emergency 
response planning. Planning is particularly important for 
small mining operations that will need to call on outside 
help to mount a sizable response. 
There are a number of resources available at little or 
no cost to the small mine operator who wants to begin 
planning for a mine emergency. One place to begin is 
with the sample emergency response plan provided in the 
appendix to this paper. The plan is a simplified version of 
one prepared for and being used at an underground coal 
mine. It could be used as a model for the development of 
a site-specific plan. 
Another source of information is the National Mine 
Health and Safety Academy at Beckley, WV. The acad- 
emy is devoted to mine safety training and has both writ- 
ten material and classes on emergency response topics. 
There is also a fire school on the grounds where miners 
are trained to fight underground fires. Information about 
classes being taught at the academy can be obtained by 
calling the Instructional Services Office at 304-256-3211. 
Written materials are promoted in a catalogue, which is 
available through the Business Office at 304-256-3257. 
Assistance is also offered through the Center for Emer- 
gency Preparedness, West Virginia University Mining Ex- 
tension, in Morgantown, WV, at 304-293-4211. Like the 
academy, the center has written materials available and 
conducts training related to emergency response. Staff 
members also act as consultants conducting fire audits for 
mining companies. 
Local resources should not be forgotten. Local experts 
may be needed during an emergency, and those individuals 
will be happy to help. The best time to meet with these 
people and coordinate planning efforts is during the plan- 
ning process. Local law enforcement may be called on to 
provide site security and should be familiar with the site 
and the individuals who will be in charge. Ambulance 
crews and other medical personnel should be contacted so 
that their part in the response will go smoothly. The 
American Red Cross or a local civic group may be willing 
to coordinate activities, such as feeding responders and 
making family members as comfortable as possible. A 
church, school, or community center may have rooms that 
could be used as offices or a press briefing area. It will be 
much easier for community members to assist in a re- 
sponse if their tasks are defined before an event occurs. 
The probable needs should be considered and then re- 
sources sought to fulfill them. The telephone calls and/or 
meetings to set up this coordination of resources may save 
a considerable amount of time and energy and decrease 
confusion inherent in the situation if a response ever needs 
to be put in place. 
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APPENDIX.-SAMPLE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN 
Weplan Mining Company 
Mine Emergency Preparedness Plan 
Introduction 
Although substantial improvements in the technical aspects of mining and improved examinations have 
been made, mine emergencies continue to occur. Because of this fact, we must continue to search for 
the safest methods to obtain the best results using training and planning skills, and being prepared for 
positive response in the event of an emergency. 
A combination of actions in an emergency many include all of the following: 
1. Hazard Control: The immediate action to eliminate the hazard or limit its scope. 
2. Evacuation: The orderly exit of miners from affected areas, using designated escape routes, and 
emergency breathing devices. 
3. Survival: Alternate means of survival, such as barricading, when escape routes are blocked. 
4. Rescue: The efforts by those outside the mine to locate, communicate with and remove those 
miners trapped underground. 
5. Recovery: The effort to recover missing persons and return the mine to operational or investigative 
status once conditions permit. 
Confusion and disorder after discovery of an emergency is normal. The first few minutes after 
discovery are crucial. Since almost all emergencies are unique, a program detailing every situation is 
not possible. However, there are certain elements common to all and the preparation of a written plan 
can minimize the confusion and disorder associated with the emergency. This program is intended to 
offer some basic guidelines for responding when an emergency occurs. 
Some elements included are: 
1. Communications and notifications immediately after discovery of an emergency and at certain 
intervals thereafter. 
2. Responsibilities of certain personnel during the emergency. 
3. Selection of a person to be in overall control. 
4. Development of an advisory and control group. 
5. Evacuation and survival procedures. 
INTRODUCTION 
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6. Rescue and recovery procedures. 
7. Surface organization, facilities, and outside sources of assistance for support purposes. 
8. Control of outside elements with an interest in the emergency, but not involved with the operation 
such as news media, relatives and the general public. 
It is intended that all persons who have a part in the emergency will review the entire plan and be 
aware of the contents. If anything is noted that should be changed, it should be brought to the 
attention of "the Safety Department" for revision as necessary. 
Waiting until an emergency to review this plan may be too late to organize an effective emergency 
operation. Study it frequently. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The actions taken in this manual are color coded. 
When implementing any step of these instructions, identify the color high- 
lighted and turn to the corresponding color tab for detailed information. 
[In the original plan, the underlined words in the following summary were highlighted with colors. 
The notebook which held the plan included corresponding color tabs. These tabs separated sections 
consisting of detailed informution on each item and blank fonns that would be needed to complete the 
tasks. Headings are used here instead of the colors.] 
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UNDERGROUND MINE EMERGENCY PLAN 
Upon notification or indication of a mine emergency: 
IMMEDIATELY ... 
1. Initiate Event Log 
2. Notify personnel adversely affected and document their intentions 
3. Notify on-site person in charge 
4. Activate on-shift mine emergency or fire fighting procedures 
PRIOR TO 15 MINUTES 
1. Initiate mine monitoring procedures 
2. Notify personnel outby affected area for evacuation or assistance 
3. Notify person in charge of mine 
4. Notify person in charge of safety 
5. Notify critical company manpower 
PRIOR TO 1 HOUR 
1. Evaluate underground conditions 
A. Determine emergency location and extent 
B. Effect of emergency on evacuation, escape and barricading 
C. Determine fire fighting, mine rescue or other emergency needs 





3. Initiate check-inlcheck-out procedures 
4. Provide critical supplies 
5. Notify Mine Rescue Team 
6. Notify Fire Brigade 
RESPONSE PLAN SUMMARY 
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7. Notify EMT's on shift and other medical assistance as needed 
8. Notify essential manpower 
9. Notify MSHA 
10. Notify State Division of Mines 
1 1. Notify Local Law Enforcement 
PRIOR TO 4 HOURS 
1. Activate gas sampling and fan evaluation procedures 
2. Provide essential supplies and services 
A. Shop 
B. Engineering 
C. Other Corporate operations 
D. Other mines 
E. Vendors 
3. Activate control group organization 
4. Notify additional fire brigade members or mine rescue teams 
5. Provide for technical assistance from other corporate operations and other local mines 
AFTER 4 HOURS 
1. Activate advisory group organization 
2. Provide additional outside communications 
3. Provide maximum number of mine emergency teams needed 
4. Activate facility needs procedures 
A. Control Group area 
B. Advisory Group area 
C. Mine rescue briefing area 
D. Mine rescue benching area 
E. Mine rescue housing 
F. Family relations area 
G. Press and public relations area 
5. Provide necessary supplies and services 
A. Food services arrangements 
RESPONSE PLAN SUMMARY 
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B. Press and family briefing procedures 









Prior to 15 minutes 
Prior to 1 hour 
After 4 hours 
WHERE 
Logs and Records 




Logs and Records 
See Page 3 
Operations Center 
Mine Rescue 
Briefing Room Area 
Logs and Records 
See Page 4 
HOW 
As Events Occur 
Mine Monitors 
Utilize Log for 
Response Personnel 







Mine Rescue Team 
Logs 
WHO 
Person who learns 








Logs and Records 
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Weplan Mining Company 
Emergency Command Center Activity Log 
Person Keeping Log 
Information recieved or instructions given TIME Instructions to (Person) 
INITIATE 
Logs and Records 
Page 3 
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Prior to 15 minutes 
Prior to 15 minutes 
Prior to 15 minutes 
NOTIFY 
Persons Affected 
On site person in 




Person in charge of 
Mine (Call until one 
is reached, then go 
to Safety list) 
Person in charge of 
Safety (Call until 
one is reached, then 






Prior to 15 minutes 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
NOTIFY 
Critical Company 
Manpower (Do not 
repeat if notified 
above) 
Mine Rescue Team 
Members 
Fire Brigade Team 
Members 
Emergency Medical 








Note: should be 
called in order by a 
Safety or Mine 

























































Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 4 hours 
NOTIFY 
State Mine Officials 
Note: Should be 
called in order by a 
Safety or Mine 




























Mine Emergency Plan 




Fire Fighting and 
Evacuation 
Procedures 












Prior to 4 hours 
Prior to 4 hours 
After 4 hours 
After 4 hours 
After 4 hours 
After 4 hours 





























At or Inby Affected 
Area 










Weplan Mining Company 
Facility Needs Procedures 
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1. Command Center 












4. Briefing Area for Teams 
Building Name 
Location 
A Phone Number 




- - - - -  
6. Press Room and Information Center 
Building Name 
Location 
_ Phone Number 








Prior to 1 hour 
Mine Emergency 
Evaluate Conditions for Decision Making 
Weplan Mining Company 
EVALUATE 
1. Emergency 
location and extent 




3. Firefighting, Mine 
Rescue, or other 
emergency needs 
WHO 
Person in charge of 
mine 
WHERE 
Mine monitor or 
mine site 
HOW 
1. Review event log 
2. Review 
notification log 
3. Review Current 
Monitoring - CO 
levels and their 
locations 
4. Prior monitor 
print-outs 








Prior to 1 hour 





1. Person assigned 






1. Person assigned 
by person in charge 
of mine 
2. "Name" 










1. Physical check of 
outside and 
underground power 





b. rate of drop 
2. Current mine 
monitoring 








Provide for Materials and Equipment 






1. Deliver to portal 
2. Deliver to 
emergency site 
1. Dispatch 
ambulance to mine 
site 
2. EMT list 




a. section safety 
trailer 




2. Mine monitor 
room 




1. Persons assigned 




2. Person in charge 
3. Safety department 




Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
PROVIDE 
1. Fire fighting 
2. Foam generator 
and foam 
3. First aid andlor 
medical assistance if 
needed 






Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 1 hour 
Prior to 4 hours 
















Qualified mine rescue 






2. Engineering - 
"Names" 
3. Other Corporate 
Operations 











"Mine Names - 
Contact Person" 





Deliver to operations 
center 
Quick bench and 
respond with or 
without full team 










Prior to 4 hours 
After 4 hours 
After 4 hours 












1. Food service 






















EXPERIMENTAL TRAINING TO REDUCE VARIABILITY 
IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF MACHINE GUARDING REQUIREMENTS 
By Lynn L. ~e th i '  and William J. wiehagen2 
ABSTRACT 
The use of machine guards for industrial equipment is 
commonly accepted as a primary means of injury preven- 
tion. Often the interpretations of rules pertaining to 
machine guarding lead to a variety of guarding applications 
at the worksite. The consequences of this variability be- 
tween regulatory intent and practice are evidenced by the 
frequency of guarding citations by inspectors, litigation 
seeking to ameliorate judgment of the inspectors, injuries 
that may be sustained because of workers' misunderstand- 
ing of safe guarding practices, misinterpretations of 
guarding requirements, or failure to comply with guarding 
mandates. 
Training is a common method used for reducing this 
variability. This paper describes a U.S. Bureau of Mines- 
developed training intervention that might begin to define 
and identify this variability within the inspectorate, work 
force, or management. The fidelity of the training is en- 
hanced through the use of three-dimensional slides and the 
structure of the classroom exercise. The classroom simu- 
lation moves beyond traditional safety training by offering 
an opportunity to apply general guarding rules and regula- 
tions to a specific situation. It is suggested that this type 
of training may be useful in defining and seeking solutions 
to the apparent variability in both the interpretation and 
application of guarding requirements. 
INTRODUCTION 
The reason behind a machine guard seems simple 
enough-to prevent employees from coming in contact with 
moving parts. The method of providing that protection 
appears equally simple-install a barrier. Machine guard- 
ing is not a new concept. The first patent issued for a ma- 
chine guard was registered in 1868 Since then, the 
guarding of moving parts has become much more sophisti- 
cated. A major influence on present machine guarding 
practices was the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (OSHAct) (2). Within a few years of the OSHAct, 
 rainin in^ research specialist. 
2~ndustrial engineer. 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
3~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this paper. 
the National Safety Council asserted: "One of the major 
goals of the [Act] is the guarding of all machinery and 
equipment to eliminate personnel hazards created by point 
of operations, in-going nip points, rotating parts, flying 
chips and sparks. These hazards have been responsible for 
countless numbers of injuries, and fatalities of personnel. 
If the now required guarding had been required back then 
[prior to the OSHAct], many if not most of these accidents 
might have never occurred and even . . . [the Act itselfl 
would probably not be the law of the land" (3). These re- 
marks imply a widely accepted recognition of the irnpor- 
tance and application of machine guarding requirements. 
What can be done today to better apply a proven tech- 
nique for loss prevention? While the solution may be 
elusive, the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) conducted this 
research to learn more about the sources of variability 
between guarding theories, regulations, and everyday experiments," in defining variability, may lead to innova- 
practice. This approach would involve the collection of tions in guarding practices, work procedures, and training 
data. These data could define the variability within the protocols. Benefits could include a further reduction in 
inspectorate, management, and work force concerning the the number of injuries related to improper guarding prac- 
practical understanding and application of guarding re- tices, reduced levels of violations, and lesser reliance on 
quirements. Defining variability, through structured the judicial system to resolve a variety of interpretations of 
training experiments, may lead to a shift in the way one machine guarding regulations. 
thinks about traditional safety training. These "training 
EVIDENCE OF VARIABILITY 
Although the sensible notion of "good guarding prac- 
tices" is fairly common within general industry, other 
factors suggest that variability exists in the regulatory 
interpretation and use of machine guards at the workplace. 
How can this variability be described? Does it fall within 
the literature relating to perception and recognition, moti- 
vation, judgment and decisionmaking, ergonomic design, 
or the adherence of workers to safe job procedures? 
Understanding and describing this variability may offer 
insight to solutions that embody all these concepts. This 
knowledge could assist in the design of training, the design 
of guarding components, or regulatory policy. The evi- 
dence of variability is manifested by the information ob- 
tained from injury reports, legal controversies, and 
violations-citations associated with machine guarding 
practices. 
INJURY DATA 
One important consequence of variability between reg- 
ulatory intent and practice is the frequency of serious 
injuries. A variety of questions might be posed based on 
any one of these incidents. To illustrate, in 1993, a belt- 
man was fatally injured while cleaning an area around an 
underground belt drive. The U.S. Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) investigative report (4) notes: 
A beltman was fatally injured when he par- 
tially removed a guard from the side of a sta- 
tionary roller and entered the take-up area with 
the belt in motion. Guarding for the belt and 
take-up assembly was constructed with four foot 
wide by eight foot long sheets of expanded metal 
welded in angle iron frames and bolted onto a 
main frame. The guarding was then secured to 
the entire length of the drive and take-up as- 
sembly on both sides. Evidence indicated that 
the victim partially removed the stationary guard 
in an attempt to gain access to the take-up area. 
While shoveling loose coal, he became caught in 
the roller and was fatally injured. 
Assuming the guard was "adequate" prior to its removal, 
what are some questions that might be asked to explore 
the contributing factors? 
1. Was there an appropriate machine guarding policy 
at the mine? 
2. How was the employee trained? Were there any 
follow-up observations of his performance? 
3. Was there a lockout-tagout procedure? 
4. Was the hazard recognizable? 
5. Was this a safe practice? 
Responses to these questions highlight variability. 
These include perceptions of what constitutes (1) an ap- 
propriate policy, (2) quality training, (3) an adequate pro- 
cedure, (4) a recognizable hazard, and (5) a safe practice. 
These perceptions would be expected to vary within and 
across the inspectorate, work force, and management. 
Outside of mining, the importance of researching these 
questions is magnified. For example, within the agricul- 
tural sector, Etherton (5) estimates that 20,000 occupa- 
tional amputations occur annually. Ninety percent of these 
serious injuries are traced to machinery and equipment. 
The magnitude and severity of these injuries ampllfy the 
need to pose serious questions. The careful consideration 
of these questions might lead to a better understanding of 
the variability between regulatory intent and everyday 
practice. 
LITIGATION 
Another indication of variability is perhaps evident in 
the number of legal controversies surrounding safe or un- 
safe guarding practices. In more than a few cases, the 
final determination of "compliance" with guarding regula- 
tions is a product of the judicial system. In one case, 
involving a piece of mobile equipment, it was determined 
that failure to properly guard the cooling fan blades and 
air compressor belts and pulleys located on the front of 
the engine was a valid violation. The parts in question 
were located in the center of the engine compartment in 
front of the engine. In order for an individual to contact 
the parts, it would be necessary to reach over the truck 
frame, which is approximately 76.20 cm high, and extend 
one's arm a distance of approximately 76.20 to 91.44 cm. 
The judge ruled that "given the physical accessibility of the 
engine compartment, the fact that mechanics could check 
and work on running equipment, and that contact with the 
cited machine parts could occur, we conclude that a rea- 
sonable possibility of contact existed (6). In litigation, 
variability is exhibited by the opposing views of those 
involved in the case. 
VIOLATION AND CITATION DATA 
Violation and citation data may also imply large levels 
of variability within and across the inspectorate, general 
work force, and management. In 1991, for general indus- 
try, OSHA reported over 4,000 violations issucd for unsafe 
machine guarding practices, with an initial dollar penalty 
of $6.64 million (7). The direct costs resulting from ci- 
tations of unsafe machine guarding ranked third, behind 
hazard communication and electrical lockout-tagout 
procedures. 
A review of MSHA data indicated that from 1991 
through 1993 there were 20,517 significant and substantial 
violations issued for unsafe guarding practices in the 
mining industry (8). These numbers may be directly 
linked to the undefined variability that surrounds safe 
guarding practices. 
How one interprets machine guarding regulations, how 
one determines if a guard is adequate (or, in compliance 
with the regulations), how one maintains or modifies a 
guard, or how one adheres to safe guarding practices can 
all contribute to large levels of variability. 
For the regulators, the violation data explicitly imply 
variability in compliance profiles. Implicitly, is the issue 
one of adherence (motivation and skills)? Is it one of how 
workers and managers interpret the regulations? Or, a 
combination of both? Knowledge does not guarantee a 
decision to act, nor does it obligate the appropriate action. 
What can be learned from studies of traditional mine safe- 
ty training that could offer insight to these questions? 
TRADITIONAL METHODS FOR MINE SAFETY TRAINING 
Safety training is a common method to inform and mo- 
tivate workers to adhere to safety procedures and require- 
ments. Its widespread acceptance to loss prevention is in- 
grained within regulations, company policies, and culture 
of the workplace. Training implies increased competence; 
competence suggests some means to measure; and meas- 
urement implies a connection between the training inter- 
vention and goals of the organization. Improved compe- 
tence, in turn, cannot be defined without some means of 
evaluation. The concept of training (and performance) 
evaluation is consequential, as it suggests a means for 
improvement. 
USBM-sponsored studies of mine safety training were 
described in a series of research reports by Adkins (9), 
Digman (lo), Short, (11), and Cole (12) spanning the 
period of 1976 to 1986. These evaluative studies of mine 
safety training, coupled with the general safety training 
literature, offer insight into methods to understand the 
limitations of traditional safety training. Combined, these 
studies suggest a shift to instructional procedures that can 
better tie investments in training to the performance of the 
workforce. Performance measures imply a reliable means 
to evaluate, both within the context of the training and 
how those skills are transferred to the worksite. 
Two of the more recent studies (10, 12) observed a 
noticeable level of variability in both the conduct and 
outcomes of classroom health and safety training. This 
variability was observed during annual refresher training 
sessions. Researchers noted several of the reasons for this 
variability: 
1. There was confusion among the trainers and par- 
ticipants concerning the expected outcomes of safety 
training. 
2. There is limited availability of good test designs to 
assess health and safety knowledge and the application of 
that knowledge. 
3. Miners were more attentive when participation was 
encouraged or instructors used stories or examples to 
ground the instruction. 
4. The preponderance of concern was more apt to re- 
late to quantity of instruction (i.e., hours of training) as 
opposed to outcomes (quality). 
5. The use of innovative teaching techniques (games or 
simulations) was fairly common but usually limited to the 
factual recall of safety information. 
6. Trainees appeared most attentive when discussions 
involved the resolution of a safety problem in a work pro- 
cedure or emergency protocol. 
These studies suggest that traditional mine safety train- 
ing could benefit by more objective and reliable data. 
These data would better connect safety training interven- 
tions to the performance of the work force. It is within 
this con text that the following training exercise was 
developed. 
A NEW APPROACH 
The "Raggs and Curly" machine guarding exercise is a 
three-dimensional (3-D) latent image ~imulation.~ The 
idea of combining 3-D slides with latent image simulation 
was first introduced in 1989 (13-14). The Raggs and Curly 
exercise embeds teaching with evaluation, makes use of 
3-D slides to enhance the fidelity of the simulation, and is 
administered in small group settings. It is similar in 
structure and complements the growing set of interactive, 
latent-image, problem-solving simulations described else- 
where (e.g., 12, 15). 
Raggs and Curly is an eight-question, seven-slide exer- 
cise that deals with machine guarding hazards and unsafe 
practices. The Raggs and Curly exercise is set at a surface 
coal mine. The situation is as follows: 
You, Earl E. Raggs, are the chief me- 
chanic at the main mine complex of the AB 
Coal Company. You have been called to the 
Jake's Run surface nine. The mine supplies 
coal directly to rail cars by means of a 48" 
mobile conveyor. The superintendent explains 
that during a recent insurance company in- 
spection, some potentially dangerous situa- 
tions concerning improper guarding practices 
were noticed. He  instructs you to conduct a 
survey and document the guarding problems 
you observe around the mobile conveyor. 
Your recommendations will be part of a 
planned company wide guarding policy. He 
assigns Noah "Curly" Hair, who just recently 
became a mechanic's helper at this operation, 
to accompany you. The superintendent stress- 
es the fact that Curly is not too familiar with 
safe guarding practices and asks that you take 
this opportunity to share your knowledge con- 
cerning guarding. You and Curly are to re- 
port back to the superintendent with your 
findings. 
Skills developed through this classroom simulation in- 
clude machine and equipment guarding strategies and pro- 
cedures; hazard identification; warning and caution sign 
'?he authors are indebted to D. L. Garry, mining industry specialist, 
and R A. Dorton, safety and occupational health specialist, both at the 
USBM's Pittsburgh Research Center, Pittsburgh, PA, for their invaluable 
assistance in designing this exercise. 
usage; safe work habits; safe guarding practices; and de- 
cisions involved in the use of factual, regulatory informa- 
tion .in their application to specific machinery and 
equipment. 
The exercise follows Raggs and Curly as they evaluate 
machine guards and discuss safe guarding practices. The 
efficiency of the training is noted through the opportunities 
to experience real-life situations and the application of 
factual knowledge often reserved for on-the-job learning. 
The classroom training and discussion provides a con- 
trolled setting for trainees to experience the consequences 
of both good and bad decisionmaking. The exercise itself 
is designed to reinforce good decisions and to correct er- 
rors when inappropriate decisions are made. 
The exercise seeks to apply and reinforce important 
characteristics in guard design and construction. These 
characteristics of guard design are summarized in the 
widely distributed "MSHA Guide to Equipment Guarding 
for Metal and Nonmetal Mining" (16). As MSHA notes: 
"Such guards should: 
1. Bc considered a permanent part of the equipment or 
machine. 
2. Afford maximum protection. 
3. Prevent access to the danger zone. 
4. Be convenient-they must not interfere with efficient 
operation. 
5. Be designed for the specific machine, with provisions 
made for oiling, inspecting, adjusting, and repairinq 
machine parts. 
6. Be durable and constructed strongly enongh to resist 
normal wear. 
7. Not present a hazard in itself." 
The guard might also be constructed to contain those parts 
that may fail or be propelled to possibly strike employees. 
As participants work through the exercise, they begin to 
discover the difficulties that can exist in the interpretation 
of regulations, the necessity for safe guarding practices, 
and common misperceptions about guarding requirements. 
It is within this context that this exercise approaches 
training. (See the appendix for problem example.) 
The exercise is now being field tested and will be 
revised as needed. Once completed, the exercise will be 
sent to the Mine Safety and Health Academy located in 
Beckly, WV, for distribution to those mining compznies 
requesting machine guarding training exercises. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Variability within the applied interpretations of rules, fidelity of safety training, thus aiding in the transfer of 
regulations, and actual work practices may be a major con- safety skills. The benefits of this and similar exercises 
tributing factor in machine guarding injuries, violations, could be a further reduction in the number of injuries re- 
and litigation. The experimental training simulation dis- lated to improper guarding practices, less reliance on the 
cussed in this paper is an attempt to better define and judicial system to resolve a variety of interpretations of 
understand differences in the interpretation and applica- machine guarding regulations, and a reduced level of 
tion of machine guarding regulations. The use of the 3-D violations. 
slides within a realistic problem setting can improve the 
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APPENDIX 
The appendix consists of a problem workbook and a master answer sheet. These items represent a completed exercise. 
Raggs & Curly Guarding Exercise 
Raggs and Curly Guarding Exercise 
Problem Booklet 
Mining Systems and Human Engineering 




Raggs & Curly Guarding Exercise 
Instructions 
Read the problem situation described on the next page. Then answer each of the eight questions. Do them one at a 
time. Some questions will ask you to look at one or more three-dimensional slides. Look at the appropriate slide or 
slides, then continue on with the exercise. Don't jump ahead, but look only at the questions and slides to which you are 
directed. However, you may look back to earlier questions and answers at any time. Follow the directions for each 
question. 
After you have selected a choice to a question, look up its number on the answer sheet. Select your answer(s) to each 
question by slowly and gently rubbing the special pen between the brackets on the answer sheet. A hidden message will 
appear and tell you if you are right. When you have finished, you will learn how to score your performance. 
Raggs & Curly Guarding Exercise 
The Situation 
You, Earl E. Raggs, are the chief mechanic at the main mine complex of the AB Coal Co. You have been called to the 
Jake's Run Surface Mine. The mine supplies coal directly to rail cars by means of a 121.92-cm (48-in) mobile conveyor. 
The superintendent explains that during a recent insurance company inspection, some potentially dangerous situations 
concerning impropdr guarding practices were noticed. He instructs you to conduct a survey and document some of the 
guarding problems you observe around the mobile conveyor and make recommendations for correcting these problems. 
Your recommendations will be part of a planned company-wide guarding policy. He assigns Noah "Curly" Hair, who was 
just recently reassigned as a mechanic's helper at this operation, to accompany you. The superintendent stresses the fact 
that Curly is not too familiar with safe guarding practices and asks that you take this opportunity to share your knowledge 
concerning guarding. You and Curly are to report 'back to the superintendent with your findings. Turn to Question A. 
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Question A 
You and Curly take a camera and notebook and begin to document the status of the guards located at the mobile 
conveyor area. Look at slide 1. You are looking for unsafe guarding practices and related problems. What should you 
point out to Curly? (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
1. A dirty warning sign. 
2. A missing guard. 
3. Altered guard. 
4. Coal spillage. 
5. A missing guard around the electrical box. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question B 
Continuing your survey, you and Curly go to the rear of the bin. Look at slide 2. What hazards would you note and point 
out to Curly at this location? (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
6. The salamander is located too close to the fuel depot. 
7. There are holes in the guards. 
8. The guard is not extended far enough to enclose all pinch points. 
9. Warning signs are inadequate. 
10. Coal has built up here. 
11. Guard screens are not aligned. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question C 
The next place you stop is a conveyor dump point. Look at slide 3. Other than repairing the holes in the guards and 
cleaning up obvious spillage, what corrective measures should you recommend to the superintendent for this area? (Select 
as MANY as you think are correct..) 
12. Replace the missing triangular guard on the near side. 
13. Display warning signs. 
14. Investigate the cause of the large coal chunks underneath the equipment. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question D 
You walk around the dump point to look at the other side. This is what you see. Look at slide 4. What corrective 
measures should you and Curly recommend to the superintendent for this area? (Select as MANY as you think are 
correct.) 
15. Display warning signs. 
16. Repair the holes in the guard. 
17. Investigate the cause of the large coal chunks underneath the equipment. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question E 
You and Curly travel to the mobile conveyor. Look at slide 5. You ask Curly to assess this piece of equipment. What 
positive guarding practices would you expect Curly to note? (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
18. Effective use of multiple guarding materials. 
19. Extended grease fittings. 
20. Handrail and toe boards. 
21. Walkway is clear of all slip and trip hazards. 
22. Guarding for machinery parts that are out of reach. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question F 
Curly mentions to you that he saw another example of guarding on a piece of mobile equipment. Look at slide 6. This 
is a refurbished piece of equipment that arrived from the factory not too long ago. After new tires are put on it, what 
guarding changes, if any, do you think should be made before the equipment is put into use? (Select as MANY as you 
think are correct.) 
23. No changes should be made because this is the way it came from the 
factory. 
24. Extend the height of the guard around the engine compartment. 
25. Paint the engine compartment guards a different color than the equipment. 
26. Extend the guarding down to cover the top of the tire. 
27. Install warning signs and reflective materials on the step. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question G 
You decide to conclude this initial phase of the survey by asking Curly to survey his work area near where the compressed 
gas is stored. Look at slide 7. You see quite a few potential hazards at this site and decide to have Curly point them 
out to you. What should Curly point out as potential hazards? (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
28. The handrail is lying of[ to the side and not attached to the steps. 
29. Combustible materials are stored too close to the compressed gas. 
30. There are no signs indicating compressed gas storage. 
31. Batteries are not stored properly and are placed too near the compressed gas. 
32. Compressed gases are not secured in place. 
33. Compressed gases should be stored in metal sheds. 
34. Housekeeping is poor in this area. 
35. There are no fire extinguishers here. 
When you have made your selection(s), do the next question. 
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Question H 
You meet with the superintendent to brief him on your findings. Besides the condition of the guards themselves, what 
are some other safety practices that you might recommend to support safe work procedures around moving parts? (Select 
as MANY as you think are correct.) 
36. Warning signs placed in close proximity to moving parts. 
37. Materials used for guarding should be substantial and heavy. 
38. Written procedures such as SOP'S and JSA's that address specific tasks. 
39. A maintenance and inspection program specifically aimed at guarding. 
4-0. Removal of a guard only after a piece of equipment has been deenergized or locked and tagged out. 
41. Guards should be designed and modified to protect maintenance personnel as well as to make their job easier. 
End of Problem 
Scoring your performance 
1. Count the total number of responses you colored in that were marked "correct." Write this number in the first 
blank on the answer sheet. 
2. Count the total number of incorrect responses you colored in. Subtract this number from 9. Write the 
difference in the second blank on the answer sheet. 
3. The best score is 41. The worst score is 0. 
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Master Answer Sheet for the Raggs & Curly Guarding Exercise 
Use this answer sheet to mark your selections. Rub the special pen gently and smoothly between the brackets. Don't 
scrub the pen since the message may blur. Be sure to color in the entire message once you have made a selection. 
Otherwise, you may not get the information you need. The last part of the message will tell you what to do next. 
Question A (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
1. [Correct. It is a good idea to clean the illegible sign. A comprehensive 1 




2. [Correct. A missing guard exposes a hazard. ]i 
3. [In many circumstances it may be necessary to alter existing guards. 1 
[The addition of straps to this.guard strengthen and protect it. 1 
4. [Correct. Coal buildup can be a fire and tripping hazard. The amount 1 
[of coal may indicate that additional malntenancc is necessary here. 1 
5. [The electrical box does not require additional guarding in this situation. 1 
Question B (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
6. [The distance between the salamander and the fuel depot is adequate 1 
[and poses no hazard. 1 
7. [Correct. Holes in guards present a hazard because they make it ]I 
[possible for persons to come into contact with moving parts. 4 
8. [Correct. Even if the guard was in good condition, the rollers would not 
[be completely enclosed by the guard. Contact with moving parts is nOh 1 
[prevented here. I] 
9. [Correct. Warning and/or caution signs are a good safcty practice. 1 
LO. [Correct. Coal buildup is a potential fire and tripping hazard. The 
[amount of coal seen here may indicate that equipment 
[modifications may be necessary to prevent continued spillage. 
PI. [Correct. Space left between the frames of guards allows openings 
[where fingers could contact moving parts. 
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Question C (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
12. [Correct. If you look closely, you can see a triangular guard on the opposite 
[side of the structure. It may be a possible violation if a similar guard is 
[not in place on this side of the structure. 
13. [Correct. It is a good policy to include caution and warning signs as 
[part of the guarding program. 
14. [Correct. This problem needs to be addressed. Either the area should 
[be guarded so that the large pieces can be confined or the source of 
[the problem should be remedied. 
Question D (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
15. [Correct. It is a good policy to include caution and warning signs as part of 
[the guarding program. 
16. [Correct. Holes in guards present a hazard because they make it possible for 
[persons to come into contact with moving parts. 
17. [Correct. This problem needs to be addressed. 
Question E (Select as hlANY as you think are correct.) 
18. [Correct. Materials used include screen, belting, and manufacturer equipped 
[guards. 
19. [Correct. Extended grease fittings and cups allow for easy greasing of 
[moving parts and are required. 
20. [Correct. Sometimes we forget that guarding includes handrails to 
[guard against the employee falling from an elevated position. 
21. [Correct. There is no problem here. 
22. [Correct. Even though they are out of reach, moving parts may break 
[and pieces may fly out and hit someone if not guarded. 
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Question F (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
23. [This is not necessarily true. Manufacturer's specifications do not always meet 1 
[company, State, and Federal regulatory agency guarding specifications. 1 




25. [Correct. This is recommended to make guards more obvious. ]I 
26. [This is not practical. If guards were there they could restrict movement 1 
[of the wheels and could be a hazard. 1 
27. [Correct. Warning signs are good guarding practice. The use of reflective 9 
[materials along the catwalk of the machine and around the other guards can ] 
[draw attention to potentially hazardous areas, such as the step as a tripping ] 
[hazard. 1 
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Question G (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
28. [Correct. Handrails provide a means of support and guard against 
[accidental slips and falls. 
29. [Correct. Combustible materials may be an ignition source and a fire 
[could easily develop. 
30. [This is not required. The only sign required is a "NO SMOKING-NO 
[OPEN FLAMES" sign. 
31. [Correct. Batteries may be a source of hydrogen gas, which is highly 
[explosive. Batteries should be kept in a secure location to guard 
[against chemical burns. 
32. [The safety chains shown are adequate and the door is locked. 
33. [That is not a problem here. It is not recommended that compressed 
[gas be stored in metal sheds because of the potential heat buildup. 
34. [Correct. Side of stairs is broken and steps are not anchored solidly to 
[the shed. Accumulations of unmarked drums and debris create a 
[potential f i e  hazard. 
35. [Correct. Fire extinguishers are required because it is a wooden 
[structure that presents a fire hazard. 
123 
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Question H (Select as MANY as you think are correct.) 
36. [Correct. Warning signs alert personnel to potential hazards associated 
[with moving parts. 
a 
I 
37. [This doesn't make a good guard. Additional hazards may be 
[introduced when trying to remove a heavy guard. 
I 
I 
38. [Correct. These procedures clarify safe practices to be followed 
[including guarding issues. 
39. [Correct. Through a preventive maintenance schedule and regular 
[inspection, guarding problems can be documented and corrected. 
40. [Correct. This is always a good practice. In addition, thought 
[should be given to other forces, such as belt tension and pressurized 
[liquids and gases. 
41. [Correct. One example is extended grease fittings and cups, which 
[eliminate the need to work close to moving parts when lubricating. 
3 
I 
End of Problem 
Scoring your performance 
1. Count the total number of responses you colored in that were marked "correct." Write this number in 
the first blank on the answer sheet. 
2. Count the total number of incorrect responses you colored in. Subtract this number from 9. Write the 
difference in the second blank on the answer sheet. 
3. The best score is 41. The worst score is 0. 
ERGONOMIC AND STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY 
IN DEEP-CUT MINING 
By Lisa J. ~teiner,' Fred C. ~urin, '  and Christopher A.  amr rick' 
ABSTRACT 
This U.S. Bureau of Mines paper examines the occupa- 
tional safety concerns associated with deep-cut mining. 
Mining deeper cuts may have some unknown effects on 
how miners position themselves for visibility, the types of 
accidents that can occur, and the new interactions between 
the equipment and the continuous miner operator. This 
preliminary report utilizes data from the U.S. Mine Safety 
and Health Administration accident database, interviews 
with mine workers and mine operators, and conversations 
with State, local, and union representatives. A statistical 
analysis was performed to compare injurics and fatalities 
that occurred in mines with deep-cut approval to mines 
that did not have deep-cut approval. The data were cate- 
gorized by mine size. A series of interviews with over 
50 mine workers in 5 States was also conducted. A pre- 
liminary task analysis study revealed some concern in the 
following areas: the bolting cycle, continuous miner op- 
erator positioning and ~{sibility, mine conditions and depth 
of cut, cable handling, and remote-control unit design. 
Methods that will be used to study these tasks are 
discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Like many other industries, mining companies imple- 
ment new technologies as they are developed to increase 
productivity and/or increase safety. These technologies 
require research to explore what unintended effects these 
new methods, machinery, and interfaces will have on mine 
workers. Deep-cut mining refers to mining a cut of coal 
with a continuous miner deeper than the standard 6.1-m 
(20-ft) cut. A standard cut may be mined with the miner 
operator using controls on the deck of a continuous mincr 
or by using a remote-control unit for a continuous mining 
machine. In either case, the miner operator is protected 
under a roof that has been bolted. With the development 
of the remote control and better dust control and ventila- 
tion methods, miner operators are able to mine more than 
6.1 m (20 ft) while still remaining under a supported roof 
area (fig. 1). These deeper cuts allow the miner operator 
to mine coal for a longer period of time without moving 
the machinery as often, which in turn is expected to in- 
crease productivity and safety. To be permitted to per- 
form deep cuts, a mine must apply for U.S. Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) approval. MSHA has 
various conditions and equipment updates that must be 
met bcfore approval is given. Currently, MSHA informa- 
tion states that approximately 22.3% of U.S. underground 
coal mines have deep-cut approvals. 
Bauer, Pappas, and Listak examined fatal coal 
mining accident data from 1988 through 1990. They re- 
ported that the rate of fatal roof falls is 2.5 times higher in 
mines with deep-cut approval, considerably larger roof falls 
occur when deep-cut mining is practiced, and geology- 
influenced roof fall fatalities occur about equally in deep- 
cut and nondeep-cut mining. However, they reported that 
'Industrial engineer, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of 'Italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. at the end of this paper. 
Figure 1 .-Diagram of deep-cut mining method. 
nearly half of the fatalities for deep-cut mining were the 
result of illegal deep cutting. These were classified as 
illegal because the mines either exceeded the approved 
length of cut or did not have MSHA deep-cut approval. 
The rate of Iegal deep-cut fatalities was found to be at a 
rate slightly below that of nondeep-cut fatalities. 
Davis (4) conducted a detailed analysis of roof fall 
fatalities in 1990. It was found that 7 of 20 (approximately 
31%) fatalities occurred in a deep cut. However, only one 
fatality occurred in a deep cut made in compliance with an 
approved plan. The remaining six fatalities occurred while 
illegal deep cuts were being taken. 
Bauer, Steiner, and Hamrick (2) examined 1990 and 
1991 MSHA accident data to compare reported accidents 
in deep-cut and nondeep-cut mines by mine size. The 
data indicated that the reported accident rate and the rate 
of accidents at the face were higher for all mines taking 
deep cuts in all size categories, with the exception of those 
mines with a 150- to 250-employee range. Overall, deep- 
cut mines had a 23% higher reported accident rate at the 
face and a 12% higher rate of accidents. Reported ac- 
cidents included those which did not result in injury. 
Fatality rates were found to be lower in deep-cut mines, 
with the exception of mines in the 50- to 150-employee 
range. The overall fatality rate was 37% lower for deep- 
cut mines. 
Many studies have explored the overall productivity ef- 
fects of deep-cut mining. It is believed that taking deep 
cuts will improve productivity through decreased tramming 
time since the machine will stay longer in each working 
face. In a U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) study (11) of 25 
mines to assess the reasons for high productivity, 2 mine 
operators said that their productivity per section increased 
by about 25% by using deep cuts. The 4 mines that had 
depths of cut of 9.14 m (30 ft) or more had an average 
section production of 1,067 t (1,050 st) per shift while the 
21 mines with a depth of cut of less than 9.14 m (30 ft) av- 
eraged 892 t (878 st) per shift. However, in a mine with 
1,476 t (1,452 st) per shift, it was found that deep-cut 
mining did not improve overall productivity. This might 
mean that as maximum productivity for a given mining sys- 
tem is approached, small technological changes become 
less important and major technological innovation, such as 
longwall mining, is needed for major production increases. 
In other words, mines that have a higher production rate 
may not see as much of a production rate change by irn- 
plementing deep-cut technology as would a mine with a 
lower production rate. In mines with lower productivity 
rates, however, implementation of technological change, 
such as deep-cut mining, may result in a substantial 
improvement. 
Deep-cut mining has not only shown improvements at 
the productivity level, but has also been attributed to 
improving safety by removing the continuous miner opera- 
tor from inherent dangers at the mine face and decreasing 
the respirable dust levels through the required use of 
scrubber and fan-spray systems. By relocating the contin- 
uous miner operator from the face return air position to 
the face intake air position, a 94% reduction in respirable 
dust was evidenced (6).  
Though deep-cut mining has introduced new safety fea- 
tures, it may have introduced new hazards. Vertical visi- 
bility may be limited when cutting the deeper cuts, which 
may cause some extraction of the roof and floor (3). 
Another study, performed by the USBM, revealed that 
continuous miner operators were standing in positions that 
were not recommended by their standard operating proce- 
dures because of the inability to see from these recom- 
mended positions (8). The study concluded that the posi- 
tions used were not in accordance with the safe operating 
procedures of the mine and that there was a problem with 
determining a safe position with adequate visibility. The 
results of the study are magnified as the variance is 
granted for deeper cuts. As the length of cut increases, 
visibility, staying on the sight line, and watching the roof 
changes become more difficult. The continuous miner op- 
erator is removed from the machine through the use of the 
remote control and has to rely heavily on sound and sight 
senses instead of vibration for condition and position cues. 
The further the miner operator is away from the face, the 
potential for misreading cues increases and, therefore, the 
potential for mistakes and accidents increases. 
Though deep-cut mining has been embraced by the 
mining industry as a way to avoid the obvious safety and 
efficiency drawbacks of the machine-mounted compart- 
ment, research addressing the new issues is still relatively 
new and scarce. There is a lack of information regarding 
training for miners who will be or are using deep cuts. 
Because of varying mine conditions, not all mines will have 
the same problems and their experiences with deep-cut 
mining will vary. The USBM is taking a systematic look 
at the new technology to help identify problems associated 
with deep-cut mining and to address problems associated 
with standard-cut mining. A first step in identifying prob- 
lems is to take a look at current available accident data. 
In this paper, the USBM examines the occupational safety 
concerns associated with deep-cut mining. This work was 
done in support of the USBM's goal to enhance the safety 
of the Nation's underground miners. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction Method 
The most objective measures of mine safety are the fre- 
quency and severity rates of mining accidents. An impor- 
tant element of the research to assess the safety of deep- 
cut mining operations has been an evaluation of mine 
accident data collected by MSHA. In particular, accident 
data of mines that had MSHA approval to take deep cuts 
have been compared with accident data of mines that did 
not have approval to take deep cuts. 
Title 30, part 50 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regula- 
tions (14) requires mine operators to notify MSHA im- 
mediately of mine accidents and to investigate accidents. 
Mine operators must file reports with MSHA pertaining to 
accidents, occupational injuries, and occupational illnesses 
using form 7000-1. Mine operators must also report em- 
ployment and production data using form 7000-2. MSHA 
generates yearly data files containing employment and pro- 
duction data, as well as reported accident, injury, and ill- 
ness information. In recent years, the MSHA data files 
have included estimated accident costs, as determined by 
the USBM's accident cost indicator model (ACIM). 
ACIM considers the type of accident and other factors, 
such as regional medical treatment rates to estimate costs 
to the public, industry, and family (5). 
Mines that had approval to take deep cuts were 
compared with mines that did not have approval using 
MSHA employment, production, and accident data. The 
data were classified and selected as follows: First, mines 
that had obtained approval to take deep cuts for 1990 and 
1991 were identified in the data files. Second, mines that 
used longwall technology in these 2 years were identified 
in the data files. The list of longwall mines was obtained 
from Merritt (9-10). Third, data for mines without long- 
wall operations, with underground coal production greater 
than zero tons, and with at least 16,000 underground em- 
ployee hours were selected [16,000 equates to approxi- 
mately 8 underground workers (a minimal face crew), 
working for a year]. Fourth, accident records for un- 
derground workers who were fatally injured or had lost- 
time injuries were selected. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the number of mines, underground 
hours worked, and productivity data for mines with and 
without approval to take deep cuts. Data are present- 
ed for four mine size categories: average number of 
employees less than 50, average number of employees be- 
tween 50 and 150, average number of employees between 
150 and 250, and average number of employees greater 
than 250. ' Overall results are presented as well. 
Table 2 displays fatality rates and nonfatal lost-time 
injury rates for mines with and without deep-cut approvals. 
Rates are normalized to 200,000 underground hours 
worked. In addition, the average number of days lost per 
nonfatal lost-time injury and average estimated cost per 
nonfatal lost-time injury are displayed. Results are cat- 
egorized by mine size in the same manner as in table 1. 
Additional incidence rates were calculated for small 
(average number of employees less than 50) mines with 
and without deep-cut approvals. These rates were broken 
down according to "accident-injury-illness" type, mine 
worker activity, and job title. These results are displayed 
graphically in figures 2 through 4, respectively. 
Limitations 
It would be desirable to compare the characteristics of 
accidents that occur when a deep cut is taken to those that 
occur when a cut of 6.1 m (20 ft) or less is taken. Unfor- 
tunately, MSHA data files do not identify whether a mine 
was taking a deep cut at the time of an accident. The only 
information available is the identity of mines with MSHA 
approval to take deep cuts for the years 1990 and 1991. 
For this reason, the analyses compare mines with and 
without deep-cut approvals for 1990 and 1991. It is not 
known what percentage of deep-cut mining is done at 
mines with deep-cut approval. It is also known that some 
deep-cut mining is done at mines without deep-cut ap- 
proval (1, 4). However, it is assumed that deep-cut mining 
is more prevalent at mines with deep-cut approval. 
Data that are reported to MSHA on the 7000-1 and 
7000-2 forms are not always complete. The most accurate- 
ly reported accidents are those that resulted in a fatality. 
It is also more likely that accidents that result in lost work 
time will be reported accurately. This analysis only ex- 
amines accidents that resulted in a fatality or a lost-time 
injury. 
Longwall mining and mine size are two factors that 
greatly influence the data, and each were addressed in this 
analysis. However, other factors that influence safety in 
underground mining that were not addressed include min- 
ing conditions, seam height, geology, type of ventilation 
system used, makeup of the work force, and management 
structure. Because of the limitations discussed, definitive 
conclusions about the comparisons that are presented are 
difficult to make and the interpretation of many of the re- 
sults will be left to the reader. 
Table 1.-Summary of 1990 and 1991 employment and production data for underground coal 
mines without longwall operations, categorized by mine size and deep-cut approval status 
Mine 
Number of mines (sum of Work time, lo3 h Coal productivity, t/h 
size (average number each year's total) underground underground 
of employees) 
Deep-cut No approval Deep-cut No approval Beep-cut No approval 
Less than or equal to 50 . . .  162 1,298 9,657 51,212 3.80 3.21 
50 to 150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  130 156 20,309 22,041 3.46 3.04 
150 to 250 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50 22 17,796 6,995 2.87 3.09 
More than 250.. . . . . . . . .  32 13 22,699 6,710 2.76 3.09 
Overall . . . . . . . . . . . . .  374 1,553 70,461 86,958 3.13 3.15 
Table 2.--Summary of 1990 and 1991 fatal and nonfatal lost-time injury rates, average days lost, 
and average total cost for underground coal mines without longwall operations, categorized 
by mine size and deep-cut approval ststus 
Fatal injuries per Nonfatal lost-time in- Average days lost per Average total cost per 
Mine size 200,000 h underground juries per 200,000 h nonfatal lost-time injury nonfatal lost-time 
(average number ~eep-cut NO approval underground Deep-cut No approval injury, $ 
of employees) approval Deep-cut No approval approval Deep-cut No approval 
approval approval 
Less than or 0.12 0.13 12.28 1 1.76 42 46 10,719 12,282 
equal to 50 . . .  
50to150 . . . . . .  0.06 0.05 13.32 12.61 41 42 10,355 1 0,737 
150to250 . . . . .  0.04 0.06 15.01 15.73 45 50 9,826 9,037 
More than 250 . . 0.00 0.06 15.08 14.04 42 36 10,208 10,559 
Overall . . . . .  0.05 0.10 14.17 12.47 43 44 10,206 1 1,407 
KEY 
Nondeep-cu t  mining 
MDeep-cut mining 
Handling Machinery Powered Fall of Hand tools Slip-fall Other 
material haulage roof 
ACCIDENT-INJURY-ILLNESS TYPE 
Flgure 2.-lncldence rates (serious accidents per 200,000 underground hours worked) by accldent- 
injury-Illness type for small mines (average number of employees less than 50). 
KEY 
Nondeep-cu t  mining 
EQ Deep-cu t mining 
Roof bolting Handling Moving cable Machine Hand tools Load-haul- Other 
supplies maintenance dump 
WORKER ACTIVITY 
Figure 3.--Incidence rates (serious accidents per 200,000 underground hours worked) by mine 




Roof bolter Shuttle car Scoop car Laborer Continuous Belt operaror Other 
operator operator miner operalor 
JOB TITLE 
Figure 4.-Incidence rates (serious accidents per 200,000 underground hours worked) by job 
title for small mines (average number of employees less than 50). 
Discussion 
The calculations from data in table 1 indicate that deep- 
cut mines report more than three times the number of em- 
ployee hours per mine than mines without deep-cut ap- 
proval. This fact highlights the need to normalize acci- 
dents to exposure hours; any analysis that fails to do so 
may provide misleading information. 
In smaller mines (less than 150 employees), those with 
deep-cut approval had a higher productivity rate than 
those without approval. In the larger mines, however, the 
converse is true. Perhaps this indicates that as mine size 
increases, the impact on total productivity of taking deep 
cuts is lessened and other factors that impact on productiv- 
ity play a more prominent role. When the productivity for 
all mine sizes are compared, mines with and without deep- 
cut approval had nearly the same rates. 
Table 2 indicates that the overall fatality rate of mines 
with deep-cut approval was about half that of mines with- 
out deep-cut approval (0.05 versus 0.10). However, fatality 
rates within each mine size category, with the exception of 
mines with average number of employees greater than 250, 
were very similar. Fatality rates were higher in the smaller 
mine categories than in larger mine categories. This indi- 
cates that mine size had more impact on fatality rates than 
deep-cut approval status. 
The opposite effect is seen when comparing the non- 
fatal lost-time injury rates. Mines with deep-cut approval 
have a slightly higher accident rate than those without 
approval (14.17 versus 12.47). It appears that mine size 
played a significant role in this difference as well. Larger 
mines reported lost-time injuries at a higher rate than 
smaller mines. 
Two measures of accident severity are days lost and 
cost per accident. Average number of days lost is approxi- 
mately the same for mines with and without deep-cut ap- 
proval. Mine size does not seem to have a significant im- 
pact on average days lost. The estimated average cost per 
nonfatal lost-time injury is slightly higher in mines without 
deep-cut approval than in those that do have approval 
($11,407 versus $10,206). Mine size does appear to have 
some impact on the average cost data. In particular, 
mines with fewer than 50 employees appear to have the 
highest average cost per injury. 
According to figure 2, "handling materials" was the 
largest single category of accidents in small mines, ac- 
counting for more than 30% of all accidents, and deep-cut 
mines had an almost 20% higher rate of material handling 
accidents than nondeep-cut mines. One possible explana- 
tion for this statistic is that as deeper cuts are taken, the 
trailing length of cable of continuous mining machines is 
longer and, therefore, the lengths of cable to be handled 
are longer. The longer cable is more difficult to move and 
is more likely to result in an injury. This explanation is 
also supported by figure 3, which shows that moving cable 
is associated with a 26% higher incidence rate in deep-cut 
mines than in nondeep-cut mines. The accident rate due 
to handling supplies also is higher in deep-cut mines by 
about 22% than in nondeep-cut mines (fig. 3). Slip-fall ac- 
cidents have a substantially higher rate in deep-cut mines 
by about 82% than in nondsep-cut mines; however, these 
accidents only accourit for about 7% of p!l accidents in 
small mines. 
One finding of note is that the activity of roof bolting 
has a lower reported accident rate in deep-cut mines than 
in nondeep-cut mines (fig. 3). Furthermore, the incidence 
rate for roof bolters is lower in deep-cut mines by about 
22% than in nondeep-cut mines (fig. 4). This finding is in- 
teresting because roof bolting is often thought of as one of 
the most dangerous tasks in mining. Special concerns have 
been associated with this task in deep cuts. These discrep- 
ancies about the bolting task indicate that this area war- 
rants further investigation through task analysis. 
It appears from figure 4 that the job titles of "shuttle 
car operator" and "continuous miner operator" have higher 
accident rates in deep-cut mines by 20% and 63%, respec- 
tively, than in nondeep-cut mines. The duties performed 
by these job classifications also should be examined 
through task analysis so the reasons for these increased 
rates can be determined and countermeasures suggested. 
UNDERGROUND MINE INTERVIEWS 
A questionnaire was used to determine what aspects of 
deep-cut inining arc considered the most critical to the 
mining industry. To date, over 50 mine workers, including 
mine operators and supervisors, have been questioned at 
various mines with deep-cut approvals throughout Pennsyl- 
vania, Kentucky, Maryland, and Ohio. The questionnaire 
addresses various aspects of the worker's experience, mine 
conditions, and the mine worker's view of safety of deep 
cuts. Topics included in the questionnaire are miner ex- 
perience, deep-cut methods and procedures, roof control, 
accidents and injuries, manual materials handling, control 
layout and design of equipment, visibility, ventilation, 
continuous miner operator protection, breaker tripping, 
maintenance, and general safety questions. The USBM's 
goal is to cover as many areas as possible to identify any 
problems particular to deep-cut mining. 
In general, the results reflect a positive attitude from 
the miners and the mine operators toward deeper cuts. 
Seventy-four percent of the large mine (more than 100 
employees) workers and 95% of the small mine (less than 
100 employees) workers said that deep-cut mining im- 
proved or maintained their productivity levels. The miners 
believe deep-cut mining is safer because they move the 
equipment less, thus decreasing the probability of moving 
accidents. Twenty-two percent of continuous miner oper- 
ators interviewed felt there was increased safety with 
remote control in general. They commented that they 
were more mobile and therefore able to get out of the way 
of the continuous miner quicker and more safely than 
when on the deck of the continuous miner. They also felt 
they were exposed to less noise and dust. Nearly one-half 
of miner operators thought it would be worthwhile to ex- 
amine the design of the remote-control unit because of its 
weight and bulkiness. 
Several concerns with deep cuts were raised. Sixty- 
seven percent of continuous miner operators interviewed 
said that there were visibility problems and 29% said that 
it was at least sometimes difficult to stay on the sight line 
in the deep cuts. Several of these continuous miner 
operators stated that a 12.2-m (40-ft) cut is the maximum 
safe cut because visibility problems begin to occur after 
that point. Scrubber systems are necessary at any length 
to help improve visibility. As the roof and rib conditions 
worsen, miners expressed more concern, especially when 
taking deep cuts and with any length of cut for that matter. 
Also, the miner operator's position when operating the 
continuous miner has become an important safety concern 
in deep cuts, as voiced by many of the interviewees. 
There were varying opinions among the roof bolters of 
the increased danger of bolting deep cuts. It was difficult 
for some bolters to keep up with the mining cycle in deep 
cuts because the extent of roof to be bolted is larger than 
the standard cut. The cutting task and the bolting task 
have become more efficient because of decreases in tram- 
ming time, but it is not known whether the tramming time 
has decreased proportionately for both. The bolting task 
time is heavily dependent on several variables. If there are 
poor roof and rib conditions, the bolting slows down. Pil- 
lar dimensions also affect the bolting cycle. If the pillars 
are larger, there is less bolting to be done and it is easier 
for the bolter to keep up. If the mine is wet, bolting be- 
comes a more difficult task. 
The bolters' workload has been described as the heav- 
iest of all of the job positions. Bolter operators are con- 
cerned that the continuous miner operator will have to 
wait on them to finish bolting the section (13). One-third 
of the roof bolter operators in the study of six mines with 
deep-cut approval said that they find themselves hurrying 
to stay ahead of the continuous miner every day, and 
another 24% said that this happens to them a few times a 
week (12). This workload may encourage the bolter to 
take shortcuts, either to keep up with the miner operator 
or to get a break. The type of shortcuts mentioned were 
spacing bolts further apart than the roof plan allows, ne- 
glecting to do methane checks, neglecting to drill test 
holes, and neglecting to check the torques on bolts. 
Another important concern is the length of time be- 
tween bolting. Some believe that the longer the top sits 
unbolted, the greater the probability of the roof sagging 
and possibly falling. Fifty-seven percent of continuous 
miner operators interviewed were concerned that roof falls 
in deep cuts were both deeper and have larger surface 
areas than roof falls in standard cuts. Thirty-seven percent 
of roof bolters interviewed thought that ground falls may 
be larger in deep cuts. According to Bauer, Pappas, and 
Listak (I), deep-cut roof falls averaged 3.0 times larger in 
area and 1.5 times greater in thickness than nondeep-cut 
roof falls. Love and Peters (7) found that roof bolter 
operators thought that the increase in lengths of cuts was 
causing an increase in the frequency of high roof falls. 
Bolting in deep-cut sections is considered to be the most 
dangerous of the mining job categories because of increase 
in roof fall size and frequency combined with temptations 
to take dangerous shortcuts to keep up with the miner 
operator and to go under unsupported roof. 
Some areas to be looked into more closely are venti- 
lation, cable handling, roof fall protection, remote reset of 
the continuous miner, maintenance, safe operating proce- 
dures, and remote-control unit design. Hanging ventilation 
curtain and extending the ventilation tubing in deep-cut 
sections could result in miners going under unsupported 
roof (13). This occurrence also depends on the ventilation 
plan and type of ventilation available. Cable handling, 
though it is the same task as in a standard cut, may be 
more difficult because of the longer length of cable to be 
handled with the deeper cut. Several miner operators 
thought that they would like to have some protection from 
roof and rib falls when operating the continuous miner, 
but were not sure of the practicality of such a structure. 
There is si&cant interest in the ability to remotely reset 
the breaker on a continuous miner when it trips under un- 
supported roof during deep-cut mining. Erecting tempo- 
rary supports is time consuming and places the worker in 
close proximity to unsupported roof. The temptation is 
great to quickly go out and reset the breaker because it 
takes a fraction of the time required to set temporary 
supports. The USBM has developed alternate methods to 
remotely reset the machine and test sights are being 
established. 
Currently, the USBM is taking a systematic look at 
safety issues in deep-cut mining through the use of the 
questionnaire. The results of these interviews are being 
used to determine what areas need further examination. 
The USBM plans to perform task analyses to break down 
the problem and develop possible solutions. One outcome 
the USBM plans to develop from this research is a meth- 
od for mine management to use when implementing new 
mining technology, whether it is equipment or methods. 
This will provide them with a tool for evaluating the 
human factors aspects of technological changes and to bet- 
ter plan and design for these changes. Because of the na- 
ture of the data presented here, it would be a mistake to 
rely solely on these data to make inferences as to the 
safety of deep-cut mining or to point out all of the areas 
where problems are occurring. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preliminary task analysis questionnaire has helped 
to point out several areas of concern with deep-cut mining 
safety. Several discrepancies were found between the sta- 
tistical analysis and the questionnaire results, but both can 
be useful in pointing out areas of concern. The informa- 
tion helps to better define the factors contributing to in- 
juries and fatalities involved in deep-cut sections. The 
interviews with miners reflect the way they feel about the 
issues discussed. Many limitations and biases may shape 
their perceptions, but their viewpoints are considered 
informative and insightful and are a valuable source of 
information. This sample was relatively small and was not 
randomly selected and, for that reason, should not be 
considered representative of the entire industry. 
The USBM is also taking into account discussions with 
State, Federal, and United Mine Workers of America offi- 
cials to develop a task analysis approach to researching the 
controversial aspects of deep-cut mining. The USBM 
plans to use several types of task analysis methods at two 
or more mines with varying conditions. As part of the 
study, the USBM apects to develop a method for mine 
operators to evaluate, their mine before, during, and after 
the implementation of the new technology or method to 
diminish possible human interface problems. In this way, 
problems can be identified before they show themselves as 
statistics. 
To take a closer look at the visibility aspects of con- 
tinuous miner operators, the USBM plans to initiate a 
work sampling-work activity analysis. This will help to 
determine where the miner operator is positioned in the 
different phases of the cycle and why. The bolter work- 
load is another area that requires special attention. Since 
interview data have indicated that the bolter may be taking 
shortcuts or may be under pressure and hurried, we plan 
to check the loadings on the bolter, both physical and 
mental, through ergonomic checklists, task decomposition, 
and human error analysis. We expect these studies will 
help to point out the amount of exposure to dangerous 
work situations, the amount of workload, the most effec- 
tive type of training needed, and to identify potential 
errors and their likelihood of occurrence. 
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CREWSTATION ANALYSIS PROGRAMS-AN EASY TO USE PERSONAL 
COMPUTER-BASED LIGHTING AND VISIBILITY ANALYSIS 
SOFTWARE PACKAGE FOR UNDERGROUND MINING EQUIPMENT 
By Richard L. ungerl 
ABSTRACT 
Restricted fields of vision are a common problem to use gcrsonal computer-bascd software package to aid in 
with the operator of underground mining equipment, par- the analysis of the visibility and illumination aspects of 
ticularly in lower seams. Also, when lighting systcms are mining equipmcnt design. The software is widely available 
provided underground, they arc often positioned where for use by mine operators and equipment manufacturers 
they cause cxcesslve glare. This restricts the visibility to design new machine illumination systems, as well as 
around the machines even further. To help address thcse to evaluate proposed modifications to existing machines 
problems, the U.S. Bureau of Mines has developed an easy already in use. 
Designing operator compartments (crewstations) for 
underground mining equipment can be a formidable task. 
Massive machinery is required to meet production goals 
while the confined environment imposes severe space 
restrictions in every direction, most critically in hcight. 
As a result of the space limitations, mining equipment 
operator compartmcnts are frequently smaller than rec- 
ommended to adequately accommodate most of the pop- 
ulation. In fact, crewstatioils that provide operator 
accommodations of less than 76 cm (30 in) in height and 
60 cm (24 in) in width are not uncommon. In these 
cramped quarters, visibility is often severely impaired, 
forcing operators to lean outside of the protection of their 
crewstations to see. When lighting systems are provided 
to meet regulatory requirements, they may be positioned 
where they cause glare, which creates additional problems 
for miners operating or working around the machines. 
Given the difficulty of implementing human factors into 
mining equipment design, the U.S. Bureau of Mines 
(USBM) has been attempting to provide the industry with 
products to assist in the equipment design process. 
Several recommendations documents have been dzveloped, 
including a maintainability design reference (I)'  and a 
textbook on human factors in mining (2). In addition, a 
database containing abstracts of human factors research 
applicable to mining was developed and made available to 
anyone with a Digital Equipment Corp. VAX-compatible 
terminal and modem. One of the most recent USBh4 re- 
search projects that shows promise of impacting how 
engineers think about the mining equipment design proc- 
ess is the development of the Crewstation Analysis Pro- 
grams (CAP) package. CAP is a set of computer pro- 
grams that can be used to analyze some of the human en- 
gineering aspects of crewstation design that have particular 
significance in underground mining. These programs cur- 
rently include assessments of visibility and illumination in 
the surrounding work area. Graphics-oriented procedures 
allow the user to input information needed for the anal- 
yses, such as type of mining machinery, lighting systems, 
and mine layouts. Once this information is identified, 
'civil engineer, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, '1talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
Pittsburgh, PA. at  the end of this paper. 
the user may select any of the available analyses. By experiment with novel crewstation layouts for mining 
automating the task of evaluating human factors design equipment. 
issues, CAP will allow engineers to more quickly and easily 
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DESIGN OF CAP 
The original version oT!be software, completed in 1990, 
was written in FORTIZAN for a Digital MicroVAX I1 
computer and reqi;iicd a Tektronk graphics display ter- 
minal and mouse, a graphics tablet, and an optional hard- 
copy unit. The programs have recently been updated and 
translated to the C language and are now targeted for the 
widely used 386/486 processors. However, the programs 
have been designed so that they can be easily transported 
to other, more powerful platforms, such as work stations. 
A great deal of effort was expended to develop interactive 
graphic displays that are "user friendly" to assist in the 
placement of machines, lamps, and other objects needed 
to perform the various ergonomic analyses. 
CAP is designed much like a simple computer-aided 
drafting (CAD) program, such as AutoCAD. The center 
of the screen is taken up by a large view port into the 
"world," where the user positions three-dimensional modcls 
of mines, machines, lamps, glare shields, or any object that 
is needed by the analysis (fig. 1). The lower right portion 
of the screen contains the viewing controls, which allow 
users to change their point of view with respect to the 
objects in the scene. These controls are always available 
and activate several zooming, panning, and camera posi- 
tioning functions. The lower left portion of the screen 
contains controls for the activation of utilities and posi- 
tioning aids. These include changing the color or visibility 
of objects in the scene, turning on a grid to help position 
objects, toggling the scene from a wire frame to a solid 
mode, and activating the help screen. 
The upper right portion of the screen contains the main 
menu area of the program. This is a changeable menu 
several levels deep that controls access to the majority of 
the functions of the program. From this menu you can 
open and save files; input mines, machines, and lamps; edit 
and delete objects; run the analyses; and change the pro- 
gram settings. 
The upper left portion of the screen contains a user 
defined menu. If the users determine that there are func- 
tions in the main menu that they use more often than 
most, the controls for those functions can be permanently 
displayed here so they are readily available. 
Prompts to the user and other pertinent information are 
displayed in the banncr across the top of the screen. In- 
formation about what the program is currently doing is 
generally displayed here. Input into the program is often 
made through dialog boxes, such as the one presented in 
figure 2. This particular dialog box allows the user to 
position a lamp, change its type, or turn it on or off. 
The models of machines and lamps used by CAP are 
usually created with AutoCAD. The AutoCAD DXF file 
is translated to the CAP file format with a utility program 
supplied with CAP. However, simple machine models can 
be created by using either a text editor or a separate mod- 
el build utility supplied with CAP. Actual mine layouts 
can be input to CAP by scanning existing mine maps and 
vectorizing the resultant image into AutoCAD. Mines can 
also be created from scratch in AutoCAD. 
CAP'S VISIBILITY ANALYSIS 
Visibility is a significant problem in the underground chines: shuttle cars, scoops, and continuous miners. 
mining environment. During thc 1980's, the USBM- Using structured interviews and on-site task analyses 
sponsored research (3) to determine minimum visibility re- involving approximately 100 subjects, the researchers first 
quirements for three classes of underground mining ma- identified the tasks involved in the operation of each class 
of vehicle, such as loading, hauling, or unloading. Then, 
the machine operators were interviewed to identify the 
visual information required to perform each of these tasks. 
For example, a shuttle car operator performing a loading 
task would need to see the positioning of the shuttle car 
under the tail boom of the continuous miner. While haul- 
ing, the location of the shuttle car and any obstacles in the 
roadway would be required. Following the interviews, the 
operators were observed while performing the tasks to ver- 
ify the visual information requirements established in the 
interviews. 
Once the requirements were determined, a methodol- 
ogy was developed to identify specific points in the front- 
to-back, side-to-side, and vertical planes that must be 
visible to the operator to satisfy the visual requirements. 
These points, called visual attention locations (VAL's), 
were defined in reference to generic locations on the 
machine. This alluir'cd the VAL'S to apply to all config- 
urations of a particular equipment class. For instance, 
while tramming, a shuttlc car operator must be able to 
spot an obstruction on the ground, while there is enough 
time to stop thc vehicle. The location of one of the VAL's 
associated with this requirement is describcd in table I. 
Using this methodology, the procedure involved in com- 
puting the location of the VAL is the same even if the 
length of the equipment, the operator's position, or the 
height of the equipment is modified. 
The results of this VAL research have been incorpo- 
rated into the CAP package. The CAP visibility model 
automates the task of determining whether or not the re- 
quired VAL's are visible to a selected human operator, 
currently either a 5th percentile female or 95th percent- 
ile male. The output is a relative visibility rating for 
the machine, which can be compared with results of alter- 
native machine designs. CAP also provides both graphical 
(figs. 3-4) and tabular output to pinpoint any machine 
parts that obstruct visibility. 
Table 1 .-Location of VAL associated 
with tramming shuttle car 
Coordinate 
plane 
Position of VAL 
Front to back . . Front edge of machine plus necessary stop- 
ping distance. 
Side to side . . . Machine centerline. 
Vertical . . . . . .  Floor. 
CAP'S ILLUMINATION ANALYSIS 
Due to the perpetual darkness of the underground 
environment, illumination is a factor that must be con- 
sidered when designing equipment for optimal visibility. 
Federal regulations specify that certain surfaces within 
a miner's normal field of vision must be illuminated to 
0.21 cd/m2 (0.06-fL) while self-propelled mining equip- 
ment is being operated. The 0.21-cd/m2 (0.06-fL) level is 
a measure of luminance, or photometric brightness. It is 
a product of the level of illumination (incident light) 
impinging on a surface and the reflectivity of the surface. 
USBM research has shown that the 0.21 cd/m2 (0.06%) 
level is adequate for most mining tasks and is low enough 
so that operaLois will not cxpcricncc severe adaptation 
problems when moving from illuminated to nonilluminated 
areas of thc mine (1-5) .  
Unfortunately, in attempting to mcet these illumination 
standards, mine equipment designers sometimes aggravate 
another mine lighting problem-glare. There are currently 
no standards related to glare in underground mining. The 
regulations state only that designers should attempt to 
minimize glare when developing machine illumination sys- 
tems. Obviously, performing all of the calculations re- 
quired to compute glare for a multitude of machine and 
lamp types, with the possible combinations running into 
the thousands, is too tedious and costly to be practical 
using manual methods. The result is that the designer is 
impeded significantly in solving for an optimal illumination 
system that minimizes glare. 
The CAP illumination model eliminates these problems 
by turning the computational portion of the lighting design 
task over to the computer. The software allows the light- 
ing designer to concentrate on adjusting the configuration 
of the illumination system to minimize the potential for 
glare while still providing enough illumination to conform 
to the Federal regulations. 
To perform an illumination analysis using CAP, the 
user lays out a lighting system on a machine model. Each 
lamp has associated with it an illumination profile, previ- 
ously measured along selected angular orientations from 
the lens of the lamp. Using these profiles, the software 
can calculate the light output at any location in the scene. 
The model does not take into account reflected light, but 
it can correct for the shadowing effects of machines or 
other objects in the scene. 
In CAP, illumination measurement panels represent the 
areas (roof, ribs, floor, and face) that must be illuminated 
to 21.52 lx  (2.0 fc) to meet the Federal regulations. These 
panels can be sized and positioned around a machine 
model (fig. 5). The output of the illumination analysis can 
be displayed on these panels so that quick comparisons 
can be made between lamp layouts (fig. 6). 
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Figure 1.-Default screen layout of CAP with solid model of battery-powered scoop displayed. 
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Figure 2.--Screen layout switches to three view modes when objects are being positioned. Dia- 
log box allows Input of preclse lnformatlon for objects. 
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Figure 3.-Shuttle car and continuous miner in entry. Pillars are from scanned mine map. 
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Figure 4.-View from inside shuttle car cab. VAL'S are represented as blocks. 
Figure 5.--Continuous mining machine with three of its lamps turned on. There are four illumi- 
nation measurement panels-ane on floor, one at face, and two at sides. 
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Figure 6.-Illumination measurement panels are unfolded to display results. Crosshatched 
blocks indicate an average Illumination of at least 21.52 l x  (2.0 fc). 
SUMMARY 
The hardware and software requirements for CAP are 
listed below. 
Hardware: 
1. IBM-compatible 3861486 computer. 
2. Math coprocessor. 
3. 8 Mb of random access memory (RAM) (16 Mb is 
preferred). 
4. At least 10-Mb hard-disk space. 
5. Video graphics adaptor (VGA) with 256 color ca- 
pability (super VGA is preferred), 
6. VGA monitor. 
7. Microsoft-compatible mouse. 
1. DOS 5.0 or greater. 
2. Optional AutoCAD release 11 or 12 with or without 
advanced modeling extension. 
AutoCAD release 11 or 12 with or without the advanced 
modeling extension (AME) is also necessary to generate 
complex machine models. However, CAP is supplied with 
a library of generic mining machines that suit most needs. 
There is a charge to cover the USBM's licensing fees for 
the graphics toolkits used by the software. 
There are many advantages to using computers to assist 
in the design of mining equipment. Computers permit 
quick evaluation and cornparisoil of different systems, such 
as when trying to optimally position lamps. Information 
that is difficult or tedious ro incorporate into a design with 
manual methods, such as anthropometric data, call be 
conveniently accessed. Graphical feedback not only en- 
ables the designer lo quickly identify potential problems, 
but also enhances his or her ability to con~municate ideas 
to the client, increasing fhc lihclihoad i l l  acceptance of 
novel designs. 
In the future, the TJSHhl plans to enhance CAP with 
additional capabilities. Work is already underway to auto- 
niatlcally gznerate the path network composed of the en- 
tries and cros~cuts of the mine model. This will allow 
computerized t~min,g sstudies to be performed, such as t l~e  
tiinc ncedcd for pcrsonilel to escape from a scctiou. Op- 
erator reach and accommodation models may- idso be add- 
cd, Thcse progr,iIns would bclp the dcsigner to determine 
whether operators from a sclccted populrition would bc 
able to fit into the crewstation and reach the controls. As 
with t1:c illumination and virlliility models, the unique re- 
quirements of the underground mine worker would be tak- 
en into account, including provisions for miners wearing 
hardhatb, metatarsal t)c)cjis, and self-contained breathing 
apparatus. 
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IMPACT OF MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN ON INJURY 
RATES AND MAINTENANCE COSTS FOR 
UNDERGROUND MINING EQUIPMENT 
By Richard L. ungerl and Kirk ~ o n w a ?  
ABSTRACT 
In the U.S. underground coal mining industry, main- 
tenance of the mining equipment accounts for over 30% of 
the lost-time injuries. In addition, the steadily increasing 
cost of maintaining this equipment has focused attention 
on the need to find ways to contain or reduce these 
expenses. To  obtain a better understanding of why main- 
tenance injuries occur, the U.S. Bureau of Mines has 
conducted a research project to analyze the design of 
underground mining equipment with respect to ease of 
maintenance and maintainer safety. The objective was to 
identify design factors contributing to these high injury 
rates and maintenance costs. The work included a review 
of relevant maintainability design literature, analysis of 
maintenance-related accident data, field reviews of equip- 
ment design in underground operating environments, and 
interviews with mine maintenance personnel and equip- 
ment manufacturers. Based on the findings, a set of main- 
tainability design recommendations have been prepared 
and published. The documents include basic maintain- 
ability engineering information for equipment designers, as 
well as a buyers' guide to assist purchasers of mining 
machinery in evaluating the maintainability of equipment. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950's underground coal mining equipment con- 
sisted of relatively simple but rugged machines powered by 
electric motors and hydraulics. These machines were used 
to cut, dig, load, and transport coal from the mine face to 
the surface. The machines were maintained by mine 
maintenance personnel armed with a basic knowledge of 
hydraulics, electricity, and mechanical design. These 
maintainers were expected to repair all of the equipment 
at the minesite using only simple hand tools. 
Over the years, the basic mining machine has been 
transformed into powerful, complex mining systems. To 
boost productivity, the horsepower and size of the original 
machines have been increased. To enhance unit productiv- 
ity, machines were designed to perform multiple functions. 
'civil engineer, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
Pittsburgh, PA. 
%enior staff scientist, VRC Corp., Monterey, CA. 
To increase throughput, continuous miners, longwall and 
shortwall systems, and continuous haulage were intro- 
duced. To reduce injuries, numerous safety features have 
been added to the machines. To protect the miners' 
health, environmental control systems have been tacked 
on. 
With few exceptions, however, little improvement in the 
basic design of equipment for maintainability has been 
made. In many cases, equipment maintainability has been 
sharply decreased. Many of the above design changes 
were achieved by simply modifying existing machine de- 
signs. On certain mining machines, sharp reductions in 
maintainability and, consequently, maintainer safety were 
experienced as a result of added-on safety and environ- 
mental systems designed only with the machine operator 
in mind. 
Even with all of the above changes, the maintainer is 
still expected to service and repair these ever more com- 
plex machines. This must be accomplished in an opera- 
tional setting providing little in the way of new main- 
tenance tools, procedures, automatic test equipment, or 
other technology-based maintenance aids and in an en- 
vironment that usually lacks proper lighting and clearances. 
All in all, there has been little concern directed at the well 
being of the maintainer. It is no wonder that equipment 
maintenance has traditionally accounted for one-third of 
all lost-time injuries in underground mines. This injury 
rate persists in spite of concerted efforts on the part of 
mine management to minimize accidents, U.S. Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) efforts to enforce 
health and safety rules, and USBM efforts to conduct 
safety research. 
In addition to the safety of the maintainer, another area 
of concern has been the escalating cost of mining equip- 
ment maintenance. Underground equipment maintenance 
typically accounts for 25% to 35% of the total mine op- 
erating costs. These costs have continued to rise over the 
years despite efforts to contain them. Mine operators 
have attempted to gain control of these steadily increasing 
costs through (1) optimization of scheduled maintenance 
operations, (2) reductions in maintenance staff, (3) re- 
duction and better control of spare parts inventories, 
(4) contracting for maintenance support, and (5) deferring 
nonessential maintenance. 
Unfortunately, little attention has been focused on 
the design of the mining machine itself with respect to 
maintenance costs. The cost of maintaining a machine is, 
after all, a direct function of- 
1. Maintenance frequency and failure interval for the 
machine and major components. 
2. Time and labor required to complete unscheduled 
maintenance actions. 
3. Time and labor required to complete routine main- 
tenance tasks. 
A review of current mining equipment design suggests 
that considerable improvements in safety, as well as sub- 
stantial cost savings, could be achieved with relatively 
simple design improvements. For example, by relocating 
difficult to access, but frequently replaced hydraulic valves 
and hoses on certain roof bolters, this 1-h plus removal 
and replacement (R/R) task is reduced to a 5-min opera- 
tion. Improved component accessibility and increased ease 
of R/R tasks reduces the maintainer's risk of injury. Nu- 
merous other maintenance improvements could be realized 
with minor design changes on new or existing equipment. 
As part of its program to enhance the safety of mine 
workers, the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) completed a 
project entitled "Assessment of the Maintainability Design 
of Underground Mobile Mining Equipment," which was 
performed by VRC Corp. The final report was published 
in 1988 Other papers published by the USBM based 
on this work are listed in the references (2-6). 
DESIGN-INDUCED MAINTAINABILITY PROBLEMS 
The USBM analyzed underground coal mining equip- 
ment with respect to design for maintenance and main- 
tenance personnel safety. A maintainability design review 
and human factors analysis of equipment was completed 
at nine operational coal mines. Mining machines in large 
and small mines operating in high- and low-seam coal 
were surveyed. Conventional, continuous, and longwall op- 
erations were included. Shuttle cars, scoops, roof bolters, 
continuous miners, longwall equipment, undercut ma- 
chines, face drills, utility vehicles, and personnel carriers 
were reviewed. The survey identified the following design 
limitations that directly impacted maintenance time, cost, 
and personnel safety. 
1. Accessibility problems: Inability of maintenance 
personnel to access failed or suspected components to in- 
spect or remove and replace them. Accessibility problems 
resulted from- 
a. Inadequate access opening size. 
b. Poor layout of components in a compartment, 
necessitating R/R of nonaffected parts to access the 
failed units. 
c. Inability to access mounting bolts or connectors 
or to use required tools. 
d. Installing components in inaccessible interior 
cavities and running cables inside the frame or chassis 
where they cannot be reached. 
e. Locating fasteners and mechanical interfaces 
where they physically cannot be reached unless the ma- 
chine is partially or completely disassembled. 
2. Inadequate component-handling capability and 
component-machine interface design. 
3. Inadequate design for routine maintenance: Inability 
to quickly remove and replace leaking hydraulic hoses and 
water lines, to remove and replace failed hydraulic valves, 
3~talic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this paper. 

HUMAN ERROR AND DESIGN FOR MAINTENANCE 
So-called human error is a problem that must be ad- of the component-machine interface. Although not direct- 
dressed in design as well as during operation and main- ly applicable to underground mining operations, the above 
tenance of complex equipment (9-13). Errors may occur error rates are suggestive of the types, frequencies, and 
in operating mining machines, performing maintenance sources of human errors in maintenance. It is reasonable 
tasks, or in making management decisions. Fortunately, to assume that similar error-rate patterns could be ex- 
most human errors result in limited negative consequences pected in mine maintenance operations. 
(e.g.; lost time and production waste). In many cases, the 
error ends up costing the party involved time or money. 
Unfortunately, in a smaller percentage of cases, people are 
injured or killed and equipment destroyed. 
Dramatic evidence of the impact of a maintenance er- 
ror was the 1979 American Airlines DClO crash that killed 
272 people. This crash was directly attributed to mainte- 
nance error. The probability of recurrence of this type of 
error was reduced substantially by means of a simple com- 
ponent design change. 
OPERATIONALLY INDUCED ERRORS 
Table 2.-Representative maintenance task 
error rates (13) 
Action Object Error description Error 
rate1 
. . . . .  Observe . .  Chart Improper switch action 1,128 
Fiead . . . .  Gage . . . . .  Incorrectly read . . . . . .  5,000 
. . . . . .  Read . . . .  Instruction Procedural error 64,500 
. . . . .  Connect . .  Hose Improperly connected 4,700 
. . . .  Torque . . .  Fluid lines incorrectly torqued 104 
. . . . . . . .  Tighten . .  Nuts, bolts Not tightened 4,800 
. . . . . . . . .  Install . . . .  Nuts, bolts Not installed 600 
. . .  Install . . . .  0 rings . . .  Improperly installed 66,700 
. .  Solder . . .  Connection Improper solder joint 6,460 
. . . . . . . . . . .  What does human error have to do with mining equip- Assemble Connector Bent pins 1,500 Assemble Connector Missing part . . . . . . . . .  1,000 
. . .  . . . .  . . . . .  ment maintainability? In an interesting review of the sub- Close valve Not closed properly 
ject, researchers report that a significant percentage of all Adjust . . .  Linkage . . .  Improperly adjusted . . .  16,700 
operational equipment failures are human error induced Install . . . .  Orifice . . . .  Incorrect size installed 5,000 
. .  . . . . .  (11-12). In fact, human error accounted lor- Machine Valve Wrong size drill and tap 2,083 
'per million operations. 
1. Fifty to seventy percent of all electronics failures. 
2. Sixty to seventy percent of all aircralt and missile 
failures. 
3. Twenty to thirty percent of all mechanical failures. 
ERRORS IN UNDERGROUND MINING 
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 
Representative underground mining maintenance errors 
Many of these are operator induced errors resulting in have been identified, with the major types summarized in 
machine damage Or prolonged down time. Maintenance table 3. It was also possible to identify a number of fat- 
requirements be reduced designing Out these tors to maintenance-related human error. 
types of errors. Other errors are made by maintenance include- 
personnel while performing maintenance tasks (13). 
MAINTENANCE-INDUCED ERROR RATES 
The above study also reports that 20% to 25% of all 
failures are directly traceable to maintenance errors. A 
separate study found 25% of all maintenance problems to 
be human error induced during maintenance operations 
(11). Another study reports human error rates lor specific 
types of maintenance tasks. These data, summarized in 
table 2, were derived from an earlier study (13). The 
values are indicative of the error rates found in many 
industrial and military settings. 
Another maintenance study reports that the average 
human reliability in adjusting or aligning tasks is 0.0987 
(13). This value suggests that out of every 1,000 attempts 
to adjust a component, you can expect 13 errors. Many of 
these errors could be eliminated through improved design 
1. Confined workspaces: Crowded equipment bays. 
2. Inability to make visual inspections. 
3. ~naccesiible components: - 
a. Lube points that could not be reached. 
b. Adjustment points that are hard to access. 
c. Major components that could not be reached. 
4. Poor layout of components in a compartment. 
5. Inappropriate placement of components on machine. 
6. Poor or no provision for hose and cable 
management. 
7. Lack of troubleshooting guides and tools. 
8. Lack of positive component installation guide pins 
and other installation controls. 
9. Insufficient task inspection and check-out time. 
10. Cumbersome or inadequate manuals. 
11. Excessive weight of components being manually 
handled. 
Table 8.-Typical mining equipment maintenance errors b. Provide mounting pins and other devices to sup- 
Frequency Type of enor 
I . . . . . . . . Install incorrect component. 
S . . . . . . . Omitting a component. 
Parts installed backwards. 
Failure to properly torque. 
Failure to align, check, or calibrate. 
Use of incorrect fluids, lubricants, or greases. 
Reassemble error. 
Failure to seal or close. 
O . . .  
port a component while it is being bolted or unbolted. 
2. Improved fault isolation design: 
a. Designate test points and procedures. 
b. Provide built-in test capability. 
c. Clearly indicate direction of fault. 
3. Improved indicators, warning devices, and readouts 
to minimize human decisionmaking. 
4. Use of operational interlocks so that subsystems can- 
Error resulting from failure to complete task due to not be activated if they are incorrectly assembled-installed. 
shift change. 5. Use of positive decision guides to minimize human 
Failure to detect while inspecting. guesswork: Failure to lubricate. 
Failure to act on indicators of problems due to a. Arrows to indicate direction of flow. 
workload, priorities, or time constraints. b. Correct type of fluids or lubricants. 
Failure to follow prescribed instructions. c. Correct hydraulic pressures. 
I Infrequent (less than once per year). 
S Somewhat frequently f2 to 5 times per year!. 
0 Often (over 5 times per year). 
Listed below are several engineering design improvements 
that reduce maintenance errors: 
1. Improved component-machine interface: 
a. Design interface so that the component can only 
be installed correctly (e.g.; irregular bolt pattern). 
6. Design to facilitate detection of errors: 
a. Locate connections on front of component to fa- 
cilitate visual inspections. 
b. Lay equipment out in a logical flow sequence. 
If maintainer-induced errors could be reduced by 50%, 
overall equipment availability would be increased by more 
than 10%. These reductions can be achieved through 
improved design. 
MAINTENANCE SAFETY COSTS 
Maintenance operations account for a significant per- 
centage of all coal mining accidents and injuries. MSHA 
accident statistics for 1984 suggest that maintenance-re- 
lated injuries account for 33% of all lost-time accidents 
(14). These accidents impact mine operating costs in the 
form of decreased productivity, increased benefits costs, 
and increased insurance rates. 
Many injury accidents can be directly traced to equip- 
ment design in this and other studies (6). Inadequate 
accessibility, lack of meails to lift and maneuver heavy 
components, inability to visually observe the maintenance 
task being performed, inadequate maintenance safeguards, 
and other design-induced problems account for a signifi- 
cant percentage of maintenance accidents. Improved ac- 
cessibility, enhanced component-machine interface, and 
simplified maintenance procedures could have a positive 
impact on these statistics. Improved maintenance safety 
will reduce maintenance as well as overall operating costs. 
COST OF MINING EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 
Reliable maintenance cost data are not currently avail- to over 35% of total mine operating costs. Actual values 
able across the underground coal mining industry, although varied based on the size and type of mine, mining technol- 
several industry estimates are available. These estimates, ogy employed, management attitude toward maintenance, 
however, vary substantially from source to source. and other factors. 
Informal data gathered over the past several years 
reveal that equipment maintenance costs range from 20% 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MAINTENANCE COSTS 
The current review of mine maintenance operations 
suggested that the following factors contribute to equip- 
ment maintenance costs: 
1. Management attitude towards maintenance: Atti- 
tudes range from "when it breaks-fuc it" to strong top 
management support for professionally planned and im- 
plemented preventive maintenance (PM) programs geared 
to reducing unscheduled equipment down time and to con- 
trolling maintenance costs. 
2. Skill of maintenance management personnel: The 
skills required to organize and manage an effec~ive mine 
maintenance program differ from the skills required to 
perform "hands on" maintenance of mining equipment. 
Poor maintenance management contributes to increased 
costs. 
3. Maintenance training and experience: Poor main- 
tenance skills on the part of maintainers resulting from in- 
adequate training; lack of job performance aids, manuals 
and guides; and complexity of maintenance tasks. 
4. Maintenance environment: It is an entirely different 
task to maintain a continuous miner in a 91-cm (36-in) 
coal seam than it is to maintain one in a well-equipped 
standing height underground repair shop. 
5. Age of equipment: Older equipment tends to be 
smaller and inherently simpler in design. As a result, old- 
er machines are somewhat simpler to maintain. Newer 
equipment tends to be larger, more complex, and overlaid 
with numerous "add-on" systems and components, making 
accessibility and the basic maintenance process more 
difficult. 
6. Maintenance errors: Reliable data are not available, 
but most maintenance personnel interviewed informally 
concede that maintenance errors contribute substantially 
to overall maintenance costs. Removing and replacing 
nonfailed items, troubleshooting one system too long, not 
replacing suspected components during a previous mainte- 
nance opportunity, failing to install or repair a component 
correctly, failing to test a component prior to reassembly, 
and related errors account for an estimated 10% to 25% 
of all maintenance time. 
7. Design of equipment itself: Certain makes and 
models of mining equipment are designed to facilitate 
maintenance and repair, while the basic design of other 
models hinder maintenance actions. 
8. Regulatory compliance: Safety and environmental 
control devices required for regulatory compliance add to 
the complexity and increase maintenance costs. 
COST OF DESIGN FOR MAINTAINABILITY 
The value or worth of any machine resides in its ability 
to generate a return on investment. If a machine has an 
initial cost of " Y  dollars, it must produce "Y plus" dollars 
of coal to have a positive worth or value. On this assump- 
tion, it is possible to illustrate the cost savings derived 
from improved design for maintainability using simple eco- 
nomic models. 
There are many economic models that can be used to 
compute the worth of equipment. For this discussion, a 
simplified model will suffice. Figure 1 presents an over- 
view of this model. (Readers interested in a more compre- 
hensive treatment are referred to references 8, 15, 16, and 
17.) The following model suggests that the worth (W) of 
a piece of mining equipment can be defined as- 
where L = initial purchase price of machine, 
The initial purchase price of the piece of equipment is 
fued or "inelastic." It is set at the time of purchase. The 
price is simply amortized per hour over the useful life of 
the machine. Of course, the more hours of production it 
sees, the lower the amortized cost per hour. 
The cost per hour to o p e r a t ~  the machine is relatively , 
fured or "inelastic" and composed of the following cost 
elements: 
1. Labor costs for the machine operator(s), support 
personnel, and immediate production supervision. 
2. General overhead costs, which include insurance, 
utilities, royalties, brokerage, and related costs. 
3. Cost of mining supplies and materials. 
4. Other management and administrative costs. 
The cost to maintain consists of the followine; cost ele- 
- 
ments, some of which are fuced and some of which are rel- 
atively "elastic": 
C = cost per hour to operate machine, 1. Labor costs for maintenance personnel. 
2. Cost of spares, replacement parts, and supplies. 
M = maintenance costs per hour of operation, 3. Loss of production during maintenance. 
4. Cost per hour of idled machine operators. 
and P = production value per hour of operation. 5. Other maintenance-related costs. 
The costs of replacement parts and maintenance sup- 
plies are also relatively inelastic. Certain savings can be 
realized with careful buying. The cost of labor and other 
overhead items, on the other hand, are a function of the 
duration of repair time for unscheduled corrective mainte- I 
nance (CM) actions. F rY 
More importantly, a reduction in repair time for 0 
downed equipment contributes positively to the overall 3 
worth equation by increasing the time available for pro- 2 duction. Thus, decreased time to repair not only reduces w 
direct maintenance costs, but also increases the production F 
per hour, thereby offsetting other costs. If we look at the C/) > 
maintenance process again, we observe many points at y.) 
which time can be saved through improved design for 
maintenance (fig. 2). Several of these points include- 
1. Prediction of pending failures to facilitate PM 
scheduling. 
2. Decreased fault isolation time. 
3. Reduced component access time. 
4. Decreased inspection and diagnosis time. 
5. Diminished component R/R time. 
6. Reduced test and alignment time. 
A review of underground maintenance task completion 
times at two large mining operations revealed that the 
time required to change hydraulic hoses on continuous 
miners and shuttle cars ranged from 15 min to over 3 h. 
The estimated average time for a failed hydraulic hose 
R/R was over 35 min. Examination of these machines re- 
vealed that the time differences were directly linked to 
accessibility of the hose connectors. In several cases, two 
or more nonfailed components had to be removed to ac- 
cess a failed hose connection. 
By relocating several components or rerouting hoses, 
maintenance personnel could directly access over 90% of 
all hydraulic line connections on the surveyed machines. 
This would have reduced the average hydraulic line R/R 
time to well under 15 min per replacement. 
If a maintainability design standard for new or rebuilt 
machines specified that all hydraulic hoses had to be 
7 Logistics 
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MAINTAINABILITY 
Figure 1.-System worth versus maintainability (13). 
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I Remove-replace part 
I Reassemble machine V///////////1 I Test and align I Return to service 
MAINTENANCE TASK SEQUENCE 
Figure 2.-Sample maintenance task sequence. 
removed oi replaced in less than 15 min, the average 
repair time for this task could be reduced 50%. Similar Evidence from other civilian and military research efforts 
performance criteria could be developed for other suggest that PM and CM task time reductions of from 
maintenance tasks. The result would be significant 40% up to 70% are achievable with planned maintain- 
reductions in all maintenance task completion times. ability design efforts (15-16). 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Productivity represents the other side of the maintain- and ease with which the mining machine can be repaired 
ability issue. Productivity is a function of the machine pro- and returned to service. The more rapidly a machine can 
ducing coal. Hence, it is directly impacted by the speed be returned to production, the more productive it will be. 
Productivity is expressed in terins of the units (of coal) 600 h/yr x 90,000 kg/h (100 st/h) = 54 million kg/yr 
produced by a machine per unit of time. The greater the 
number of hours the machine is available to produce coal, (60,000 st/yr) per machine increase. 
the more productive it is going to be. For example, sup- 
pose that a continuous miner has a rated production ca- If the mine were operating eight miners, this 54 million 
pacity of '07 kg/h (loo st/h). Further, that the kg/yr (60,000 per machine increase would be the 
same miner requires an average of- 
equivalent of adding another miner with no additional 
1. One hour of P M  per shift, and 
2. One hour of CM per shift. 
increase in cost. 
54 million kg/yr (60,000 st/yr) x 8 miners 
Assume that the mine operates the equipment during 
two production shifts per day for 300 d/yr. Hence- = 432 million kg (480,000 st) annual increase. 
(300 h P M  + 300 h CM) x 2 shifts = 1,200 h/yr. Actual analysis of the design of three different con- 
tinuous mining machines during this project suggested that If the CM and PM time could be reduced by 50%, this productivity improvements exceeding the above example 
would result in the following increase in productivity: 
could be achieved with relatively simple redesign efforts. 
(1,200 CM and PM h/y) x 0.5 = 600 h/yr savings 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions were derived from this study 
of maintainability in the underground mining industry: 
1. There is little evidence of the systematic application 
of maintainability design principles, concepts, or criteria 
to the design of operational underground coal mining 
equipment. 
2. Similarly, there is little evidence of systematic 
application of human factors engineering principles, con- 
cepts, or criteria being applied to the design of this equip- 
ment with respect to maintenance. 
3. Reduced task completion times and fewer mainte- 
nance problems were reported for the 10 most frequently 
performed maintenance tasks on older and smaller ma- 
chines than for newer more complex equipment. This ap- 
pears to be the result of simpler design on the older 
equipment. 
4. Increased task complexity and completion times 
were generally reported for the newer, larger mining ma- 
chines. This appears to be the result of increased design 
complexity, larger and heavier components to be handled, 
overlaying of safety and environmental control systems 
over the basic machine design, and inadequate accessibility 
to components. 
5. For certain machines, heavy maintenance tasks could 
be performed on the surface or in high roof underground 
shops equipped with requisite lifting devices. The same 
maintenance tasks were extremely difficult, time con- 
suming, and risky to perform at the mine face, where they 
often have to be completed. 
6. With the exception of machines produced by 1 small 
mining equipment manufacturer, maintenance task com- 
pletion times for the 10 most frequently performed main- 
tenance tasks could be reduced from 10% to 30% or more 
with relatively simple design improvements. 
7. Application of accepted human engineering design 
standards and criteria could substantially reduce mainte- 
nance risk. Over one-third of the reviewed maintenance 
lost-time injuries were traceab!e to equipment design de- 
ficiencies. Estimates of actual maintenance risk reduction 
resulting from redesign of the equipment could not be de- 
rived from the data. 
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APPENDIX.-MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST 
This appendix presents an example maintainability de- 
sign checklist for coal mining equipment. The purpose of 
the checklist is to provide a summary of design review 
points for the maintainability assessment of new or existing 
underground equipment. It specifically focuses on the 
identification of equipment design features, tasks, or pro- 
cedures that impact equipment down time, repair costs, la- 
bor hours, and maintainer skill level requirements. 
Some of the checklist points are general in nature. The 
checklist was designed to be used across all categories of 
underground equipment. The intent is to draw attention 
to design features and maintenance procedures that will 
increase maintainability requirements. The reader is en- 
couraged to adapt this checklist to site-specific or machine- 
specific requirements by- 
1. Inserting specific performance criteria for various 
categories of maintenance tasks. For example, all hydrau- 
lic lines on a shuttle car should be replaceable in 15 or 
25 min. 
2. Adding or deleting checklist items for different cat- 
egories of equipment. Environmental control equipment, 
for example, would be included on face equipmen1 and not 
on shuttle cars or mantrips. 
3. Adding additional checklist items based on site or 
equipment specific maintenance histories or experience, 
company maintenance standards, or other factors. 
Guidance on how to develop local maintenance stand- 
ards is provided in the USBM final report "Maintainability 
Design of Underground Mining Equipment" (1). Several 
definitions are provided to clarify items in the actual 
checklist. These include- 
I. Primary maintenance zone: The zone or area 
from the side or the end of a mining machine inward 45 
cm (18 in). 
2. Secondary maintenance zone: The area from a 
point 45 cm (18 in) from the side or end of the machine 
to a point 45 cm (18 in) from the opposite side or end of 
the machine. 
3. Tertiary maintenance point: A maintenance point 
outside the primary and secondary maintenance zone. An 
example would be a lubrication point on the end of a con- 
veyer boom. 
4. Immediately accessible: A component that can be 
reached, removed or repaired without having to open ac- 
cess covers, remove other components, or disassemble 
other components. 
5. Maintenance point: Any point on the machine 
where- 
a. Two components are joined, or 
b. A component is mounted on the machine 
chassis, or 
c. Where hoses, cables, and lines are attached to a 
component. 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
GENERAL MAINTENANCE REDUCTION 
Hydraulic hoses, electrical cables, and water hoses are securely attached along their length to protect 
against abrasive wear, pinching, or other damage. 
All cables and hoses are protected to minimize exposure to impact or fall of roof damage. 
Power feed cables enter the machine or the cable reel from the side to minimize exposure to vehicle 
wheels or tracks. 
All components, systems, and devices are located where they are protected from fall of roof damage. 
All exterior mounted machine features and components are protected from impact, scraping, or 
collision damage. 
Operator controls and displays are protected from impact, fall of roof damage, or inadvertent 
activation. 
Components subject to wear are designed for self-adjustment where possible. 
Where self-adjustment is not practical, the design provides components that can be manually adjusted 
for wear to minimize the need to tear down. 
Design provides for a self-lubricating system for all bearings, joints, and other wear points on the 
machine. 
Design provides for bearings and seals with wear or failure monitoring capability to permit 
scheduling of maintenance prior to actual component failure or component damage. 
Design provides hour meters (e.g., on conveyer circuits), volt meters and ammeters (e.g., on electric 
drive motors) to assist in wear assessment and maintenance management. 
Design provides for gears, bearing, hydraulic cylinders, and other impact or load-absorbing 
components of sufficient size or rating to handle peak impact loads. 
Design provides for adequate derating for bearings, motors, and hydraulic systems to minimize 
overload related failures. 
Vehicle frame is adequately designed to prevent cracking or other fatigue-induced failures at: 
Hydraulic cylinder attachment points. 




MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
GENERAL MAINTENANCE REDUCTION (Cont.) 
Other frame load-bearing points. 
b Welded seams. 
Provides for shock and vibration isolation of critical components. 
Interlocks are provided to prevent vehicle from being trammed or moved with components deployed 
or extended that are easily damaged: 
Stab jacks. 
b Drill booms. 
b Tail booms. 
b Automated temporary roof support (ATRS) components. 
b Cutting heads. 
b Canopies. 
Protective covers are over all body cavities containing components, hoses, lines, or maintenance 
points to prevent buildup of muck and debris. 
Expanded metal grating is used for floors or other designs to prevent accumulation of water, mud, 
and other materials in equipment bays, crevices, and body cavities. 
Rubber tires are protected by fenders, bumpers, or guards from collision and rib impact. 
Mechanical linkage systems are protected from impact and fall of roof. 
Roof bolter geometry is designed to prevent overelevation damage to boom lift mechanism. 
Disc and drum-type brake systems and components are protected from coal dust, rock, and other 
debris to minimize wear and damage. 
Mounting holes and brackets are designed to permit installation of functionally similar parts 
produced by different manufacturers. 
ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM DESIGN ADEQUATE 
FEATURES 
YES NO 
Required safety equipment is properly installed and protected, but easily accessed for repair: 
. MSHA-required lighting. 
. Fire suppression system. 
. Panic bars. 
. Methane detectors. 
Dust control equipment is located for easy inspection and servicing: 
. Dust bins and filters are easily accessed, opened, and serviced. 
. Water spray nozzles are easily accessed for adjustment or replacement. 
. Fan motors are readily accessed for repair or replacement. 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN STANDARDIZATION FEATURES 
Design provides for standardization of the following items throughout the machine: 
. All mechanical components. 
. Hydraulic connectors, valves, hoses. 
Electrical components and connectors. 
. Water hoses and connectors. 
. Fasteners and other attachment devices. 
. Bolts, nuts, and fasteners. 
ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
ADEQUATE 
DESIGN FEATURES FOR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 
YES NO 
Routine service points are clustered in one or two service locations in the primary maintenance zone 
including: 
Lube points. 
. Hydraulic reservoir tank fill points. 
. Hydraulic filters. 
Environmental system filters. 
Fuel tanks on diesel-powered equipment. 
. Belt or chain adjustments. 
Line bleed valves. 
Fluid-level indicators are provided on fluid reservoirs and in the primary maintenance zone for ease 
of inspection. 
Routine inspection points are all clearly visible and labeled including: 
. Relief valves. 
. Drain plugs. 
Wear points. 
. Hydraulic line connections. 
. Personnel safety equipment. 
Test points for stand-alone or built-in test equipment are located in the primary maintenance zone. 
All mechanical adjustment points are located in primary maintenance zones. 
Quick connect type couplers are installed on frequently changed hydraulic lines, water hoses, and 
cables. 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FEATURES FOR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 
(Cont.) 
Quick-release fasteners are used on doors or covers for routine inspection points. 
Only one type of hydraulic fluid is used on the machine. 
Oil seals are easy replaceable types. 
Design reduces to a minimum the number of spare parts and components required to support 
maintenance: 
. Common hoses. 
. Connectors. 
. Valves. 
. Drive belts, chain, etc. 
. Cables. 
. Nuts and bolts. 
. Washers. 
Routine service points are not located behind other components or structural members, in enclosed 
spaces. or in the secondary maintenance zone (e.g., more than 46 cm (1 8 in) from the side or the end 
of the machine). 
ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FEATURES FOR TROUBLESHOOTING 
General design and layout provides for rapid and positive identification of component malfunction: 
. Fluid leaks. 
. Pressure loss. 
. Shorts. 
General layout facilitates visual inspection of major components, connections, couplers, interfaces, 
and potential damage points. 
Hydraulic, electrical, and mechanical system schematics permanently affixed to machine to facilitate 
troubleshooting. 
Hydraulic, electrical, and other systems can be easily traced throughout the machine. 
The following pertinent information is immediately available to the maintainer: 
. Component or system identification. 
. Proper direction of motion or fluid flow. 
. Proper adjustment, pressure level, or setting. 
. Correct fluids. 
Amperage and other electrical information. 
Self-checking features are designed into critical components or systems where possible: 
. Major hydraulic systems. 
. Cooling systems. 
. Electrical circuits. 
All mechanical interfaces are visible froni the sides or end of the machine. 
ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FEATURES FOR TROUBLESHOOTING (Cont.) ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
Manual test points are located in the primary maintenance zone for all critical systems or subsystems. 
Test points are designed to eliminate or minimize the need to remove components for testing. 
Locate test points in one or two locations where practical or in a single test panel. 
Test points are coded or labeled to identify recommended or acceptable pressure, temperature, or 
voltage ranges. 
Test points are labeled and are located close to the control or display they are associated with. 
Built-in test capability andlor test equipment provided to monitor wear on critical bearings or other 
wear points such as: 
. Continuous miner cutterhead. 
. Gathering arms. 
. Articulation bearings on scoops. 
. Hydraulic pumps. 
Test set instructions for built-in test equipment (BITE) are attached to the machine at the point of 
service. 
Automatic test equipment (ATE) sensors are provided that operate without disturbing or loading the 
system under test. 
Fail-safe design for all ATE where failure of test equipment will not cause failure of the mining 
machine. 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FEATURES FOR REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
Provisions are made for adequate towing or movement of disabled machine to maintenance area: 
Tow cable attachment points. 
t Designated push points. 
. Tow bar attachment points. 
Design features are incorporated to facilitate jacking, hoisting, or lifting of machine to expedite 
maintenance and repair: 
- 
. Designated jack points with jack plates designed to prevent jack slippage. 
Attachment points for overhead lifting devices. 
Design features are incorporated to facilitate lifting, hoisting, or manipulating heavy components and 
machine features: 
. Built-in attachment hooks. 
. Lift bolt attachment points. 
Lifting guides or pins. 
Provisioris for forklift arms. 
. Built in swing boom arm. 
. Designat~A lift points. 
All areas of the machine are designed to be self-cleaning and designed to eliminate (minimize) the 
accumulation of rock, coal, mud, and water. 
All components are labeled to positiS:ely identify part number-type, component ratings, types of 
lubricant-fuel required, direction of flow, and orher pertinent information. 
All components and interfaces are designed to be installed only one way - the correct way. 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FEATURES FOR REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT 
(Cont.) 
Design eliminates the need for special tools or jigs to perform required maintenance. 
All major parts used are readily available from local suppliers or vendors. 
All mounting bolts are directly accessible and unobstructed to permit use of required hand tools 
without having to remove or disassemble adjoining components. 
ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
VISUAL INSPECTIONS AND ACCESSIBILITY 
All maintenance points should be visually accessible from the side or the end of the machine and 
should provide line-of-sight inspection capability. 
Design provides for clear and rapid visual identification of parts that may have to be replaced or 
repaired. 
Approved glass covers should be installed in all access opening covers if routine visual inspection of 
maintenance points are required. 
Access openings should be large enough to permit visual contact with the component being worked 
on while the work is being performed. 
Visual access openings should not be located on the top of machines unless the average roof height 
I 
above the top of the machine is 61 cm (24 in) or more. 
Visual access openings should never be located under the main chassis of the machine or behind 
other components that may restrict visibility. 
For less frequently performed maintenance tasks, the maintenance point may be located behind a 
protective cover. The component, however, should be directly visible when the pro:ective cover is 
removed. 
Maintenance and service points should be located no further than 91 cm (36 in) from the 




MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FOR PHYSICAL ACCESSIBILITY ADEQUATE 1-1 
- - - - -  
All components are accessible from the side or the end of the machine. 
All drain valves for compressor tanks, reservoirs, and sumps are accessible from the slde or end of 
the machine. 
All other maintenance points are accessible from the sides or ends of the machine. I I 
A11 components that require repair, replacement, or adjustment every 2,000 h or less should be 
directly accessible (can be removed-replaced without having to remove other components) from the 
sides or ends of the machine. 
For components that must be disassembled to be repaired or inspected (e.g., bearings), no more than 
four R/R task steps (e.g., remove par? A, remove part B, etc.) should be required to access the 
targeted part. 
i 
For components with an expected service life of over 2,000 h, only one other component should 
have to be removed to access for removal or replacement (RIR). 
All components weighing more than 23 kg (50 Ib) or more should be removed frorri the side or the 
end of the machine and should not have to be lifted up and over the machine frame or other 
componen ts. 
I 
Hinged or quick-release access opening covers should be used where practical with the hinges on the 
side or bottom so that door will remain open during maintenance. I 
A minimum number of bolts or fasteners should be used on access covers, equipment bay doors, or 
other pr0tective:shielding. 
I For components weighing more than 45 kg (100 Ib), access openings and workspace should be sufficient tc  permit the attachment of hoisting or lifting devices. I 
Access openings should be sufficiently large to permit removal and replacement of all components 
contained in that area. 
Screws, nuts, and bolts should be located to permit use of requisite hand tools to remove or replace 
them. 
Nonhinged access opening covers weighing more than 23 kg (50 Ib) are designed with built-in 
handles or lifting device attachment points. 
1 
I All components can be removed and replaced in a straight line from their place of attachment. (Components do not have to be maneuvered around or over structural features or components.) 
- - 
Design provisions are made to support components weigh~ng over 23 kg (50 lb) while they are being 
unbolted or bolted into place. 
i - 
1 MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MAINTENANCE DESIGN 
Fluid reservoirs have adequate storage capacity to ensure uninterrupted operation between shifts. 
Dual in-tank or stand-alone filters are installed on each fluid system to minimize component and 
control valve wear. 
Hydraulic system filters are located in the primary maintenance zone and use permanent or cartridge- 
type filters. 
Hydraulic meters and gauges are located in the primary maintenance zone. 
Quick-disconnect-type hydraulic line connectors are used where practical. 
Hydraulic systems are designed to be fail safe with the system or components reverting to a safe or 
neutral position in event of loss of power. 
Hydraulic circuits are permanently labeled to identify circuit, direction of fluid flow, recommended 
pressure settings, and high- and low-pressure lines. 
All hydraulic valves are labeled to positively identify the system-subsystem operated by that valve; 
the label should not be on the valve itself. 
Design uses seals that are visible after installation to ensure that they are not inadvertently left out 
during maintenance. 
Design uses armor-coated flex hoses where hoses are subject to abrasive wear or impact damage. 
Design provides for automatic bleeding of major hydraulic system(s). 
Physically incompatible connectors are specified where there is a danger or mismating connectors 
from adjoining systems. 
Design provides metal shielding to protect electrical and other sensitive equipment in the event of 
hydraulic fluid leak. 
Design prevents the accumulation of hydraulic fluids in the event of leaks or hose breaks. 
Design provides for hydraulic system drains at the lowest physical level in the system. 





MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
MECHANICAL SYSTEM MAINTENANCE DESIGN 
Design provides for minimum manual adjustment of all mechanical systems, except to correct for 
wear. 
Self-adjustment designs are incorporated where practical. 
Adjustments that cannot be designed out should: 
Be completed without the requirement to disassemble the unit. 
Be reduced to the minimum number of steps possible to complete. 
Not require removal or replacement (RR)  of other components to complete. 
c Be incorporated into other required maintenance on the same component. 
Incorporate range limits to prevent over-adjustment damage. 
Design precludes the need for special tools or hardware to install, adjust, or align mechanical 
components. 
Components and mechanical interfaces are designed with the minimum number or pivots, bearing 
surfaces, and other moving part wear points to minimize maintenance requirements. 
Mechanical system locks or locking devices are incorporated wherever mechanical locking is 
required for maintenance. 
Design avoids the use of through bolts for installation or assembly where the nuts are not accessible 
to the maintainer. 
Design locates high-failure-rate components outboard in the primary maintenance zone. 
Design provides for coverings or boots for exposed connectors, universal joints, and other 
interacting mechanical parts to protect them from mud, coal dust, and other debris. 
ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM MAINTENANCE DESIGN ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
Design provides overload or other electrical protective devices for all major electrical circuits, each 
of which is equipped with a "kickout" indicator light for easy troubleshooting on: 
Drive, conveyor, cutterhead, and gathering arm motors. 
Lighting. 
r Electric power takeoffs. 
Design routes all electrical cables on machine to avoid damage from abrasion, pinching, or cutting. 
All electrical cabling is routed to permit easy removal and replacement. Cabling is not routed under 
machine chassis, in the center of boom arms, or in other difficult-to-access locations. 
Electrical connectors are isolated from hydraulic fluid leaks, fuels, water, and other liquids. 
Quick-disconnect-type electrical connectors are used where possible. 
All electrical equipment cabinets are equipped with interlock that terminates power to the unit when 
the access cover is removed. 
A manual override is provided for all cabinets equipped with shutoff interlock. 
Breakers and other overload protective devices are in a central location in the primary maintenance 
zone. 
Electrical connector pin patterns are coded to permit connecting cables only to the appropriate 
receptacle. 
Uses electrical plugs in which the alignment pins extend beyond the electrical pins. 
Design makes receptacles "hot" or "cold." 
Uses contact pins no larger than 30 cm (12 in) to resist being bent upon insertion and withdrawal of 
the connector. 
Design uses right-angle plugs to avoid sharp bends in the electrical cable. 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
Personnel protective equipment is designed and located to facilitate inspection, repair, and 
replacement of the following systems: 
t Dust control. 
Methane monitoring. 
Operator protective canopy (as required). 
Operator panic bars. 
Emergency power cutoff devices. 
.................... 
MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
DESIGN FOR MECHANICAL SAFETY 
Protective guards are provided on or around all moving mechanical parts adjoining to where 
maintenance personnel will be working. 
Mechanical lockout devices are provided where maintenance must be performed at location that 
exposes maintainer to moving components (e.g., under a cutterhead). 
Design prevents components from slipping or falling as they are being unbolted for repair or 
replacement. 
Mechanical components are located to prevent maintainer from being exposed to energized 
equipment, hazardous fumes, hot surfaces, or other hazards during repair operations. 
Mechanical components that require the use of heavy springs are designed so that the springs cannot 
inadvertently dislodge, causing damage or personnel injury. 
Design provides for warning plates where mechanical assemblies, linkages, or components are under 
high strain or loading. 
Design routes hot exhaust pipes away from locations where routine maintenance will be performed. 





MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CHECKLIST FOR UNDERGROUND COAL 
MINING EQUIPMENT 
STORAGE BATTERY MAINTENANCE ADEQUATE 
YES NO 
I Design isolates routine machine maintenance paints from battery fumes. I 1 
Design prevents leaking battery acid from accumulating in equipment compartments or operator 
station. 
I 
Batteries are installed in a location that permits use of overhead lifting device to remove or replace 
them. 
INEXPENSIVE, EASY TO CONSTRUCT MATERIALS-HANDLING 
DEVICES FOR UNDERGROUND MINES 
By Richard L. ungerl and Kirk conwayz 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBhI) has developed and site. The six devices include scoop-mounted lift boom, 
tested designs for six materials-handling devices for use in swing-arm boom, heavy component lift-transport, mine 
underground mines to redilce materials-handling injuries. mud cart, container-work station cart, and timber car. 
Particular attention was focused on making the designs This paper presents a brief discussion of that work and 
practical, low cost, and easily fabricated to be broadly the six devices. It is intended for mine operators who wish 
applicable in underground operations. Where possible, the to make use of the design concepts to manufacture similar 
designs were simplified so that off-the-shelf components devices for use in their mines. 
could be used to permit fabrication by mine personnel on 
Manual materials handling represents a critical and per- evaluation. Complete plans for the devices are available 
sistent source of personnel injuries in undcrground coal in USBM Information Circular (IC) 9212.3 
mining operations. On an annual basis, such injuries 3~onway,  E. J., and R. L. Unger. Material Handling Devices for Un- 
represent the largest category of nonfatal, lost-time in- derground Mines. BuMines IC 9212, 1989, 48 pp. 
juries, accounting for 35% of all lost-time injuries in 1983 
and 1984, according to an analysis of U.S. Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) data. Approximately 26% 
of all injuries related to manual materials handling are 
associated with the performance of mine maintenance or 
equipment maintenance tasks (fig. 1). 
In the mid-19809s, as part of its program to im- 
prove health and safety conditions in mines, the 
USBM conducted a research program that addressed the 
materials-handling problems of mine maintenance and 
equipment maintenance. During the course of the project, 
a detailed analysis of mine- and machine-related tasks was 
completed and sources of injuries were identified. Con- 
cepts for simple materials-handling devices that could 
replace manual handling were then developed and evalu- 
ated. Six of these devices were fabricated and delivered 
to operational underground coal mines for testing and 
'civil engineer, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Figure 1.-Most materials handling IS done manually in un- 
Pittsburgh, PA. derground coal mlnes, whlch Is part of the reason It is the leading 
2 ~ e n i o r  staff scientist, VRC Corp., Monterey, CA. cause of Injuries year after year. 
SUMMARY OF DESIGN RATIONALE 
The work described in USBM IC 9212 specifically ad- 
dressed materials-handling tasks related to mine mainte- 
nance and equipment maintenance performed in under- 
ground coal mines. Surface materials-handling tasks and 
the transporting of supplies or materials from the surface 
to the operating section were outside the scope of this 
effort. 
MINE AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 
Representative mine maintenance tasks included- 
1. Installation or removal of ventilation, electrical, 
communications, or compressed-air systems. 
2. Installation of timbers, cribbing, and other supple- 
mental materials used in roof or rib control. 
3 Track installation, repair, and retrieval. 
4. Rock dusting, installation of air-control screens, and 
electrical wiring installation of warning or other systems. 
Typical machine maintenance tasks falling within the scope 
of this project included- 
1. Removal or rcplacenlent of bclt drives, head, pumps, 
drive motors, and other major machine parts on stationary 
equipment. 
2. Assembly, installation, and repair to mine equip- 
ment, including mobile face equipment. 
3. Routine servicing of mining equipment. 
All underground coal mine seam heights were included 
in this study. However, emphasis was placed on midseam 
to lower seam coal mines (under 147-cm (58-in) seam 
height) because preliminary data suggested that the highest 
risks of manual materials-handling injuries were to be 
found in those seam heights. The study included a review 
of relevant materials-handling literature and past USBM 
programs, visits to six operating coal mines, and an 
extensive analysis of MSHA's accident database. 
The mine maintenance and equipment maintenance 
tasks investigated involved, by their very nature, the 
manual handling of supplies and equipment components. 
Individual modules of items handled might range in weight 
from a few to several thousand kilograms. Because of the 
operational constraints in underground coal mines, these 
materials and components often have to be manually 
moved from the supply dropoff point to the place where 
they will actually be used or installed. 
Components used in equipment maintenance are typ- 
ically hoisted onto a railroad car, scoop bucket, or main- 
tenance jeep on the surface. They are then transported to 
the section where the disabled machine is located. At that 
point, they are manually lifted off the rail car or jeep or 
ejected out of the scoop bucket and manually carried to 
the installation position. Occasionally, hoists or come- 
alongs are attached to roof bolts to aid in this process. 
Replaced components are then manually loaded into the 
transport vehicle for shipment to the surface. 
Mine maintenance materials (e.g., timbers, rock dust 
bags, roof bolts, etc.) are typically loaded in bales or via 
pailets onto railcars or into scoop buckets for shipment to 
or near the working section. At the end of the rail line, 
the bales or pallets are broken down for manual loading 
into scoops or onto other transport vehicles for delivery to 
work locations. (One mine visited had rubber-tire- 
equipped railcars that could be detached at the end of the 
rail line and towed by battery-powered vchicle to the work 
locations or section supply areas.) Once the materials are 
dumped near the work location, miners manually carry 
them to the maintcnance point for use. These mainte- 
nance personnel may lift materials weighing 23 to 226 kg 
(50 to 500 Ib) continually on a daily basis. They handle 
materials (sections of rail or steel arches) weighing 454 kg 
(1,000 lb) or more on a monthly or more frequent basis. 
Analyses of materials-handling injuries in the six mines 
visited indicated that- 
1. Thirty-nine percent of all mine maintenance and 
35% of all machine maintenance injuries involved the 
lower back. 
2. Forty-five percent of all mine and 39% of all ma- 
chine maintenance accidents were the result of overexer- 
tion. 
3. Sixty-eight percent of mine maintenance injuries 
involvcd handling timbers, posts, caps, and cribbing mate- 
rials, while 32% of the machine-related accidents involved 
handling metal machine components. 
MECHANIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
The desigil implications of these and other findings 
revealed during studies of materials-handling tasks related 
to mine and equipment maintenance can be summarized 
by the lollowing mechanization needs: 
I. Devices to lift or lower and rotate machine compo- 
nents weighing up to 1,361 kg (3,000 lb) for removal from 
and replacement on mining equipment. 
2. Devices to lift or lower components of up to 226 kg 
(500 Ib) in and out of scoops, off railcars, and on or off 
other mobile vehicles. 
3. Carts or other devices to transport small quantities 
of materials weighing up to 226 kg (500 Ib) from storage 
areas or railheads to working sections. 
4. A device to raise and support crossbeams for tem- 
porary roof support while permanent roof supports are 
installed. 
Six materials-handling devices were developed to fulfid 
these needs. Particular attention was focused on making 
the designs practical, low cost, and easily fabricated so 
as to be broadly applicable in underground operations. 
Where possible, the designs were simplified and off-the- 
shelf components used to permit fabrication of the devices 
by mine personnel on site. 
The devices discussed in this paper are not intended to 
be final designs. Rather, they are working prototypes that 
have been field evaluated and are presented herein in the 
hopes of stimulating other innovative designs on the part 
of mine personnel. 
The six devices include- 
1. Scoop-mounted lift boom. 
2. Swing-arm boom. 
3. Heavy component lift-transport. 
4. Mine mud car. 
5. Container-work station vehicle. 
6. Timber car. 
Functions performed by, and design specifications for, each 
of these devices are discussed in the following section. 
PROTOTYPE MATERIALS-HANDLING DEVICES 
SCOOP-MOUNTED LIFT BOOM To address these requirements, a lightweight, removable, 
storable lift boom was designed (figs. 4-5). This boom can 
One of the major identified needs was for a simple be installed at various locations on maintenance carts or 
boom device to lift and transport components weighing up on mining machines themselves. The height of the boom 
to 1,361 kg (3,000 Ib) in the underground environment. can be varied by quickly changing the boom leg. The 
The device had to be mounted on a powered mobile ma- inexpensive mounts can be permanently welded at vari- 
chine and installed and removed quickly to minimize ous locations on the machine frame and are designed to 
production down time for the machine. This tool would 
be used for transporting and maneuvering heavy machine 
components such as a continuous miner head. 
A quick-mount-dismount lift boom device was devel- 
oped for installation on the front of a small scoop with its 
bucket removed (figs. 2-3). 
The design features of the scoop-mounted lift boom 
include- 
1. A 1,361-kg (3,000-lb) lift capacity. 
2. Manual or powered lift capability. 
3. Installation and removal in 5 min or less. 
4. Ready storage in working section or on mobile 
machinery. 
Four attachment points secure the lift boom to the 
scoop lift mechanism by means of four pins. The pins 
correspond in size and location to the pins used to secure 
the scoop bucket. The overhead design of the lift boom 
permits lifting or lowering of components being handled. 
The bucket tilt mechanism provides up and down maneu- 
vering of the components, while the scoop's normal steer- 
ing permits lateral and forward and reverse maneuvering. 
SWING-ARM BOOM 
Accident and biomechanical analyses suggested the 
need for a simple swivel crane or boom device to lift com- 
ponents on and off transport vehicles and to assist in ma- Figure 2.-Testing rcoopmounted lift boom at Pittsburgh R a  
neuvering heavy machine components in confined spaces. search Center. 
Figure 3.--Scoop-mounted lift boom during surface tests. 
Flgure 5.--Crane Is easily mounted In Its removable base. 
Figure 4.--Machine-mounted swivel crane during underground 
tests. 
resist damage during normal machine operation. Two or 
more quick mounts can be installed on the same machine 
to permit access to all machine locations. 
Design features of the swing-arm boom include- 
1. Load capacity of 227 kg (500 lb). 
2. Boom height range from 61 to 173 cm (24 to 68 in), 
depending on leg length. 
3. Arm radius of 61 to 122 cm (24 to 48 in). 
4. Mounting and stowing without tools. 
5. Light weight for carrying by one person. 
HEAVY COMPONENT LIFT-TRANSPORT 
Another identified need was for a floor-type main- 
tenance jack that could be used to lift heavy machine 
components from the bottom, transport them over short 
distances, and lift them into position for installation. 
Saddles on the lift point could be designed to permit 
additional maneuvering of the component during actual 
installation. This type of device could be used, for 
example, to install drive motors under the nonremovable 
fenders in shuttle cars. 
The heavy component lift-transport prototype is shown 
in figures 6 and 7. The device utilizes a standard hydraulic 
floor jack to provide the lift mechanism. The jack head 
itself is tiltable and rotatable to permit close-in maneuver- 
ing. The jack mechanism travels along the device frame 
by means of a sump drive mechanism. This motion per- 
mits forward-backward movement of handled components 
and balancing of components over the lift-transport device 
wheels during travel. The long handle permits the use 
leverage by which to maneuver loads up and down or side- 
ways, as required. Dual tires or oversized balloon tires 
increase the device's stability and permit easy movement 
over uneven floors. 
MINE MUD CART 
One of the basic problems faced by all miners is that of 
moving machine components or supplies such as concrete 
blocks from the supply storage area to 'the point of use. 
If a powered vehicle is not available, the task must be ac- 
complished manually. The intent of this concept was to 
design a small, manually pulled cart that could transport 
up to 408 kg (900 Ib) of materials over a short distance. 
The mine mud cart has the following design features: 
1. Narrow width to permit passage by a parked mining 
machine. 
2. Tandem design to prevent tipover if one unit is 
loaded and the second is empty. 
Flgure 6 .4eavy component lift-transport durlng testing wlth 3. Balloon tires for transit through mud or water and 
680-kg (1,500-lb) concrete block. over mine floors. 
4. Handle designed for pulling by one or two people. 
Flgure 7.-llre-changlng attachment ellmlnates manual han- 
dllng of heavy wheels durlng replacement 
The design features of the heavy component lift- 
transport include- 
1. Up to 454-kg (1,000-lb) lift capacity. 
2. Balloon tires for ease of transporting manually. 
3. A standard automotive floor jack for the lift 
mechanism. 
4. Ability to lift and maneuver a heavy component as 
it is being removed or replaced on a mining machine. 
5. Jack head that can be trammed forward or back on 
the frame for close-in maneuvering or for load balancing. 
Figure 8 illustrates a tandem cart concept using eight 
wheels. The vehicle can also be fabricated as a single cart. 
CONTAINER-WORK STATION VEHICLE 
Hand tools and supplies required to perform most 
maintenance tasks in a section can be mounted on a trans- 
portable container. This concept is for a device that 
allows a single manually powered mechanism to lift and 
transport such containers (figs. 9-10). There are many 
uses for the containers themselves, such as tool station, 
lubrication module, rock dust unit, fire and safety equip- 
ment storage, repair work station, and cable-splicing 
module. 
To move the container around the working section, the 
transporter is positioned around the container and a lift 
mechanism raises it off the floor and positions the load 
sightly ahead of the axle. The load is carried by the 
wheels while the operator controls motion by pulling, 
steering, and balancing the unit on its axle. 
~ e s i g n  features of the container-work station include- 
1. Rapidly interchangeable containers that can be 
picked up or dropped off as required. 
2. Containers that can be used as secured storage units 
when dismounted from the vehicle. 
3. Up to 454-kg (1,000-lb) load capacity. 
4. Adjustable ground clearance. 
5. Balloon-type tires for easy transporting on unim- 
proved mine floor. 
6.  A tow bar that can be adapted for towing behind 
utility vehicles. 
TIMBER CAR 
One of the most hazardous materials-handling tasks in 
underground mining is that of installing crossbeams for 
roof support. A need was identified for a mechanism to 
lift beams weighing up to 227 kg (500 lb) to the roof, 
where they could be held in place until permanent sup- 
ports could be installed (figs. 11-12). The device shown in 
the figures utilizes a modifred hydraulic floor jack to pro- 
vide the lift. The jack mechanism is moved manually 
along a track down the center of the car. This forward- 
backward movement permits easy positioning of the load. 
In addition, the jack head rotates to ease positioning of 
extra-long members. 
Figure 8.4 ine mud caR 
Figure 11.-Timber car durlng underground tests at Pittsburgh 
Research Center's safety research coal mine. 
Figure S.-Contalner-work statlon vehicle. 
Flgure lO.-Contalner is easily removed from frame of vehicle. 
Containers with specialized functions may then be attached. 
Figure 12.4iners using tlmber car to raise 39-kg (85-lb) rail 
for roof support in an eastern Ohio coal mine. 
Design features of the timber car include- 
1. U p  to 227-kg (500-lb) lift capacity with a 152-cm 
(60-in) lift height (suitable for low- to medium-seam 
mines). 
2. Mounting on a low-profile flatcar, which serves dou- 
ble duty as a 36,287-kg (40-st) capacity supply car. 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
On-site visits, task analyses, and interviews suggest that 
the majority of the risk exposure associated with materials 
handling in underground coal mines results from the lack 
of properly designed and easily accessible materials- 
handling tools, devices, and vehicles. Mine personnel tra- 
ditionally rely on a "couple of extra hands" or on crowbars, 
come-dongs, and other makeshift tools to handle even the 
largest components of mining machinery. Similarly, due to 
the lack of appropriate tools, carts, and other handling 
devices, mine personnel manually move timbers, posts, 
beams, and other heavy materials on a continual basis. In 
most instances, tools are simply not available for these 
heavy lifting, transporting, and positioning tasks. 
These investigations also revealed that what is needed 
is not another complex, powered vehicle designed to per- 
form any and all maintenance jobs. Rather, what is re- 
quired is a series of simple, task-specific tools, aids, and 
devices to be housed and used in the working sections and 
maintenance areas. Mine personnel tend not to wait 30 to 
60 min while a special vehicle or tool is brought in from 
another area of the mine. The materials-handling hard- 
ware should be relatively easy to fabricate and should, 
where possible, utilize off-the-shelf components. The 
hardware should be relatively inexpensive and designed for 
fabrication in mine shops. The prototypes of six such 
devices that were developed and tested by the USBM are 
described in this paper. 
There appears to be a sincere interest on the part of 
mine management and safety and production personnel in 
reducing injuries related to materials handling. There is 
also a need for exposure to new ideas, products, and 
materials-handling mechanization concepts to assist mine 
personnel in identifying their own unique handling require- 
ments and developing appropriate mechanical solutions to 
these problems. The concepts presented here were de- 
signed to stimulate the development of other mechaniza- 
tion concepts to address mine-specific materials-handling 
problems. 
Three major recommendations are suggested with re- 
spect to development of materials-handling devices: 
1. Systems Approach to Materials Handling.-Many 
larger mines have developed so-called systems for moving 
huge quantities of supplies and materials from surface 
storage areas to in-mine drop points or supply depots. 
These systems, however, have many missing elements and 
3. A modified automotive floor jack for the lift mech- 
anism. 
4. Jack that can be maneuvered forward or back in its 
track for close-in maneuvering. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
built-in problems. For example, pallets are utilized to load 
quantities of 41-kg (90-lb) cement blocks or 45-kg (100-lb) 
bags of rock dust from the storage onto the supply train. 
Forklifts or hoists may be used to offload the pallets at the 
dropoff points. However, person~el  must manually load 
these supplies onto battery-powered vehicles or physically 
lug them to the point of use. This systems-approach think- 
ing has failed to account for the fact that the blocks still 
weigh 41 kg (90 lb) and the bags 45 kg (100 lb) apiece 
when they get into the mine. These loads are too heavy 
for personnel working in confined workspaces and on un- 
improved mine floors. If a systems approach is to be used, 
it should start with the end user or task and work back- 
ward from there. 
2. Task-Spec@ Tools.-As in any industry, the design 
of special tools to perform specific tasks is often over- 
looked. In underground mining, few if any tools or de- 
vices have been developed to cope with specific materials- 
handling tasks. Exposure to high-risk tasks could be sub- 
stantially reduced if appropriate task-specific tools were 
available. For example, the transporting of materials 
through a 91- by 91-cm (3- by 3-ft) door requires the 
miner to lift a 23- to 45-kg (50- to 100-lb) (or heavier) 
object, rotate his or her body, and heave the object 
through the door opening. Exposure to overexertion-type 
injuries is very high. If a simple slide. or materials 
conveyor was available, the miner could simply pass the 
material through the opening. Similar aids and mechanical 
tools are required for handling rail sections, timbers, posts, 
cribbing materials, etc. 
3. New Teclznologies. The search for new technologies 
is an ongoing process in any industry. In underground 
mining, however, it is even more important since so little 
completely new technology has been introduced to this 
sector. With respect to materials-handling, this search 
should focus on new, low-cost, reduced-weight materials 
for mine maintenance and safety applications. It should 
address improved designs and packaging for manual han- 
dling in operational environments. It should cover im- 
proved methods of installation and maintenance of the 
mine and the mining equipment. It should focus on ways 
of reducing mine maintenance (e.g., cleaning up along belt 
lines) and machine maintenance (e.g., autolubing systems). 
It should attempt to replace muscle power (particularly 
back muscles) with mechanical or hydraulic power. 
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